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Abstract 
Hydropower reservoirs can provide a range of energy and water services. Proponents of 
multipurpose reservoirs as a climate change and water security ‘solution’ often neglect an 
important detail: the technical capacity for infrastructure to provide water services and social 
benefits is a necessary but not sufficient condition for their actual provision. Multipurpose 
operations constrain electricity generation and hydropower companies’ revenues. The opportunity 
costs of providing non-energy services are changing under the global transition to renewable 
energy systems. The value of water services shifts as water demand and supply change under short-
term shocks, such as extreme weather events, and long-term trends, such as climate change and 
population growth. Under dynamic risks and trade-offs, profit-motivated hydropower companies 
do not have the discretion nor information to efficiently and equitably provide water services. The 
potential social benefits of multipurpose hydropower operations are not automatic; they need to be 
secured through flexible regulation and economic incentives. This thesis considers the governance 
of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs and the dynamic trade-offs between the profits of 
hydropower companies and the welfare of water users. First, I review existing hydropower 
governance instruments to propose three reforms: (1) period relicensing of reservoir operations, 
(2) pricing water services to reflect the value of foregone hydroelectricity generation, and (3) 
climate/green performance bonds with a conditional interest rate. Second, I consider how 
economic and institutional analyses could be incorporated into the governance of water systems 
under complex risks.  Insights are drawn from a participatory risk assessment process in Vietnam 
where local government officials are piloting irrigation water pricing reforms. Third, I use hydro-
economic modelling of a multipurpose reservoir in Tasmania, Australia to examine the conditions 
under which irrigation water pricing could be an appropriate reform in other locations. Finally, I 
consider a major practical barrier to pricing water services from hydropower reservoirs: the 
transmission of price spikes in electricity markets to water prices. I estimate the cost of price 
stability controls by modelling an alternative water tariff which incorporates the intertemporal 
opportunity costs of irrigation water extractions. I conclude by outlining future research on 
regulating hydropower reservoirs to support the resilience of social-ecological systems to water 
insecurity.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Growing awareness of the negative environmental and social impacts from large dams led to a 
global slowdown in new hydropower projects between 1998 and 2005 (WEC 2015a). This 
stagnation was temporary: the present-day construction boom is projected to increase global 
hydropower generation capacity by 53% between 2016 and 2040 (IEA 2018). Overall, an 
estimated 847 large hydropower projects (with generation capacity > 100MW) are either planned 
or under construction (Zarfl et al. 2015). Climate change and energy policy are driving this 
resurgence: key decision-makers perceive the flexible generation and storage of renewable energy 
by hydropower projects as central to: (i) improving energy access and supporting economic 
development in poor and emerging economies, and (ii) decarbonizing the world’s energy systems 
and economies (DOE 2016; IEA 2012; Rex et al. 2014). The shifting perceptions of large-scale 
hydropower were illustrated by a senior World Bank official: 
“Large hydro is a very big part of the solution for Africa and South Asia and 
Southeast Asia… I fundamentally believe we have to be involved,” said Rachel 
Kyte, the bank’s vice president for sustainable development and an influential voice 
among (former World Bank president Jim Yong) Kim’s top staff members. The 
earlier move out of hydro “was the wrong message…. That was then. This is now. 
We are back.” 
       (Schneider 2013) 
Central to the (rediscovered) legitimacy of hydropower are the potential co-benefits for water 
governance (e.g. Branche 2015; IFC/TNC 2017; Opperman et al. 2017). Reservoirs often serve 
multiple purposes and hydropower reservoirs can provide a range of valuable water-based services 
beyond electricity generation (Bonnet et al. 2015; IEA Hydropower Agreement 2017). Hence, new 
and existing hydropower reservoirs could support the resilience of agricultural, urban, and 
industrial water systems to risks. For example, maintaining water security under severe droughts 
or protecting downstream populations from flooding. However, the realisation of these anticipated 
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benefits will depend on the reservoir operation decisions that hydropower companies make within 
the boundaries provided by regulation.  
Water services provision constrains the decision space and, frequently, the revenues of profit-
motivated hydropower companies (Zeng et al. 2017). Water licenses, reservoir and flow 
constraints, and other conventional approaches to regulating water services are typically static. 
Yet, the trade-offs between hydropower companies’ profits and water users’ welfare are dynamic. 
The values of water and energy services shift under variable electricity prices, energy policy 
reforms, and changing weather, climate, and water demand. Further, the benefits of water and 
energy services are not just private: energy access, flood control, and urban water security generate 
a range of positive externalities. For multipurpose hydropower reservoirs, a balance has to be 
struck between energy and water services provision, but it is not obvious what that balance should 
be at any one point in time nor, from a regulatory perspective, how to achieve it. Should operating 
constraints be loosened to enable increased hydroelectricity generation during an energy crisis? 
Should hydropower operators consistently maintain buffer storage in case of a major urban water 
crisis? When are the public and/or private benefits of one service outweighed by another? How 
can water be reallocated across different services to meet social objectives? These are just some 
of the many regulatory challenges that need to be addressed for multipurpose hydropower 
reservoirs to sustainably provide water services under the risks and uncertainty associated with 
climate change and the renewable energy transition. 
There are four key implications of the dynamic trade-offs between hydropower companies and the 
beneficiaries of water services from multipurpose reservoirs. First, multipurpose operations need 
to be secured through flexible regulation. In other words, the social benefits of additional water 
services from hydropower reservoirs won’t materialise just because they can; governance reforms 
will be required. Second, trade-offs need to be understood to inform decisions on how water should 
be reallocated. Hence, the economic costs and benefits of alternative water allocation regimes need 
to be estimated. Third, dynamic risks demand dynamic risk management. Decision-making on how 
to invest in and regulate multipurpose hydropower reservoirs will require tools that accommodate 
random variables, such as water supply and electricity prices, and, importantly, the feedback 
effects that occur when trying to regulate a complex system (see Page 2015). Finally, neither 
quantitative nor qualitative analysis alone would be sufficient to identify, test, and implement the 
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reforms needed to realise the potential water security benefits of the current hydropower boom. A 
hydro-economic model can usefully provide insights on key linkages between hydropower system 
components, but it cannot explain the origins of stakeholders’ preferences and values. Equally, 
competing stakeholder perceptions of the value of different water or energy services do not provide 
the foundation for trade-off determination that is offered by economic valuation methods. 
Economic analysis has long been a feature of water resources management and governance. The 
practice of cost-benefit analysis emerged from the water development projects of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers in the 1950s (Pearce 1983). The field of water resources systems analysis 
began in the 1960s through interdisciplinary analysis of multi-objective water infrastructure 
investments across economics, engineering, political science, and hydrology (Brown et al. 2015). 
Today, there is an abundance of water systems analysis that develops and applies new modelling 
approaches and decision support tools for water planning problems (see Brown et al. 2015; 
Castelletti et al. 2008; and Harou et al. 2009 for reviews). A large subfield of this work has 
estimated the economic costs and benefits of alternative approaches to hydropower governance 
and reservoir regulation (e.g. Edwards et al. 1999; Foster et al. 2015; Guisández et al. 2013; 
Harpman 1999; Kern et al. 2017; Kotchen et al. 2006; Maas et al. 2017; Tilmant et al. 2009). In 
an increasingly complex world, however, this quantitative modelling constitutes just one step, 
albeit a very valuable one, in the process of integrating applied research into decision-making.  
Water resources and their governance increasingly provide linkages for the transmission of risks 
and uncertainty across interconnected social, ecological, and economic systems. The probabilities 
of future variables are more uncertain and the impacts of decisions more difficult to estimate. In 
this context, water resources modellers need to consider the social impacts of planning decisions 
(Loucks 2017), and engage with decision-making processes in a structured way. Complex water 
governance problems need to be addressed through multi-stakeholder participatory processes 
(Grafton 2017). Participatory water modelling is increasingly used by engineers, earth scientists, 
and interdisciplinary researchers to support water governance (e.g. Daniell 2012; Döll & Romero-
Lankao 2017; von Korff et al. 2012), but there is a large gap between the economic theory and 
modelling of water resources regulation and real-world decision-making; the prevalence of sub-
optimal water tariffs is a prominent global example (see Grafton et al. 2014; Johansson et al. 2002; 
Young & Whittington 2016). Bridging this gap between theory and practice can be achieved by 
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connecting technical hydro-economic modelling with qualitative institutional analysis and 
participatory processes that enable decisions-makers to utilise research results.  
This thesis argues that governance reforms are required for hydropower reservoirs to sustainably 
provide water services under future risks. In addition to outlining the case for reforms, I analyse 
the design of a particular reform and demonstrate how, in practice, that analysis could be integrated 
into water governance. The research methods encompass quantitative modelling, qualitative 
analysis, and participatory approaches; fundamentally, the thesis is an interdisciplinary study with 
an applied economics foundation. First, I show that flexible regulation is required to manage 
dynamic trade-offs between hydropower companies’ profits and water users’ welfare; to this end, 
I propose three potential reforms that could complement conventional governance instruments. I 
then provide insights from an applied research project on managing complex water risks in 
Vietnam to demonstrate how the economic modelling and institutional analysis in the thesis could 
be incorporated into hydropower reforms. I proceed by examine one of the proposed hydropower 
reforms in detail: pricing of irrigation water services to reflect foregone electricity generation. I 
develop a hydro-economic model of multipurpose hydropower operations and governance to 
examine the conditions under which pricing regulates irrigation water provision more efficiently 
than a fixed quota under water security and energy market risks. Finally, I adapt the hydro-
economic model to evaluate alternative water tariff designs under an electricity supply obligation 
and estimate the cost of price stability controls.  
The thesis examines four primary research questions corresponding to the four core Chapters that 
are summarised in detail further below: 
a) What hydropower governance reforms could enable multipurpose operations under risks? 
(Chapter 2) 
b) How can applied research on water governance reforms be integrated into real-world 
decision-making? (Chapter 3) 
c) When does water pricing allocate water more efficiently than fixed irrigation quotas 
under risks? (Chapter 4) 
d) What is the optimal design of irrigation water tariffs for hydropower governance in the 
presence of an electricity supply obligation and electricity price spikes? (Chapter 5) 
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Chapter 2 reviews hydropower governance in order to identify and outline governance reforms 
that enable the delivery of multipurpose operations. This Chapter shows that conventional 
regulatory instruments are under-equipped to manage the risks emerging from water and energy 
systems. These risks are creating: (i) dynamic shifts in the benefits provided by energy and water 
services, and (ii) dynamic trade-offs between hydropower profits and water users’ welfare. I define 
a conceptual approach to the resilience of multipurpose reservoir systems to show that 
‘hydropower resilience’ requires dynamic water reallocation. I propose and evaluate three 
potential reforms that could support efficient and equitable provision of water services by profit-
motivated operators of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs: (i) periodic relicensing, (ii) water 
pricing, and (iii) climate/green performance bonds.  
Chapter 3 demonstrates how the quantitative modelling and institutional analysis in the thesis can 
be integrated into real-world decision-making. This Chapter presents a causal approach to the 
participatory assessment and management of risks to complex food-energy-environment-water 
systems. I show how this approach was piloted in an applied research project working with local 
government officials in Lam Dong Province, Vietnam. I describe the water governance context, 
including the proposed reforms to irrigation water pricing. I draw on the results of that project to 
provide general insights on how researchers can facilitate water governance reforms.  
Chapter 4 examines the efficiency of using either irrigation water pricing or fixed irrigation quotas 
to allocate multipurpose reservoir storage under risks. Specifically, I seek to better understand the 
conditions under which regulators may consider adopting water pricing to increase the total 
benefits of reservoir operation across hydropower and irrigation. Or, on the other hand, I seek to 
identify when water pricing does not provide relative efficiency gains compared to the guaranteed 
provision of a fixed volume of water to irrigators. I use stochastic dynamic programming to solve 
a model of a multipurpose hydropower reservoir where there are stochastic shifts in both the 
marginal cost and marginal benefit of irrigation water. I extend this basic model to analyse risks 
across water supply, water demand, electricity prices, and energy policy. I find that the total 
benefits of reservoir operations are consistently higher under water pricing. In particular, pricing 
is a superior instrument for allocating water between energy and water services under shifting 
water demand, water scarcity, and policy-driven level shifts in hydroelectricity revenues. 
However, fixed quotas may be sufficient where they: (i) provide a central estimate of the variable 
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demand for and opportunity cost of water services provision, or (ii) can be updated to reflect the 
dynamic values of water and energy services. 
Chapter 5 estimates the costs of prioritising price stability in  the design of water tariffs for 
irrigation extractions from multipurpose hydropower reservoirs. I adapt the hydro-economic 
model developed in Chapter 3 to compare outcomes from: (i) a price stability tariff wherein the 
volumetric price is averaged over several periods and there is a fixed water scarcity premium; and 
(ii) a dynamic tariff structure that estimates the marginal user cost of water extraction and includes 
a water scarcity premium that is contingent on expected storage levels. In order to develop the 
price stability and marginal user cost tariffs, I draw on current and previous iterations of the tariff 
structure used in one of the first real-world applications of water pricing to the governance of 
multipurpose hydropower reservoirs (see Hydro Tasmania 2015, 2017a, 2018). I simulate the 
application of these tariff structures to water allocation and estimate the relative costs of deploying 
price stability controls across: (i) foregone hydropower profits, (ii) foregone hydroelectricity 
generation, (iii) additional electricity purchases by the hydropower company (to meet an electricity 
supply obligation), and (iv) the reduced efficiency of water allocation (i.e. the reduced total net 
benefits of water use). I estimate these costs and compare them to the benefits from the indirect 
subsidy of irrigation water provision by price stability controls. A methodological contribution of 
this Chapter is a heuristic for incorporating the intertemporal opportunity costs of water provision 
into water tariff design.  
Chapter 6 concludes with: (i) a summary of the main findings and the primary contributions of the 
thesis to the academic literature; (ii) the research and policy implications of the research; and (iii) 
an agenda for future work. 
Chapter 2 
 
Reforms for Resilience:                  
How to Make ‘Multipurpose Hydropower’ a Sustainable Outcome 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The contemporary hydropower boom is regularly framed as an era of sustainability wherein 
negative impacts can be minimised and benefits shared (e.g. ADB/MRC/WWF 2013; ICPDR 
2013; IEA 2012; IFC/TNC 2017; IHA 2017; MRC 2010; Rex et al. 2014; TNC 2014). Central to 
this outlook are the multiple services that hydropower projects can provide (e.g. Branche 2015) 
and the capacity for multipurpose reservoirs to make major contributions to global challenges 
across water security, energy access, and climate change (e.g. Grey & Sadoff 2007; IEA 2012; 
Muller et al. 2015; Tortajada 2014). Yet multipurpose hydropower reservoirs cannot generate 
‘win-win’ situations all the time. Supplying water for irrigation, controlling floods, and managing 
environmental impacts will often involve opportunity costs: foregone revenues from constraints 
on electricity generation and/or additional capital costs due to fish passages, multiple water outlets, 
higher dam walls, and other infrastructure modifications (Edwards et al. 1999; Harpman 1999; 
Jager & Bevelhimer 2007; Zeng et al. 2017). The capacity for hydropower operators to deliver 
water services does not equate to their actual provision. Acute trade-offs can emerge between 
hydropower profits and other water users’ welfare. Securing finance for multipurpose water 
infrastructure is challenging (Naughton et al. 2017). Despite growing calls for ‘hydropower 
resilience’ (e.g. Hellmuth et al. 2017; IHA/World Bank 2017; DOE 2016; World Energy Council 
2015b), there is limited consideration of the regulatory settings needed to ensure that hydropower 
companies’ resilience management decisions support the resilience of the broader social-
ecological system affected by their operations. 
In practice, achieving sustainable, multipurpose operations will require governance instruments 
that provide hydropower companies with the discretion and/or obligation to efficiently and 
equitably deliver both energy and water services. Prevailing regulatory instruments typically set 
constraints that support the minimum delivery of water services, including environmental 
protection, and afford limited scope to adjust the delivery of those services in response to shifts in 
their value to water users. This static, minimalist approach will not provide regulatory agencies 
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and hydropower operators with the capacity to manage emerging risks from climate change, 
population growth, and the full array of trends and shocks affecting water supply and water demand 
globally. Further, the value of hydroelectricity is changing in unpredictable ways with the uptake 
of variable renewable energy, the development of new energy technologies and business models, 
and reforms of energy and climate policies. Under these dynamic conditions, profit-motivated 
hydropower companies cannot be expected to voluntarily adjust operations to maximise social 
benefits from water services; in general, they will have been granted the right to manage water to 
maximise their private profits from selling electricity. The requisite incentives and information 
need to be provided through better regulation. Otherwise, concentrating demands for multiple 
services on a single reservoir risks undermining the resilience of connected social, economic, and 
ecological systems to the challenges that prompted contemporary championing of multipurpose 
hydropower development in the first place. 
This Chapter reviews hydropower governance in order to identify and outline regulatory reforms 
that enable the delivery of multipurpose operations under water and energy risks. Or, in other 
words, the purpose is to find ways to make ‘multipurpose hydropower’ a sustainable outcome from 
operations that consistently and flexibly deliver social benefits, and not an aspiration that is only 
achieved under favorable conditions. First, I show that conventional governance instruments are 
under-equipped to manage the emerging risks, or ‘events with uncertain consequences’, that are 
creating dynamic shifts in and, in some cases, trade-offs between the benefits provided by energy 
and water services. Second, I outline a conceptual approach to the resilience of multipurpose 
hydropower projects – where resilience is an attribute of a social-ecological system composed of 
three characteristics: resistance, recovery time, and robustness (Grafton et al. 2019) – and show 
that, in a broader social context, ‘hydropower resilience’ requires dynamic water reallocation. 
Third, I evaluate potential reforms that could support efficient and equitable provision of water 
services by profit-motivated operators of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs.  
Section 2.2 reviews the many water and energy services that can be provided by multipurpose 
reservoirs, conventional instruments for hydropower governance, and risks to hydropower systems 
from water insecurity and energy transitions. Section 2.3 demonstrates the connection between 
water reallocation and the resilience of multipurpose hydropower systems. Section 2.4 offers three 
potential reforms that complement existing institutional frameworks: (i) periodic relicensing, (ii) 
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water pricing, and (iii) climate/green performance bonds. Section 2.5 concludes by outlining steps 
to develop and test the proposed reforms.  
This Chapter focuses on medium- to large-scale hydropower projects (i.e. >100 MW of installed 
generation capacity) with the capacity for inter-seasonal storage and the provision of water across 
multiple purposes, but where hydroelectricity generation is the primary purpose. Further, the 
analysis concentrates on projects that are operated with profit objectives by private companies or 
state-owned enterprises and are thereby subject to regulation by government agencies acting in the 
public interest.  
2.2. The Governance of Multipurpose Hydropower Operations Under Risks 
2.2.1. Multipurpose Hydropower Operations  
The impoundment of water creates opportunities for hydropower dams to deliver a range of 
services. Reservoir storage and downstream flows can be managed to provide water supply and 
storage for farmers, households, industry, and other water users located downstream or adjacent 
to hydropower reservoirs (Branche 2015). Multipurpose reservoirs can provide downstream flood 
protection (Bonnet et al. 2015), flush downstream water pollution and saline intrusion (Jager & 
Smith 2008), and regulate rivers to facilitate boat navigation and inflows to downstream reservoirs. 
Reservoirs and regulated rivers also provide recreational opportunities, such as kayaking and 
fishing, that can have high economic value (Bonnet et al. 2015; Branche 2015).  
Globally, around 30% of large dams are officially registered as multipurpose, with approximately 
3900 of these including hydropower as one purpose (Naughton et al. 2017). Water-based services 
have long been a motivating factor for hydropower development, and their economic value can 
exceed that of energy production for many reservoirs (Bonnet et al. 2015). Water management 
services may emerge over time even if they are not valued and planned in the original design of 
hydropower projects (IEA Hydropower Agreement 2017). Proponents of system-scale, 
multipurpose approaches to hydropower development have proposed that, if designed correctly, 
planned investments in new and existing hydropower projects could generate US $285 billion to 
US $770 billion per year in additional water services at the global scale (Opperman et al. 2017).   
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The negative environmental and social impacts of hydropower dams and reservoirs are well-
documented (e.g. WCD 2000; Jager & Smith 2008). Dams are physical barriers to the natural flow 
regimes of rivers (Poff et al. 1997), obstructing the migration of fish and other aquatic species, as 
well as the transport of nutrients and sediment (Krchnak et al. 2009). These alterations modify the 
ecology and geology of both downstream and upstream areas, reducing the productivity of natural 
systems that provide ecosystem services to communities and economic sectors (Olden et al. 2010). 
Importantly, impacts can occur hundreds of kilometers downstream from dams (McCartney 2009). 
Hydropower projects have frequently affected the livelihoods of riparian communities in both the 
short- and long-term, including groups that are the focus of industry best-practice resettlement and 
livelihood support schemes (e.g. Shoemaker & Robichaud 2018). 
However, in some cases, dam infrastructure and operations can be modified to restore or avoid 
disrupting elements of the downstream flow regime or upstream water level fluctuations, thereby 
reducing the environmental and social costs of dam operation and supporting the provision of 
ecosystem services by regulated rivers to water users (Krchnak et al. 2009; Poff & Schmidt 2016; 
Richter & Thomas 2007; Watts et al. 2011). Hence, the reoperation of existing dams to support 
environmental flows,1 cultural flows,2 and reservoir-based ecosystem services can be an important 
water service provided by hydropower reservoirs.3  
Hydropower reservoirs store potential energy. Hydroelectric power production can be ramped up 
and down rapidly, from zero to maximum or partial capacity and vice versa, by changing the intake 
of water to turbines. The flexibility to adjust generation within minutes means that hydroelectric 
                                                 
 
1 Environmental flows are “the quantity, timing, and quality of water flows required to sustain freshwater and estuarine 
ecosystems and the human livelihoods and well-being that depend on these ecosystems” (IRF 2007). 
2 Cultural flows are understood here as water entitlements legally and beneficially owned by First Peoples that are of 
a sufficient and adequate quantity and quality to improve the spiritual, cultural, environmental, social, and economic 
conditions of those First Peoples (adapted from National Cultural Flows Project 2018). 
3 Here, I consider the partial restoration of environmental and cultural flows as a ‘water service’ in order to define a 
simple typology that facilitates analysis later in the Chapter. It is important to recognise, however, that a reduction in 
the environmental and social costs of a hydropower project does not necessarily equate to a creation of benefits and 
is not, per se, an additional purpose given that those costs are a result of the project being built in the first place. 
Further, the appropriate perspective on whether avoided costs constitute a benefit or service depends on the timescale 
of the project and how ecosystems and communities have adapted to the project. For example, partial restoration of 
spring pulse flows to an alpine river is probably a legitimate water service in the context of an 80-year old dam, but 
limiting the disruption of pulse flows by a new dam is probably not. On the other hand, restoring pulse flows to an 
aquatic ecosystem already adapted to an altered flow regime may not be a ‘water service’ if it undermines new 
ecosystem services. 
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power plants can provide a range of energy services to electricity networks. These services include: 
frequency and voltage control, maintaining spare capacity to support system-wide security and 
reliability, and ‘black-start’ capacity to initiate the restoration of failed network interconnections 
(IEA Hydropower Agreement 2017; World Energy Council 2015a). Globally, the value of these 
ancillary energy services is rising along with the increasing penetration of variable renewable 
energy technologies. Further, the transition of electricity systems from ‘baseload’ modes (e.g. coal-
fired or nuclear power plants that are never switched off) to ‘base-cost’ modes (e.g. solar and wind 
plants with zero-marginal cost that generate variable levels of electricity) is changing how 
hydropower projects provide energy services. For example, improved market- and regulation-
based incentives to provide ‘firming capacity’ for new solar and wind plants is creating incentives 
for investment in pumped storage hydropower facilities (Ela et al. 2013). 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the array of energy and water services that multipurpose hydropower projects 
can provide. These services may involve all types of goods and resources across the spectrum of 
ownership and access: (i) private goods where consumption is rivalrous and excludable (e.g. water 
supply for irrigation); (ii) club goods where consumption is excludable but non-rivalrous (e.g. 
electricity grid reliability); (iii) common-pool resources where consumption is non-excludable and 
rivalrous (e.g. fisheries or recreation in public spaces); and (iv) public goods where consumption 
is non-excludable and non-rivalrous (e.g. navigation). Note that whether a particular service 
belongs to one of the above categories can depend on the context, e.g. urban water could be a 
private good if a household’s access is conditional on paying charges, but a common-pool resource 
if access of all households is provided via full public subsidies. For all services, there may be 
indirect benefits and costs for third parties, or ‘externalities’, generated across economic sectors 
and geographic scales. For example, secure urban water supplies during droughts can reduce 
waterborne disease and improve long-term health and educational outcomes for children. On the 
other hand, damages to fisheries caused by dam construction could generate food insecurity and 
lead to rural-urban migration.  Further, the provision of particular services may be complementary 
(e.g. downstream irrigation and hydropower generation) or rivalrous (e.g. environmental flows and 
flood control). In short, hydropower projects can generate many services and externalities that 
affect a wide range of water users and other groups in different ways. Hence, multipurpose 
reservoirs comprise a central focal point of a social-ecological system encompassing a broad 
geographic scale. 
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Figure 2.1.  The potential water and energy services provided by a multipurpose hydropower reservoir.
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2.2.2. Instruments for Hydropower Governance 
The decision-making of private companies and state-owned enterprises operating hydropower 
dams is ultimately focused on the maximisation of profits and/or electricity generation. Providing 
water services, minimising negative externalities, and operating reservoirs across multiple 
purposes can often involve additional costs or foregone revenues (Krchnak et al. 2009). 
Reconciling divergent private and public interests is the role of governance institutions and 
regulations that integrate the welfare of all water users and society at large into hydropower 
operations. Further, constraints on and incentives for particular operating modes also facilitate 
opportunities for complementary uses of water, such as scheduling downstream releases to support 
productivity of downstream ecosystems.  
Here, we understand hydropower governance as the structures and processes through which public 
and private actors interact to regulate the development and management of hydropower projects. 
Below we review four prevalent instruments for the governance of hydropower dams and 
reservoirs: (i) licenses and permits, (ii) flow and storage regulation, (iii) safeguard policies and 
conditional finance, and (iv) voluntary standards and corporate social responsibility initiatives. 
These instruments are often deployed in tandem as they are complementary, cover both formal and 
informal institutions, and have different strengths and limitations.  
License and Permits 
License and permit regimes confer upon a hydropower company the legal right to: (i) plan, build, 
and operate a hydropower dam project; (ii) generate and dispatch electricity, and (iii) utilise and 
manage water resources, subject to conditions enforced by a regulatory agency or agencies. Water 
and energy licenses are used to regulate hydropower projects in many countries, such as the United 
States, Australia, Brazil, China, and Nepal (IFC 2015; Pittock & Hartmann 2011); permits or 
licenses are often required from multiple government agencies. Arrangements differ across 
jurisdictions, but a permit or license application process generally requires an environmental and 
social impact assessment (ESIA) that demonstrates how negative externalities and water services 
will be incorporated into project design and operation, as well as the project's compliance with 
relevant domestic legislation regarding, for example, water pollution, endangered species 
protection, and, in some cases, international law (IFC 2015). Review of ESIAs provides an 
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opportunity for public and private stakeholders to specify infrastructure modifications or operating 
rules that are conditions for license or permit approval. 
Licenses typically stipulate fixed operating constraints across the decades of a project's lifetime, 
unless relicensing provisions are specified for a certain date or there is a change in domestic 
legislation. Long-term certainty serves two important purposes: (i) hydropower operators and 
project financiers need to estimate project costs and revenues prior to making investment 
decisions, and (ii) water users and regulators need to make water management and planning 
decisions with reference to expected dam operations. Renegotiating conditions with both project 
operators and stakeholders can involve large transaction costs. For example, the relicensing of 
privately-operated hydropower dams under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
in the United States has typically required 5-7 years of consultations and negotiations to renew a 
30-50 year license (Kosnik 2013; Madani 2011). The status quo in most jurisdictions is that license 
conditions are fixed for many decades (Pittock & Hartmann 2011). This is a problem because 
licenses and permits are a minimalist approach to regulation: they provide boundaries for profit-
oriented operation decisions, but do not facilitate the socially optimal provision of a range of water 
services as conditions change. Important global challenges, such as food and water insecurity, are 
emerging more quickly than a license adjustment every 30-50 years could accommodate, and if 
fixed, long-term licensing conditions remain the status quo then the opportunity will not be fully 
realised for new multipurpose reservoirs to address new challenges as they arise. Further, 
adherence to licensing conditions during operations is not guaranteed: a breach may trigger a 
regulatory agency to impose a fine or other punishment on the hydropower operator, but the 
strength of monitoring and enforcement depends on the institutional capacity of the regulator and 
the political will of the government.  
Constraints on Downstream Flows and Reservoir Levels 
Constraints on downstream flows and reservoir storage levels may be included in a water license 
(Krchnak et al. 2009). Typical forms of regulation include minimum flows and/or reservoir levels, 
maximum flows and/or reservoir levels, and ramping rate restrictions. The latter define a maximum 
rate of change in flow or water level over a short time span, such as minutes or hours, to prevent 
erosion and other damages associated with rapid fluctuations. Minimum and maximum flows are 
generally expressed in terms of instantaneous releases (i.e. cubic metres per second), although 
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longer time spans may be possible, such as the total volume of downstream releases across a day 
or week. Minimum/maximum reservoir levels are typically defined with reference to specific water 
services, such as the spare capacity required to absorb a flood event of a particular size. 'Run-of-
river' operations set reservoir outflows equal to inflows on an hourly to weekly basis; this is a 
common example of flow regulation in the United States (Jager & Bevelhimer 2007). Water 
licenses or formal and informal agreements with other water users may stipulate minimum or 
maximum storage levels at particular times of year to provide downstream flood protection, sustain 
fish habitat, ensure the availability of storage for water extractions, and support other activities 
associated with multipurpose reservoirs. Release schedules can be defined to mimic specific 
aspects of the natural flow regime; for example, Snowy Hydro in Australia schedules one 2-day 
flushing flow event and four 8-hour high flow events for the Snowy River during spring to partially 
replicate natural snowmelt  (Snowy Hydro 2018).  
It is important to recognise, however, that constraining the optimisation of profits (by hydropower 
operators) to create social benefits (across all water users) is not the same as maximising benefits 
across all water and energy services. Once again, operating constraints represent a minimalist 
approach to regulating hydropower operations. Although they can be altered when major shifts 
occur in operating regimes (see Hydro Tasmania 2013), flow and storage constraints do not 
provide real-time incentives nor information for hydropower operators to manage multipurpose 
reservoirs across the full range of potential services and externalities.  
Conditional Social and Environmental Safeguards 
Social and environmental safeguards set out systems of policies and procedures that can apply to 
both financiers and borrowers. Adherence to these policies and procedures is a condition of finance 
being approved and a project proceeding. Relevant instruments include: (i) the safeguard policies 
of multilateral development banks (ADB 2009; World Bank 2016b); (ii) guidelines for export 
credits, or loans, from rich countries to developing countries (OECD 2017); and (iii) safeguards 
and conditions associated with carbon markets and funds, such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (Soanes et al. 2016), the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Linking 
Directive (European Union 2004), and the Green Climate Fund (GCF 2018). A reference point for 
the development and implementation of these safeguards are the strategic priorities, policy 
principles, and technical guidelines developed by the World Commission on Dams (2000) and 
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subsequent initiatives, such as the Hydropower Sustainability Protocol (which is discussed in the 
following sub-section). However, the growing prominence of lending institutions from China and 
other major emerging economies as alternative, and less conditional, sources of finance has 
diminished the prevalence of multilateral safeguards in the governance of new hydropower 
projects (Skinner and Haas 2014). 
An example of a safeguard system is the World Bank's Environmental and Social Framework that 
has been implemented since 2018. Bank staff are required to: (i) classify a potential project's risks, 
(ii) conduct due diligence on the project prior to financial approval, (iii) support the borrower to 
monitor the project's performance across social and environmental considerations, and (iv) publish 
information publicly (World Bank 2016b). Under the framework, borrowers are required to: (i) 
conduct an ESIA to identify stakeholders and risks, (ii) develop an environmental and social 
commitment plan, and (iii) establish monitoring regimes and a grievance mechanism for water 
users and other stakeholders (World Bank 2016).  
The regulatory capacity of financial safeguards is focused on the beginning of a project before 
finance has been approved (Skinner and Haas 2014). Unforeseen externalities, services, and trade-
offs may be identified by safeguard policies during the operation of a project, but borrowers are 
not necessarily compelled to address their full extent unless other regulatory instruments are in 
force. Project financiers, on the other hand, have limited control over whether their investment 
meets social and environmental standards during operations. In essence, safeguards set minimum 
social and environmental outcomes from a hydropower project: they provide the means to avoid 
the worst outcomes, but not the means to approach the full scale of social benefits that a 
multipurpose project could deliver. 
Voluntary Standards and Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives 
Voluntary standards and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives are self-regulation 
instruments and tools that can be implemented by hydropower project developers and/or financiers 
in partnership with industry associations and non-government organisations. Examples include the 
Equator Principles (2013) for banks to manage environmental and social risks, technical guidelines 
issued under annexes of the International Energy Agency's Hydropower Agreement (2016), water 
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stewardship initiatives (e.g. WWF/M&S 2017), and partnerships between hydropower companies 
and non-government organisations to restore natural flow regimes (e.g. Opperman et al. 2011). 
A prominent voluntary instrument is the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP) 
developed by the International Hydropower Association (IHA) in collaboration with industry, 
lenders, civil society, and governments (IHA 2018a). The Protocol supports the independent 
assessment of performance across environmental and social sustainability topics at different 
project stages. Assessors assign quantitative scores and qualitative comments across a range of 
categories, with the results providing a basis for hydropower operators to assess their performance, 
identify improvements, and monitor outcomes over time. Both participation and the publication of 
results are voluntary. The Protocol is complemented by the Hydropower Sustainability Guidelines 
on Good International Industry Practice Guidelines (GIIP) (Locher & Costa 2018) that define the 
processes, outcomes, and measures related to sustainability in the hydropower industry. 
A particular strength of the Protocol, GIIP, and other CSR instruments is that they present an 
approachable entry point for hydropower operators to gather information, better understand the 
social and environmental externalities they generate, and find ways to improve operations and 
support other water users. The absence of enforcement and a focus on generating information mean 
that voluntary approaches are very adaptable to changing circumstances. Self-regulation through 
CSR instruments can be an important avenue for hydropower companies to obtain and maintain 
the informal social license to operate under the prevailing set of formal regulatory instruments. 
But voluntary approaches to environmental regulation cannot incentivise private actors to deliver 
first-best social outcomes on their own: the prospect of some accompanying cost provided by 
external regulation (e.g. a tax, removed subsidy, or some other penalty) is necessary for voluntary 
approaches to incentivise efficient levels of self-regulation (Segerson & Wu 2006). Hence, 
voluntary standards and CSR initiatives are valuable tools to generation information and support 
stakeholder dialogue, but they will not, and indeed are not designed to, provide hydropower 
operators with the discretion to fully incorporate water services and other externalities into their 
real-time decision-making.  
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Table 2.1 summarises the governance instruments outlined above, including stages of a 
hydropower project where they are applicable, the approach to regulation they embody, and the 
likelihood of compliance and capacity for enforcement.  
 Project Stage  
Instrument 
Regulator/ 
Implementing 
Partner 
Plan Construct Operate Regulatory Approach Compliance & Enforcement 
Licenses & 
permits 
Government 
Agencies    
Assign right to use water 
resources and generate 
electricity within fixed 
boundaries; Constraints 
on water use and 
electricity production 
rights 
High/Medium 
(Conditional on 
institutional 
capacity) 
Flow & 
storage 
constraints 
Government 
Agencies, Self-
regulation 
   
Delivery of minimum 
water services; Operating 
boundaries 
High/Medium 
(Conditional on 
institutional 
capacity) 
Conditional 
safeguards 
Financial 
institutions    
Specify minimum social 
and environmental 
outcomes 
High  
(During 
planning stage) 
Voluntary 
safeguards 
Self-regulation, 
Industry, Non-
government 
organisations 
   Information generation; Stakeholder dialogue Self-regulating 
Table 2.1. Classification of hydropower governance instruments. 
2.2.3. Water Security Risks and Energy Market Risks 
There are many financial, economic, regulatory, social, and environmental risks associated with 
hydropower projects. Flood control provision by dams can create a false perception among 
downstream land users of complete protection from extreme flood events (Etkin 1999). The 
regulation of rivers may provide economic opportunities for downstream projects, such as 
irrigation and thermal power plants, that were not originally planned (Branche 2015). Social values 
regarding the natural environment change over time, causing corresponding shifts in the non-
market value of aquatic ecosystem services (Barbour et al. 2016). These and other risks alter the 
benefits and costs of the energy and water services delivered by multipurpose operations. Hence, 
they test the capacity of governance instruments to manage trade-offs and synergies between the 
profits of hydropower companies and the welfare of other water users.  
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There are many valid approaches to defining and formulating the concept of risk (Aven et al. 2015). 
Here, I think of a risk as an “event with uncertain consequences” (Wyrwoll et al. 2018). From this 
perspective there can be both positive and negative consequences associated with a risk and the 
net impact could be perceived differently by different stakeholders. Below, I consider two key sets 
of risks in the context of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs: 'water security risks' and 'energy 
market risks'. The former are formulated in terms of water security being “the availability of an 
acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production, 
coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments and economies” 
(Grey & Sadoff 2007). In that context, water security risks are caused by variability in water supply 
and shifts in the demand for water services. Energy market risks are caused by the dynamic 
economic value of hydroelectricity under energy transitions and temporal variability, between 
seasons and across decades, in the demand for water to generate energy services.  
Water Security Risks 
Hydrological variability is a defining challenge of hydropower operations and their governance. 
Real-time decisions and inter-seasonal planning are required on how much water to store and 
release when future inflows are unknown. Operating constraints are partially determined on the 
basis of the expected status of variable water supplies external to a reservoir, such as rainfall and 
run-off in downstream catchments. In the past, hydropower engineers and regulators estimated key 
variables on the basis of historical data, such as daily and monthly inflows, probable maximum 
floods, and year-to-year climate variability. Today, projected hydrological and climatic trends and 
extremes during the lifetime of new and existing hydropower projects are outside the historical 
range (Milly et al. 2008). Droughts, storms, and other extreme weather events are increasing in 
severity and frequency under anthropogenic climate change (IPCC 2013). Changes in upstream 
water extractions exacerbate uncertainty regarding reservoir inflows. In short, hydrological 
variability is increasing and becoming more difficult to manage. 
Long-term trends in precipitation and temperature due to anthropogenic climate change are 
projected to substantially alter inflows into hydropower reservoirs (Mukheibir 2013). The direction 
of these shifts and their implications vary across different regions; for example, potential water 
availability in hydropower reservoirs has been projected to increase in India, Central Asia, and 
Central Africa during the 21st century, but decrease in Europe, the United States, East Asia, and 
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southern parts of Australia, South America, and Africa (van Vliet et al. 2016). Climate change may 
also facilitate erosion and increase the rate at which reservoirs accumulate sediment and lose 
storage capacity over time (Williams 1989). Increased intensity of high-precipitation events could 
increase the need for reservoirs to reserve storage capacity for flood control. Reduced snowfall 
and accelerated glacial retreat will alter the seasonal characteristics of inflows to high-altitude 
reservoirs (Hartmann et al. 2013; Rheinheimer et al. 2013). These long-term trends will 
significantly alter the commercial returns from existing hydropower projects (Mukheibir 2013); 
although the direction and magnitude of these trends can be predicted for particular locations, their 
realisation cannot be known precisely in advance and, hence, seamlessly integrated into planning 
and regulation. Importantly, both short-term variability and long-term trends in reservoir inflows 
affect the trade-offs between energy and water services: when storage is scarce and excess water 
demand exists, the trade-offs between rivalrous water uses are acute. On the other hand, increased 
inflows can create opportunities to allocate additional water to one water use without sacrificing 
benefits elsewhere. 
The global demand for freshwater is projected to increase by 55% between 2014 and 2050 under 
current trends (WWAP 2014). Population growth, urbanisation, rising energy use, environmental 
pollution, and increasing demand for water-intensive food products are challenging the capacity 
of governance institutions to balance water supply and demand across many regions of the world 
(Beddington 2009; Rodriguez et al. 2013). Multipurpose reservoirs can help bridge supply gaps, 
but need to be operated to accommodate shifting water demand, particularly under climate 
variability and climate change. During droughts, for example, demand for irrigation extractions 
from storage may increase to make up for shortfalls in rainfall. Higher water temperatures in rivers 
and reservoirs increase cooling water withdrawals by thermal electricity plants (Byers et al. 2014). 
Household electricity demand rises under extreme temperatures, thereby increasing the demand 
for and economic value of hydroelectricity generation. The failure of alternative sources of supply 
can amplify the dependence of water users on access to hydropower storage (e.g. RFA 2013). As 
the demand for and value of allocating water across different uses and users of a multipurpose 
reservoir shift, so do the costs and benefits of the operation decisions and water allocations 
determined by the overlying governance regime. In other words, the value of different water 
services is dynamic and, once again, can be projected but not known perfectly in advance.
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Summarising the discussion above, we can conceive the following water security risks that relate 
to the management and governance of multipurpose hydropower systems:  
(W1) A short-term, stochastic shift in reservoir inflows due to climate variability or shifts in 
upstream water use or land management. Occurs over a daily to annual timescale; 
(W2) A long-term, stochastic shift in reservoir inflows due to climate change or long-term trends 
in upstream water use or land management. May emerge as a trend or level effect within 
a multi-annual to decadal timescale; 
(W3) A short-term, stochastic shift in the demand for and value of a water service or set of water 
services. Occurs over a daily to annual timescale; 
(W4) A long-term, stochastic shift in the demand for and value of a water service or set of water 
services. May emerge as a trend or level effect within a multi-annual to decadal timescale; 
Table 2.2 summarises these water security risks and their potential causes. Note that (W1) and 
(W2) relate to the supply of water to a reservoir, and (W3) and (W4) relate to the demand for water 
services which can also be a function of broader water supply conditions. For example, a single 
drought could pose multiple risks that need to be managed in a multipurpose hydropower reservoir 
system providing irrigation water: decreased inflows that reduce overall storage levels and total 
water supply for both purposes (W1), plus increased demand for irrigation water extractions due 
to less direct rainfall on cropland (W3).  
Energy Market Risks 
Hydropower revenues vary significantly over time. In liberalised electricity markets – where 
multiple generators bid into competitive markets – the marginal value of generation is determined 
by market demand and supply conditions that vary across sub-daily to seasonal time scales. Over 
the longer term, a range of factors affect marginal and total revenues, including coal and gas prices, 
the retirement and entry of other power stations that can ramp production up and down at a similar 
rate, and the trajectory of energy demand under economic, population, and technology trends. 
Secondary markets for ancillary energy services open up new revenue opportunities. Energy 
market liberalisation and other reforms shift pricing structures. Hydropower revenues can also 
Reforms for Resilience 
 
22 | P a g e  
vary in regulated markets – where a central operator determines prices and dispatch quantities – 
according to the shifts in the merit order for dispatch and the parameters for regulated returns or 
retail tariffs. 
Amplifying this periodic revenue variability is a fundamental disruption occurring globally: the 
transition toward decarbonised energy systems. This shift poses both opportunities and challenges 
for hydropower companies (Gaudard et al. 2016). On the one hand, the capacity to dispatch and 
store renewable energy offers the prospect of higher marginal revenues in markets where 
increasing penetration of intermittent renewable generation technologies coincides with: (i) rising 
or stable demand for centralised generation; (ii) markets for generation capacity, frequency 
response, and other ancillary services; and (iii) carbon pricing making hydropower more 
competitive than natural gas as a flexible generation technology. On the other hand, the long-term 
competitiveness of large storage reservoirs could be undermined by: (i) increased penetration of 
technologies for distributed energy generation (e.g. rooftop solar photovoltaic systems), 
distributed transmission (e.g. micro-grids), and distributed storage (e.g. household batteries and 
electric vehicles); (ii) falling peak prices in liberalised markets as competing forms of electricity 
storage fall in cost and are more widely deployed (e.g. off-river pumped hydropower, large-scale 
batteries, thermal concentrated solar power storage systems, and hydrogen fuel cells); and, (iii) 
adoption of demand-side management technologies.  
A further complication for hydropower companies from the energy transition are the government 
policies driving it. Renewable energy certificates (RECs) and carbon offset credits (COCs) have 
previously been a key source of income for hydropower projects at the national and international 
levels (Soanes et al. 2016). RECs and COCs can be accredited for the generation of renewable 
energy and sold by hydropower companies or project financiers to entities complying with 
obligations to reduce carbon emissions or use renewable energy, such as companies participating 
in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme or energy retailers subject to Australia’s 
Renewable Energy Target. Like any market instrument, the price of RECs and COCs vary 
according to demand and supply shifts. Compliance markets often have defined beginning and end 
points, but the underlying targets and parameters may be changed. Hence, policy shifts can cause 
both predictable price shifts (e.g. the traded price for certificates falling to zero when a target is 
met or a scheme is ending) and uncertain price shifts (e.g. a cap being placed on the eligibility of 
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certain types of credits when a scheme is already running). The introduction of carbon pricing and 
other climate change mitigation policies can have similar level effects on the value of 
hydroelectricity. 
The exact trajectory of decarbonised energy systems is truly uncertain, meaning that it is not 
possible to assign probabilities to particular forecasts of what future energy systems will look like. 
But, from a hydropower company’s perspective, their impact at any point in time is embodied in 
market prices and, hence, the revenues from dispatching hydroelectricity. Importantly, shifts in the 
value of allocating water to electricity generation alter the opportunity cost of hydropower 
operators’ allocating water to the provision of water services (Kern & Characklis 2017). For 
example, if the wholesale electricity price increases then the foregone profits from a fixed 
extraction of irrigation water would also increase. On the other hand, if wholesale prices decline 
then the opportunity costs of irrigation water provision would fall. 
Consistent with the discussion of water security above, there are two important types of energy 
market risks that affect the management and governance of hydropower systems: 
(E1) An increase or decrease in the marginal value of hydroelectricity over a specific period. 
May be a short-term, stochastic change reflecting temporary market conditions (e.g. 
demand-supply imbalances), or a long-term trend reflecting fundamental shifts in 
technology and networks; and 
(E2) A level shift in marginal hydroelectricity revenues due to a policy change, such as access 
to a green certificate market being removed or the introduction of a carbon price
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Risk type Time scale Impact on 
Hydropower 
System 
Potential Causes 
(W1) Short-term 
stochastic shift in 
reservoir inflows  
Daily to Annual Alters trade-offs 
between energy 
and water 
services 
Seasonal rainfall variability, Extreme rainfall 
events, Cropping patterns in upstream 
catchments 
(W2) Long-term 
stochastic shift in 
reservoir inflows 
Multi-Annual to 
Decadal 
Alters trade-offs 
between energy 
and water 
services 
Climate change, Climate oscillations, 
Upstream water infrastructure development, 
Deforestation/afforestation in upstream 
catchments 
(W3) Short-term shift 
in demand for water 
service(s) 
Daily to Annual Alters value of 
water services 
Price fluctuations for commodities and 
marketed goods, Seasonal rainfall variability,  
(W4) Long-term shift 
in demand for water 
service(s) 
Multi-Annual to 
Decadal 
Alters value of 
water services 
Population growth, Economic growth, 
Urbanisation, Growth or decline of water-
intensive economic sectors or technologies, 
Changing social attitudes on environmental 
protection, Investments in alternative sources 
of water supply 
(E1) Increase/decrease 
in marginal 
hydroelectricity 
revenue 
Defined time 
period  
Alters value of 
energy services 
Electricity demand/supply imbalances, Cost 
declines in generation technologies, Natural 
gas prices, Transport sector electrification, 
Extreme weather events 
(E2) Level shift in 
marginal 
hydroelectricity 
revenue due to policy 
change 
Instantaneous 
(but may be 
anticipated or 
pre-announced) 
Alters value of 
energy services 
Carbon pricing introduction/removal, New 
markets for energy services, Subsidy 
introduction/removal for alternative generation 
technologies, Changes to greenhouse gas 
abatement targets 
Table 2.2. A typology of water security and energy market risks. 
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2.3. Water Allocation and Resilience 
2.3.1. Water Allocation and Hydropower Governance 
In a multipurpose hydropower system, a water allocation is the pattern of water use across different 
services and associated water infrastructure at a specific time (see Grafton et al. 2017 for a general 
version of this definition).4 Hydropower governance instruments influence the use of water by 
hydropower companies and establish formal and informal rights for all water users. Minimum flow 
requirements, for example, ensure the availability of water for downstream ecosystems and water 
users at agreed times. Further, the construction and modification of water infrastructure by 
hydropower companies, such as the height of dam walls or the type of sediment transfer and fish 
migration technologies, are influenced by governance instruments and affect the delivery of water 
services. Although other water users control their consumption of available water resources, the 
final allocation of water across different uses is primarily determined by: (i) the profit-motivated 
decisions made by the operator within (ii) the boundaries and incentives defined by governance 
instruments. Drawing on (Grafton et al. 2017; Griffin 2016; OECD 2015a) we can assess the 
resulting water allocation across three objectives: 
• Allocative efficiency, an allocation of water at a specific point in time where it is not 
possible to reallocate water or water infrastructure across different water and energy 
services to increase the net benefits generated by the hydropower system (i.e. direct 
benefits to all water users plus positive externalities minus negative externalities); 
• Dynamic efficiency, an allocation of water across different time periods where it is not 
possible to reallocate water use and infrastructure to increase the aggregated net benefits 
generated by the hydropower system; 
• Equity, an allocation of water at a point in time or across different time periods which is 
consistent with established norms of distributive justice, perceptions of fairness, and the 
importance of different water and energy services to society as a whole.
                                                 
 
4 As Grafton et al. (2017) note, in certain water governance regimes a water allocation can refer to the volume of 
water abstraction that is permitted in a specific time period, subject to pre-defined constraints and rules.  
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Allocative efficiency is about maximising the aggregate net benefits from using a fixed amount of 
water at a given time; for example, if an irrigator could theoretically pay a hydropower company 
more than the foregone energy revenues from providing additional irrigation water and still make 
a profit, then that reallocation would increase allocative efficiency. Dynamic efficiency is about 
maximising the benefits of water allocation across time. In addition to managing seasonal or inter-
annual inflow variability, this objective also informs the timing of investments to upgrade 
infrastructure, such as increasing storage capacity to accommodate larger floods or provide 
additional water supply under droughts.  
There are two important points to note regarding allocative and dynamic efficiency. First, the 
economic benefits and costs of water services can be difficult to measure as many are not traded 
in markets. Whilst techniques exist to estimate the non-market values of ecosystem services, many 
of the externalities associated with multipurpose operations, such as national water security, evade 
real-time measurement. Second, these conventional economic criteria for resource allocation take 
a neutral view on how benefits and costs should be distributed. For example, they treat one unit of 
revenue for a subsistence fisherman, a large hydropower company, and a golf course as equivalent 
contributions to aggregate social benefits. Hence, allocative and dynamic efficiency do not provide 
a framework for prioritising particular groups or services according to socio-economic 
disadvantage, historical injustice, or meta-level objectives, such as national food and energy 
security or endangered species protection. Valuation challenges and distributional considerations 
are why equity needs to be a stand-alone objective of water allocation. However, the fairness of a 
given water allocation is subjective and political processes shape how equity considerations are 
integrated into governance instruments. There may also be trade-offs between equity and the two 
types of efficiency, and the appropriate balance is, once again, subjective.  
Shifts in water demand, water supply, and social preferences are a major driver for water 
reallocation globally (Marston & Cai 2016). The impetus for sustainable, multipurpose operations 
motivating this study is indicative of a shift in social preferences regarding the role of hydropower 
dams and how they should be built and operated. Section 2.2 of this Chapter showed how water 
security and energy market risks alter the value of and trade-offs between water and energy 
services. Below, we use the three objectives presented in this Section to outline the need for 
dynamic water allocation in multipurpose hydropower systems.
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 2.3.2. Resilience of Multipurpose Hydropower Systems 
There are many different ways to define, understand, and deploy the concept of resilience (for 
reviews see Folke 2006; Levin et al. 1996; Walker et al. 2004). The term has been used to described 
the capacity of a social-ecological system to deal with change and continue to develop (SRC 2018). 
Similarly, a resilient system has been described as absorbing and adapting to disruptions by 
reorganising itself to grow and thrive beyond the pre-disruption level of performance (see Folke 
et al. 2010; Holling 1973; Levin et al. 1996; Walker et al. 2004). In the hydropower sector, 
definitions of resilience can be imprecise but generally relate to risks and their management. The 
World Energy Council (2015, p.10) states that “resilience implies a functioning and stable system”, 
“resilience for energy infrastructure refers to its robustness and ability to recover operations to 
minimise interruptions to service”, and “resilience also implies the ability to withstand 
extraordinary events”. The Climate Resilience Secretariat – a partnership between the hydropower 
industry and multilateral development banks – is developing guidelines for the sector that define 
climate resilience as “the capacity of a hydropower project or system to absorb the stresses 
imposed by climate change, and in the process to evolve into greater robustness” 
(WBG/IHA/EBRD 2017). 
Here, I do not adopt a general definition of resilience. Instead, I adapt a specific approach that is 
consistent with the observation of Linkov et al. (2014, p. 407) that “resilience, as a property of a 
system, must transition from just a buzzword to an operational paradigm for system management”. 
The starting point is to integrate the discussion of water and energy risks in Section 2.2 with the 
approach of Grafton et al. (2019) and conceive of resilience as a specific characteristic of the entire 
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social-ecological system encompassing a multipurpose reservoir (see Figure 2.1). Here, resilience 
consists of three measurable components: 
(R1) Resistance, the degree to which a multipurpose reservoir system’s performance changes 
following an adverse risk event (adapted from Harrison 1979); 
(R2) Recovery time, the speed at which the multipurpose reservoir system recovers and returns 
to a desirable state of functionality or level of performance following an adverse risk event 
(adapted from Hashimoto et al. 1982; Pimm 1984); and,  
(R3) Robustness, the probability of the multipurpose reservoir system to remain functional and 
not cross an undesirable threshold in the presence of adverse risk events (adapted from 
Huizar et al. 2018). 
Note that (R1) - (R3) concern risk events that have a negative, or adverse, impact on overall system 
performance and, hence, resilience is considered to be a positive feature of a hydropower system. 
Section 2 defined risk events in a neutral manner, such that they could lead to positive outcomes, 
e.g. a long-term increase in reservoir inflows could increase the capacity of a multipurpose 
hydropower system to deliver both energy and water services.  
Managing the risks and opportunities of change through water reallocation is a fundamental task 
of water governance reform (OECD 2015). Here, the above understanding of resilience is used to 
show how instruments that enable water reallocation can generate better outcomes under risks and, 
hence, why governance reforms are needed for multipurpose hydropower projects to achieve their 
potential benefits. Figure 2.2 illustrates the connection between water allocation and the resilience 
of a theoretical multipurpose hydropower system5. System performance at a specific point in time 
is a combination of allocative efficiency and equity, with the aggregate net benefits of water 
allocation across energy and water services weighted by social norms regarding distributional 
equity (see Adler 2016 for a review of the use of distributional weights in welfare economics). In 
                                                 
 
5 Note that the welfare of certain water users within the system encompassing a reservoir, such as downstream 
ecosystems or resettled communities, may have exhibited greater or less resilience to risk events if dams and other 
infrastructure were not built in the first place. The hypothetical hydropower system discussed here assumes that a 
multipurpose reservoir already exists. 
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this example, I assume that there is a hydropower company with an obligation to maintain storage 
above a certain level to enable rivalrous irrigation extractions from the reservoir (i.e. water is 
extracted for hydroelectricity and irrigation from different outlets). There is a theoretical maximum 
level of system performance where, under perfect information regarding social preferences and the 
value of energy and water services, completely flexible instruments could reallocate water to 
maximise the equity-weighted net benefits of water allocation. The time path of the maximum 
performance level is dynamic because: (i) the benefits and externalities of the different services 
change under water and energy risks; and (ii) social preferences change regarding the distribution 
of water over time and under shifts in (i). Note that the area under the time path of system 
performance provides a measure of dynamic efficiency (weighted by equity considerations) and, 
for simplicity, I ignore time preferences and the discounting of future benefits. 
Figure 2.2. Resilience and water reallocation in multipurpose hydropower systems. Adapted 
from Grafton & Little (2017). The dotted line is the time-path of Scenario B (Flexible Water 
Allocation).  
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There are two different scenarios: (A) ‘Fixed Water Allocation’, where conventional hydropower 
governance instruments, such as water licenses with fixed operating constraints, provide limited 
incentives or discretion for hydropower operators to reallocate water across different energy and 
water services; and (B) ‘Flexible Water Allocation’, where reforms to governance instruments 
enable water reallocation as the economic value of and social preferences for different services 
change. The distance between either scenario and the maximum performance level provides a 
relative measure of system performance, or the ‘efficiency & equity gap’.  
There is a sharp reduction in wet season rainfall (henceforth a ‘drought’) that causes two risk 
events: (i) reduced reservoir inflows (Risk W1), and (ii) increased demand for and value of 
irrigation water extractions (Risk W3). The net impact for both Scenarios and the theoretical 
maximum are sharp falls in system performance because the foregone benefits from major 
reductions in hydropower generation (due to lower storage levels) outweigh the higher benefits 
from a given (pre-drought) level of irrigation extractions. The drought also causes shifts in social 
values: in this case, it is assumed that an increased weighting is placed on farmer profits and the 
positive externalities from irrigation water services (e.g. food security and rural development) 
compared to hydropower profits and the positive externalities from energy services (e.g. energy 
security and climate change mitigation).  
The resilience of the multipurpose hydropower system is higher under Scenario B compared to 
Scenario A. Although performance falls in both cases, resistance is higher in B because the fall in 
hydropower generation is partially offset by additional water being allocated to irrigation. The 
recovery time is also shorter in Scenario B because water can be optimally reallocated between 
water and energy services as the reservoir storage builds again and the imbalance between the 
weighted value of the different water uses gradually declines. By contrast, system performance 
under Scenario A only recovers once reservoir storage levels (and hydropower generation) return 
to pre-drought levels and distributional weightings across irrigation and energy services return to 
their pre-drought values. Without the capacity to redistribute towards irrigation, the fixed water 
allocation becomes a misallocation of the (lower) volume of water that is available. Figure 2.4 
does not allow us to demonstrate robustness because it depicts a single adverse event. However, if 
the fall in system performance is always proportional to the reduction in rainfall (i.e. the severity 
of the drought) and, if resistance is always relatively lower under Scenario A, then it follows that 
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the number of times (and probability) that the threshold will be breached over many droughts 
would be less under Scenario B.  
The simple example above illustrates how the reallocation of water can support the resilience of 
multipurpose hydropower systems to short-term, water risks. The insights from Figure 2.4 extend 
to the other water and energy risks defined in Section 2.2. For example, a sharp fall in electricity 
prices or end of a carbon credit scheme would reduce system performance (due to lower 
hydropower revenues), but the capacity to efficiently and equitably reallocate water (i.e. until the 
weighted marginal benefits of all water and energy services are equal) would support system 
resilience and recovery time. Similarly, the magnitude and duration of performance loss from a 
long-term adverse risk event, such as a gradual decline in reservoir inflows or marginal 
hydropower revenues, could be managed via water reallocation; the major difference to the 
situation depicted in Figure 2.4 would be a flatter slope in the performance decline following the 
onset of the event. Finally, I have presented a simple, theoretical illustration for rivalrous water 
extractions where there are direct trade-offs between just two services: electricity generation and 
irrigation water provision. In practice, system performance could be projected or measured for 
alternative governance instruments across many rivalrous and complementary services using a 
combination of valuation tools (to estimate allocative and dynamic efficiency) and participatory 
tools (to assign distributional weights). 
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Risk events  Location 
(Year) 
Services Description Sources 
W1 & W3  Quang Nam 
Province, 
Vietnam 
(2013-2014) 
Hydroelectricity, 
Irrigation water, Urban 
water  
Low inflows caused the Dak Mi 4 reservoir to fall below the threshold level to generate 
electricity. Severe drought was afflicting downstream farmers and contributing to salinization 
of the urban water supply of Danang, Vietnam’s 4th largest city. Despite the technical 
capacity to release water through a dam sluice gate, the operator focused on increasing storage 
to meet electricity contracts. The impasse between local authorities and the operator was only 
concluded after years of negotiations between national government ministries. 
RFA (2013); Le & 
Lam (2013) 
W1 & W3 Orville 
Dam, 
United 
States 
(2017) 
Flood control, Urban 
water, Irrigation water, 
Hydroelectricity 
Following several days of record rainfall, the primary spillways gates of the Oroville Dam 
were opened to maintain the safety of the dam wall. Structural failure of the spillway caused 
operators to reduce the outflow, leading to rising lake levels and flow over the emergency 
spillway which, in turn, failed structurally, generating rapid erosion and causing evacuation of 
180,000 people downstream. An independent review found this major incident was caused by 
a reactive approach to infrastructure management and an emphasis on water supply and power 
production over flood control and dam safety. 
France et al. 
(2018) 
W1, W3 & 
W4 
Sao Paolo, 
Brazil   
(2014-2015) 
Urban water, irrigation 
water, hydropower 
A major drought exacerbated long-term stressors (population growth, urbanization, 
deforestation, water pollution), causing acute water insecurity for this city of 20 million 
people. By January 2015, main water supply reservoirs held 5% capacity. Severe water 
rationing occurred, and hydropower production fell by 110 TWh across SE Brazil. 
Hunt et al. (2018); 
Nobre & Marengo 
(2016) 
E1 & E2 Norway 
(Future) 
Hydroelectricity, 
Renewable energy 
integration, Fish habitats 
Norway’s hydropower reservoirs could provide the energy storage needed to completely 
decarbonise the European Union’s electricity system. However, the installation of pumped 
hydropower facilities could cause rapid fluctuations in reservoir levels and undermine the 
alpine ecosystems that provide habitats for fish and other aquatic species. 
Charmasson et al. 
(2018); Hirsch et 
al. (2017) 
W1, E2 Tasmania, 
Australia           
(2015-2016) 
Hydropower, irrigation, 
environmental flows, 
recreation 
A confluence of water and energy risk events led to a major energy crisis in the island state of 
Tasmania where hydropower is the predominant electricity source. Since 2005, a privately-
owned long-distance cable (Basslink) has enabled electricity exports to and imports from the 
mainland. The anticipated abolition of a carbon price in 2014 prompted the state-owned 
hydropower company to export large volumes of electricity while marginal revenues 
remained high, leading to record profits in 2013-2014. Extremely low rainfall in 2014-2015 
prevented storage recovery and the state faced a serious electricity supply deficit when a 
Basslink fault occurred in late 2015. Major energy users reduced loads and expensive diesel 
generation capacity was installed. Basslink was offline for 6 months whilst system-wide 
storage levels fell to 12.5%, or half the standard operating minimum. The cause of the fault 
was found to be overloading the cable beyond its design capacity in years prior to the crisis. 
Hydro Tasmania 
(2016, 2017); 
TEST (2016) 
Table 2.3. Case studies demonstrating exposure of multipurpose hydropower systems to water and energy risks. 
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2.4. Reforms for Resilience 
There is growing awareness in the hydropower industry of the need for resilience to climate 
change, extreme weather events, and other adverse risks (e.g. IHA 2018b; Karki et al. 2016; Ray 
et al. 2018; WEC 2015b). Proponents of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs highlight the 
capacity for dam infrastructure to increase the resilience of food-energy-environment-water 
systems more generally (e.g. Rex et al. 2014). In this Chapter, I have shown that this capacity can 
only be realised if governance instruments can efficiently and equitably reallocate water stored in 
reservoirs. Under emerging water and energy risks, conventional hydropower governance 
instruments provide limited incentives for dynamic multipurpose operations. At best, the absence 
of adaptive governance could mean that opportunities will be missed to generate additional 
benefits from hydropower infrastructure. At worst, multipurpose reservoirs could be sources of 
cascading failures that transfer systemic risks across communities, economic sectors, and 
ecosystems. Rather than sharing benefits, poorly governed multipurpose reservoirs could create 
instability in the provision of essential services. Table 2.3 highlights contemporary examples of 
multipurpose reservoir systems where water and energy risks are challenging and, in some cases, 
overwhelming the capacity of governance institutions.  
This section proposes three reforms to existing governance instruments that could increase the 
resilience of multipurpose hydropower systems to water and energy risks. There are important 
barriers to water reallocation that encompass sociocultural factors, hydrological and infrastructure 
constraints, and political economy considerations (see Marston & Cai 2016 and Grafton et al. 2017 
for reviews). These barriers include financial costs, third-party effects (or externalities), lack of 
information, lack of property rights, and vested interests. Table 2.4 summarises the three reform 
opportunities in terms of (i) the aspect(s) of resilience they address, (ii) the water reallocation 
barriers they overcome, and (iii) challenges to their implementation. Note that all of these reforms 
are complements to rather than substitutes for the conventional hydropower governance 
instruments outlined in Section 2.2. 
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Reform Summary Component(s) 
of resilience  
Water reallocation 
barriers overcome by 
reform 
Implementations 
Challenges 
Periodic        
relicensing 
Limited license durations (< 30 years) to reassess benefits and 
costs of operations, identify required infrastructure investments, & 
renegotiate water allocations. Single, independent regulator. 
Operators required to demonstrate net social benefits. Participatory 
decision-making, with public interest taking priority. Stress-testing 
of alternative climate, energy market, and water demand scenarios. 
Alignment of licenses within a shared catchment. Applicable to all 
types of water services (e.g. public, private). 
Resistance, 
Robustness 
• Poor/inappropriate 
definition of property 
rights 
• Poor/inappropriate 
definition of system 
boundaries 
• Information asymmetry 
• Transaction costs 
• Limited 
administrative 
capacity 
 
Water pricing 
Payment by private water users to hydropower operator (directly 
or via intermediary) for the provision of water services additional 
to operating constraints defined by water licenses. Two-part tariff 
including: (i) volumetric water price approximating opportunity 
cost of water provision (i.e. foregone energy revenues), and, where 
applicable, (ii) fixed charge reflecting additional cost of 
infrastructure to provide water services.  
Resistance, 
Recovery 
time, 
Robustness 
• Vested interests 
• Financial costs 
• Unreliable water supply  
• Inadequate 
infrastructure 
• Social norms 
• Monitoring & 
enforcement 
• Limited 
administrative 
capacity 
Climate/green 
performance 
bonds 
Variable-interest bonds conditional on the bond issuer (the 
hydropower company) meeting specific conditions during 
operations. Lower rate of interest paid if input- or output-based 
indicators of water service provision met. Higher rate paid to bond 
holder if not met, and difference used to compensate intended 
beneficiaries of water services in cash or programs. 
Resistance, 
Recovery 
time, 
Robustness 
• Vested interests 
• Inadequate 
infrastructure 
• Complex policy 
design 
• Information 
limitations 
• Monitoring & 
enforcement 
• Transaction costs 
Table 2.4. Summary of proposed governance reforms to enhance the resilience of multipurpose hydropower systems. Water 
reallocation barriers and implementation challenges adapted from Marston & Cai (2016) and Grafton et al. (2017). 
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2.4.1. Periodic Relicensing 
The end of a hydropower license period is a window of opportunity for water reallocation. 
Relicensing processes enable regulatory agencies to work with hydropower companies and water 
users to: (i) reassess the benefits and costs of current and alternative modes of operation, including 
decommissioning; (ii) identify investments to maintain, upgrade, and modify infrastructure; and, 
in the case of license renewal, (iii) renegotiate the water allocation embodied in operating 
conditions and license constraints. Hydrological changes from climate change pose dam safety 
concerns that will necessitate periodic relicensing of hydropower projects (Pittock and Hartmann 
2011). Regular reviews of dam infrastructure and operations for that purpose also present an 
opportunity to adaptively manage environmental impacts, balance dynamic trade-offs between 
water and energy services, and identify alternative sources of water services other than hydropower 
infrastructure (Pittock & Hartmann 2011; Rheinheimer et al. 2013; Viers 2011; Viers & Nover 
2018; Watts et al. 2011).  
A relicensing regime that increases the resilience of multipurpose hydropower systems may 
include: (i) a single, independent regulatory agency to license all dams, barriers, and major water 
infrastructure; (ii) operators needing to demonstrate that infrastructure will generate net social 
benefits across both water and energy services; (iii) participation of water users and affected 
stakeholders in decision-making, with the public interest taking priority in the regulators’ final 
decisions on relicensing and future operating conditions; (iv) incorporating climate change 
projections and ‘stress-testing’ license conditions across alternative scenarios for the development 
of social-ecological systems; and, (v) alignment of license periods for all water projects within a 
catchment to allow collective benefits and costs to be assessed and managed even if projects are 
owned by different private and public interests (see Pittock & Hartmann 2011 and Viers & Nover 
(2018) for further description of these and other elements of a periodic hydropower relicensing 
regime).  
Periodic relicensing could increase the resilience of existing hydropower systems in multiple ways. 
Limited license durations (i.e. less than 30 years) and periodic review of operating constraints 
could reduce recovery time when slow-onset risks create expanding trade-offs between energy and 
water services. More frequent revision of operating boundaries would provide opportunities to 
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learn from extreme hydrological events and increase long-term robustness of the system. Where 
both licensing and financial safeguard regimes are in place, reporting requirements and safeguard 
frameworks could be integrated into the relicensing process, along with a facility for concessional 
finance of infrastructure modifications as the need arises. The Hydropower Sustainability 
Assessment Protocol and other corporate social responsibility instruments could feature as 
participatory tools in the relicensing process, with assessment results providing benchmarks for 
performance monitoring (e.g. critical thresholds for system robustness).  
In terms of overcoming barriers to water reallocation, updated operating conditions would enable 
dynamic reassignment of property rights to water and, hence, flexibility to increase allocative 
efficiency and equity. Participatory assessment under relicensing supports the redefinition of 
system boundaries to include (exclude) new (old) services. There are significant barriers to 
hydropower companies obtaining information on the externalities associated with their operations 
and the dynamic value of water services; structured, regulator-led processes could provide a 
framework and resources for operators to obtain more and better information. 
In practice, a major challenge to periodic relicensing is transaction costs. The 5-7 year FERC 
relicensing procedure mentioned in Section 2.2 is a multi-stage process involving substantial 
financial, legal, and human resource costs (Kosnik 2013). More regular reviews could increase the 
costs of hydropower companies negotiating with stakeholders and the regulator reviewing 
evidence and making decisions. Furthermore, there are trade-offs between efficient and equitable 
water reallocation and providing certainty to project investors and financiers on returns from the 
large, up-front costs of hydropower infrastructure. One avenue to manage this trade-off could be 
a “no-loss relicensing condition” wherein all parties must agree to license modification if the 
changes are, on aggregate, estimated to generate net benefits without reducing the welfare of any 
party (Madani 2011); in practice, however, such potential “win-win” outcomes may not be that 
common. Alternatively, ranges for operating constraints, such as seasonal minimum flows, could 
be specified for the long-term (30-50 years) with medium-term reviews (5-10 years) that set 
specific values across a small number of water license parameters; such periodic reviews are 
consistent with current practice of the US Army Corps of Engineers – one of the largest operators 
of dams in the United States – which reviews and updates water reservoir manuals at least every 
10 years (Benson 2018). Further, values could be specified for particular water supply and demand 
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variables, such as urban population growth, or indicators of system performance, such as urban 
water security, that trigger a partial/full relicensing process or a specific change to operating 
constraints and water supply arrangements.  
Key to successful implementation of the proposed components of a relicensing regime is the 
institutional capacity of the regulatory agency, including: (i) human capital, (ii) financial resources 
to manage relicensing negotiations, (iii) legislative mandate to monitor outcomes and enforce 
punishments for non-compliance, and (iv) transparency and accountability to the public interest. 
Power imbalances between hydropower companies, state utilities, and private users of water can 
be very significant and need to be managed fairly by an independent regulator. In many countries, 
institutional capacity is limited. An important step towards a relicensing process is, in the first 
place, an effectively implemented licensing process that can balance trade-offs between the 
financial interests of hydropower companies and the welfare of other water users. 
2.4.2. Water Pricing 
A water price is a charge for accessing and using water that has been processed in some way, such 
as storage in a reservoir or transmission through an irrigation channel or pipe (Griffin 2015). 
Pricing is commonly used by utilities and irrigation companies to charge water users for the fixed 
and variable costs of water provision in both rich and poor countries (see Dinar et al. 2015 and 
OECD 2010 for case studies). Here, I consider how water pricing could complement existing 
instruments by enabling reallocation of water outside the boundaries defined by operation 
constraints. Specifically, I propose a water tariff charged by a hydropower company for services 
where water is used as a private good, such as irrigation, urban, and industrial water supply. In 
these cases, water pricing could enable an efficient transfer of water that is prevented by a missing 
market. The tariff could contain two components: (i) a volumetric price for each unit of water that 
reflects the opportunity cost of delivering that water (i.e. foregone hydroelectricity revenues), and 
(ii) a fixed charge that reflects any capital expenditure or other fixed costs (e.g. additional staff) 
incurred by the hydropower company providing water services beyond those specified in its water 
or energy license. 
The general principles of applying water pricing to hydropower governance can be illustrated 
through the objectives for water reallocation and specific barriers to that occurring. Allocative 
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efficiency can be improved by enabling water to be transferred to non-energy uses when it is more 
efficient to do so and, potentially, in a timelier manner than revising operating constraints or 
renegotiating water licenses. For example, increased benefits may be realised where the marginal 
value of delivering water to energy production (i.e. when electricity prices are low) is less than 
transferring it to irrigation (i.e. when irrigated water demand is high) but conventional governance 
tools, such as fixed water allocations, do not facilitate the transfer. Hydropower operators’ 
charging beneficiaries for the fixed costs of private water service provision enables finance of 
increased storage capacity or construction of water transmission infrastructure. Further, creating 
revenue streams from water services could: (i) provide hydropower companies with the discretion 
to deliver water to those services during droughts when water has a higher value for other water 
users but there are also significant opportunity costs from foregone hydroelectricity generation, 
and (ii) remove operators’ financial incentive to maximise water allocation to hydropower.  
Pricing water could increase the resistance and robustness of multipurpose hydropower systems to 
adverse risks, whilst reducing recovery time when they occur. Under drought conditions a scarcity-
based water price could help reallocate water efficiently (i.e. increasing resistance) and, in the 
long-term, provide water users with incentives to develop alternatives sources of water services if 
it is efficient to do so (i.e. increasing robustness). Moreover, the capacity to generate revenue from 
water supply provides incentives for hydropower operators to maintain a storage buffer: in the case 
of reduced inflows, excess demand for water services could equate to foregone revenue from water 
provision. Water tariffs can also signal the optimal timing for new infrastructure investments to 
increase water storage (Grafton et al. 2014); in the case of hydropower reservoirs, such investments 
may include raising dam heights or sediment removal to increase system robustness. Finally, water 
pricing could reduce system recovery time in the presence of energy market risks by enabling 
opportunities for efficient water reallocation. For example, fast- or slow-onset falls in hydropower 
revenues will decrease overall system performance, but a falling water price would allow farmers 
and other users of water services to increase welfare or profits by increasing their water extractions 
until allocative efficiency is achieved (i.e. until the marginal benefit of additional water equals the 
volumetric water price).  
A key challenge to deploying water pricing for multipurpose hydropower governance is ensuring 
an equitable outcome. Typically, hydropower companies are large corporations and there may be 
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significant financial and power imbalances with other water users. Notwithstanding that water 
storage is a legitimate, costly service and both sides can benefit from a transaction that enhances 
allocative efficiency, any institutional arrangement where less powerful groups, such as 
subsistence farmers, pay a large, profit-oriented company to access a natural resource may conflict 
with social norms. On the other hand, equity may be less of a concern if the water user(s) are 
engaged in commercial activity, such as large-scale irrigation or manufacturing, or water is being 
delivered to an intermediary with a large customer base, such as an urban water utility. 
Distributional considerations are context specific and need to account for externalities as well: 
diverting water from electricity generation may reduce energy access for poor households, while 
wealthy elites may be the major beneficiaries of enhanced urban water services provision. In any 
case, there are options to integrate equity considerations into water pricing whilst preserving 
incentives for efficient water allocation, such as (i) water tariffs including a free initial volume of 
water, (ii) means-tested reductions in the fixed charge component of water tariffs, and (iii) cash 
transfers from government authorities or utilities to water users that reflect the reduced total costs 
of water supply due to those users accessing water from hydropower storage rather than, say, an 
over-exploited aquifer or a desalination plant.  
A further challenge is the institutional capacity required to regulate water pricing arrangements. 
The pricing schedule would need to be determined by an independent agency such that the 
volumetric price approximated foregone energy revenues; this is not a straightforward task because 
it is difficult to specify when a given unit of water would have been used to generate electricity 
otherwise, nor what the prevailing value of that water would be. Monitoring and enforcement of 
non-compliance is necessary, as are transparent and accountable regulatory instruments. Both the 
equity and institutional capacity challenges discussed here reinforce that water pricing would need 
to occur within an already developed system of water licenses, operating constraints, and, 
potentially, financial safeguards and corporate social responsibility initiatives.  
2.4.3. Climate/Green Performance Bonds 
Climate and green bonds constitute a rapidly growing source of finance for investments in climate 
change mitigation, climate change adaptation, and environment sustainability. As of 2018, the total 
value of climate and green bonds was estimated to be USD$ 1.45 trillion globally (CBI/HSBC 
2018). These financial instruments enable governments, corporations, or banks to issue debt that 
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is purchased by investors (similar to a loan), with a schedule of interest payments, and the original 
value of the debt repaid upon maturity of the bond at a predetermined date. The difference between 
green or climate bonds with standard bonds is that all or part of the loan funds projects or outcomes 
that support environmental sustainability and/or climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Investors purchase these bonds to fulfil corporate social responsibility targets and, in some 
jurisdictions, benefit from preferential tax on income from interest payments. Certification 
schemes can provide ex ante (i.e. before-the-event) verification of a bonds’ expected outcomes 
and impacts, the most prominent example being the Climate Bond Initiative (CBI) which maintains 
a list of approved verifiers and methodologies.  
The hydropower industry’s access to the green and climate bond market has been restricted thus 
far because of: (i) concerns over methane emissions in tropical reservoirs, and (ii) concerns over 
the potential negative and social impacts of large hydropower reservoirs (IHA 2018b; Ironside 
2015). A Hydropower Technical Working Group under the CBI has been established to specify 
screening criteria and associated methodologies to “identify and monitor hydropower investments 
which deliver climate change mitigation benefits and/or incorporate adaptation and resilience 
impacts” (CBI 2018a). Although green/climate bonds could facilitate investments in multipurpose 
reservoir infrastructure, the ex ante nature of certification creates major limitations. Similar to 
conditional safeguards, questionnaires and scorecards to determine the capacity for a financed 
project to deliver water services under risks do not ensure that they will be actually delivered after 
a bond has been certified and issued.  
As of March 2019, the criteria for hydropower certification have not been finalised and published 
under the CBI, but the water infrastructure criteria provide useful insights into their potential 
structure (CBI 2018b). There is a climate change mitigation component and an adaptation and 
resilience component. The latter requires the bond issuer to undertake a vulnerability assessment 
and prepare an adaptation plan if the funded asset or project has an expected lifetime over 20 years. 
The verifier evaluates the assessment using 89 questions across four categories (allocation, 
governance, diagnostics, and nature-based solutions) and the plan across 6 questions. If the total 
score is more than 60% for all categories, then the bond is certified. Screening processes like these 
are undoubtedly valuable and, applied to hydropower, could generate important information and 
promote behavioral change on the part of the bond issuer. But they would not provide tangible 
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incentives to reallocate water efficiently and equitably during operations: reporting is voluntary 
and compliance and enforcement measures are absent. Following CBI certification, bond issuers 
are required to prepare reports, but verification is not required and there is no process for 
decertification or any other compliance mechanism. Hence, there would be no punishment for a 
hydropower company issuing a bond for, say, a multipurpose project supporting urban water 
security, and theb not operating the reservoir to deliver that outcome during a drought or if water 
demand changed. Further, investors in these bonds would not be assured that the actual outcomes 
of their investment will generate planned outcomes. 
In order to address these compliance challenges and facilitate the use of climate and green bonds 
to finance multipurpose projects, I propose a specific class of climate and green bonds for 
application to hydropower reservoirs. The instrument could provide finance to both new and 
existing projects through a variable interest bond that is conditional on the delivery of water 
services. An indicator is defined for a specific level of performance with regards to climate change 
adaptation or environmental sustainability; the indicator could be input-based (e.g. volume of 
water delivered to farmers) or outcome-based (e.g. farmers’ water security). If the condition is met 
within an interval between interest payments (e.g. a 6- or 12-month period), then the payment is 
subject to a low interest rate. If the condition is not met, the hydropower company pays interest at 
a higher rate and the investor transfers the difference to the beneficiaries of water services via an 
established intermediary (e.g. local government or civil society organisation) as a direct cash 
transfer (e.g. emergency assistance during drought) or program funds (e.g. supporting drought 
management programs). Rather than a binary high- or low-rate, a schedule of interest rates could 
incentivise progressively improved performance (e.g. moving to a lower schedule on a multi-level 
scale for every successive interval when conditions are not met). This framework combines 
elements of four different types of financial instruments: (i) climate/green bonds; (ii) performance 
bonds that are commonly used in the construction industry to penalise the failure of contractors to 
meet scheduled targets, (iii) index-based weather insurance and climate derivatives (Denaro et al. 
2017; Foster et al. 2015; GCube 2015; World Bank 2013a), and (iv) social impact bonds that 
provide outcome-based payments (Gustafsson-Wright et al. 2018). 
The framework of conditions and incentives would be suitable for all hydropower projects 
regardless of whether multipurpose operations are an explicit objective and, indeed, for any 
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infrastructure investment where the outcomes are a result of how it is operated (e.g. drip-irrigation 
technology) and not the existence of the infrastructure in and of itself (e.g. a dyke to protect against 
sea-level rise). The objectives of climate/green performances bonds are three-fold: (i) provide 
hydropower companies with both finance and a financial incentive to deliver water services and 
support the resilience of multipurpose hydropower systems (including all water users); (ii) in the 
event that specific indicators or outcomes are not met through the company’s actions, provide 
financial resources to support the economic sectors and water users adversely affected by water 
security risks and/or the failure to reallocate water; and (iii) assure investors that they are funding 
the resilience of water users within the multipurpose reservoir system to climate change (in the 
case of a climate bond) and/or the environment sustainability of hydropower operations under both 
energy and water risks (in the case of a green bond). 
 
Figure 2.3. Framework of a climate/green performance bond.  
Chapter 2 
43 | P a g e  
Figure 2.3 illustrates the process: 
1) The bond issuer cooperates with a financial institution to design the bond, with the 
parameters of the agreement being developed through consultation with other stakeholders 
(e.g. beneficiaries of water services, regulatory agencies, certification organisation); 
2) The investor transfers the principal to the bond issuer – the face value of the bond that will 
be returned to the bond issuer upon maturity of the bond; 
3) The hydropower company invests in the assets or project that the bond is designed to fund. 
If the provision of water services meets performance conditions, the hydropower company 
pays interest to the investor at a lower rate. If performance conditions are not met, the 
hydropower company pays interest to the investor at a higher rate. In the latter case, the 
investor transfers the additional interest repayment to the intended beneficiaries of water 
services via direct payments (e.g. cash transfers) or through programs delivered by existing 
local organisations; 
4) The bond matures and the hydropower company pays back the principal to the investor. 
Climate/green performance bonds could potentially be sold by the initial investor in a secondary 
market. For example, a financial institution familiar with the climate/green bond market could on-
sell bonds to corporations, government entities, or individuals seeking to invest in climate change 
adaptation or environmental sustainability. In the case that a government entity was a primary or 
secondary investor, this arrangement could supplement regulations intended to support provision 
of water services and provide a source of finance to ameliorate negative impacts from hydropower 
operations not delivering performance targets. 
Performance bonds are a means to support system resistance and robustness, as well as overcome 
various barriers to water reallocation. In the event of a short-term adverse risk, such as a drought, 
the hydropower companies have an incentive to maintain water services delivery or provide 
additional resources to offset adverse impacts on other water users. Further, key thresholds for 
system performance can be explicitly built into contract design, thereby supporting system 
robustness. Performance bonds could provide incentives to shorten system recovery time after a 
minimum threshold was breached, but that would depend on contract design (e.g. interest payment 
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intervals). In terms of water reallocation, these bonds support investment in infrastructure that can 
deliver multipurpose operations as well as the efficient and equitable use of that infrastucture. 
Financial incentives for hydropower companies to deliver water services could help overcome the 
vested interest in maintaining minimum deliveries or, in other words, create an opportunity cost 
for not delivering external benefits when their value is high. While this instrument could support 
the delivery of private goods, it could be most useful in the context of public goods or common-
pool resources, particularly where a government organisation is the investor. 
The major challenges to implementing climate/green performance bonds is that they would require 
input from a range of stakeholders in the design of the contract and the broader program. These 
transaction costs could be offset, however, by connecting their design to other regulatory 
processes, such as (re)licensing procedures, and building on the information and stakeholder 
relationships developed therein. The design of these bonds would be complex and require detailed 
analysis at the beginning to ensure that the appropriate incentives were in place. If outcome-based 
indicators were used to assess performance (e.g. household water security), then monitoring and 
evaluation costs could be high.  
2.5. Conclusion 
This Chapter argues that multipurpose hydropower development requires more than planning and 
intentions. Hydropower companies need defined incentives to efficiently and equitably reallocate 
water as the net benefits of energy and water services change. The resilience of a hydropower 
project is the resilience of the encompassing social-ecological system; this important system 
characteristic is one that can be defined and its components (resistance, recovery time, robustness) 
supported by dedicated measures. Here, I propose three governance reforms that provide a 
dynamic regulatory framework to manage emerging water and energy risks. Across all of these 
proposals and, indeed, conventional regulatory arrangements there is a common need for strong 
institutional capacity and a portfolio of governance instruments. This commonality emphasises 
that these proposals are complementary to existing instruments and require their foundation for 
implementation.  
Whether and how particular reforms could be implemented will depend on the jurisdiction and the 
stakeholders involved. In any case, the following actions would inform their development for any 
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given context and provide insights for broader application: 
(i) Measure and project water supply and demand to inform valuation of water services and 
governance reforms (Garrick et al. 2017); 
(ii) Conduct hydro-economic modelling of specific reforms or alternative parameter settings 
to provide insights into the relative benefits and costs of altering status quo instruments, 
particularly under alternative scenarios for water and energy risks; 
(iii) Use participatory processes (e.g. Reed 2008; Wyrwoll et al. 2018) to integrate equity 
considerations into decision-making and identify externalities;  
(iv) Conduct real-world pilots, particularly in the case of water pricing and climate/green 
performance bonds where broader institutional reforms may not be necessary.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
Decision-Making for Systemic Water Risks: Insights from a Participatory 
Risk Assessment Process in Vietnam 
3.1. Introduction 
Recent attention to the interdependencies between food, energy, environment, and water systems 
has prompted calls for their coordinated management across levels and scales of governance (Hoff 
2011). Here, we evaluate the development of national policy responses to systemic water risks. 
Systemic risks transfer instability and shocks across network linkages and can cause major failures 
in affected systems. Water systems are important vulnerabilities because they can transfer 
instability across food production, energy generation, ecosystem health, economic development, 
and social well-being.  
Advances in the research and practice of risk, water, and natural resources management provide 
tools to analyse systemic water risks and inform cross-sectoral planning, including causal risk 
assessment (Fenton & Neil 2012), water resources systems analysis (Brown et al. 2015), and 
participatory approaches (von Korff et al. 2012). As yet, there is only limited understanding about 
how to combine different knowledge types and different tools to support decision-making under 
extreme uncertainty (Döll & Romero-Lankao 2017; Hale et al. 2015), and also an unmet need for 
physical science and economic research on water resources to better integrate social dynamics and, 
hence, provide a useful basis for real-world decisions (Loucks 2017).  
A key challenge to better decision-making on systemic risks is that uncertainty and complexity 
undermine the utility of conventional analytical techniques (van Asselt & Renn 2011). National-
level risk studies often replicate the limitations of sub-national or private sector assessments, such 
as the use of two-dimensional risk matrices that do not incorporate uncertainty (Aven & Cox 2016). 
Although frameworks have been developed and applied for systemic risk management (IRGC 
2012; Renn & Walker 2008) and a small number of countries conduct national risk assessments 
(e.g. Cabinet Office 2015; National Institute for Public Health and the Environment 2014), we are 
not aware of any cases where systemic risk analysis has guided national policy on food-energy-
environment-water systems. Systemic risks are particularly acute for water security and they 
require adaptive management across the multi-level and multi-scale networks characteristic of 
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water governance (Pahl-Wostl 2016). While our focus in this paper is on water, our approach can 
be extended to risks emerging from food, energy, or ecosystems. While systemic risks are often 
regarded in the context of global networks and shocks (Goldin & Vogel 2010; Helbing 2013) and 
supranational management of transboundary water resources is one important consideration, our 
analysis focuses on the incorporation of sub-national governance dynamics into national level 
decision-making.  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 defines systemic water risks and outlines the 
dynamics of multi-level and multi-scale water governance networks. Section 3.3 presents a causal 
risk modeling and participatory approach for systemic risk management. Section 3.4 shows how a 
process based on this approach was piloted in an applied research project in Vietnam and describes 
the underlying water governance context. Section 3.5 draws on the results of that project to provide 
general insights on how researchers can facilitate the integration of sub-national dynamics into 
national-level policy on systemic water risks. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2. Management and Governance of Water Risks Within Complex Food-Energy-
Environment-Water Systems 
3.2.1. Systemic Water Risks 
Failures across linked systems can be catastrophic: abrupt climate variability and change, for 
example, have led to social and political crises throughout history via droughts, food shortages and 
conflicts (Haug et al. 2003; Parker 2013). Globalisation and human activity are causing systemic 
risks to emerge that can transfer instability across large distances and cause failure in the key 
systems and infrastructure on which societies depend (OECD 2003; World Economic Forum 
2015). The policy challenge is that systemic risks are dynamic and non-linear; they evade top-
down control and generate surprising behavior in affected systems (Helbing 2013).  
Systemic risks arise from the complex dynamical systems in which they operate. Key 
characteristics of these systems include: diversity in system components; dynamic structures in 
which those components interact; interdependencies that vary in strength, directedness, and time-
scale; and the components of the system adapting, learning, and self-organising (Page 2015). The 
aggregation of non-linear interactions between individuals, organisations, ecosystems, physical 
infrastructure, and other system components leads to macro-level phenomena that, in turn, affect 
the subsequent interactions of these components (Levin 2002; Page 2015). Abrupt changes in the 
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dynamics of complex systems can be induced by random noise, endogenous trends within the 
system, and/or external forces pushing system components beyond ‘tipping points’ and into 
alternative states (Helbing 2010; Lenton 2013). Such shifts can lead to cascading failures or, in 
some cases, greater resilience and system stability (Biggs et al. 2012). Feedback loops connecting 
system components may either amplify (i.e. positive feedback) or dampen (i.e. negative feedbacks) 
shocks (Liu et al. 2007).  
The financial crisis and food-energy price spikes of 2007-08 demonstrated how quickly systemic 
risks can generate economic and social crises in the modern, inter-connected world (Bizikova et 
al. 2013; Goldin & Vogel 2010). Discourse across policy, practice, and research has subsequently 
emphasised the management of connected systems which underpin human societies and 
ecosystems (Centeno et al. 2015; Oppenheimer et al. 2014; World Bank 2013; World Economic 
Forum 2015). Central elements include: (1) the linkages, or ‘nexus’, between food, water, energy, 
and other connected systems (see Weitz et al. 2017 and Wichelns 2017 for recent reviews); and 
(2) the ‘resilience’ of social, ecological, governance, and infrastructure systems to environmental 
and man-made shocks (Hallegatte et al. 2017; OECD 2014; World Energy Council 2015), where 
resilience is, typically, defined as the capacity of systems to adsorb and adapt to shocks, re-organise 
their components, and subsequently grow and thrive beyond the pre-shock level of system 
performance (see Holling 1973; Levin et al. 1996; Walker et al. 2004; Folke et al. 2010).  
The burgeoning attention towards ‘the nexus’ and resilience has highlighted key issues regarding 
food-energy-environment-water systems. Strong interdependencies can exist between and within 
these systems (Hoff 2011; Ringler et al. 2013; Scanlon et al. 2017). Trade-offs exist: increased 
water allocation to one sector, for example, can cause networked shocks by reducing water 
availability for others (Zeng et al. 2017). Global population and consumption trends are 
undermining food-energy-environment-water systems and are a key cause of social conflict and 
political crises (Beddington 2009). Feedback effects can, and do, occur while short-sighted policy 
and management decisions can produce unintended, perverse consequences (Hussey & Pittock 
2012; Pfeiffer & Lin 2014). Framing and addressing major, systemic instabilities must also account 
for institutions (Weitz et al. 2017) and the agency of people and communities at the local level 
(Allouche et al. 2015). In sum, the systems associated with food, water, energy, and the 
environment comprise a complex system that generates systemic risks.  
Decision-Making for Systemic Water Risks 
50 | P a g e  
Water resources and water infrastructure are key nodes and pathways for the transfer of instabilities 
across food, energy, and environmental systems. Low water availability, for instance, is a key risk 
to both hydropower and thermal energy generation, with higher water temperatures due to climate 
change further undermining the efficiency of thermal plants (Rodriguez et al. 2013; van Vliet et 
al. 2016). Global agricultural trade can generate networked shocks by disseminating the impacts 
of water scarcity across countries (Tamea et al. 2016). Non-point source water pollution embodies 
the management challenge posed by dynamic, uncertain interactions occurring at the micro-scale 
(Patterson et al. 2013), but is also caused by global patterns of food demand and agricultural trade 
(Xie & Ringler 2017).  
Water security has been defined as the “the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access 
to adequate quantities of and acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-
being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and 
water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability” 
(UN-Water 2013). Water insecurity is a key conflict multiplier in fragile states (Sadoff et al. 2017) 
and an increasingly important driver of migration (Miletto et al. 2017). Rural women in developing 
countries are disproportionally affected by water insecurity and their limited resources for 
adaptation can lead to further disempowerment (Parker et al. 2016). 
The systemic risks associated with water resources are increasingly recognised (Pahl-Wostl 2016; 
World Economic Forum 2015). Adapting the typology of OECD (2013) and drawing on the UN-
Water (2013) definition of water security, we propose four sets of ‘systemic water risks’, or events 
where water resources and their management transfer shocks and cause failures across connected 
systems: (1) water demand exceeds the supply needed to meet particular objectives over a specific 
time period; (2) inadequate water quality for a specific purpose, such as provision of drinking 
water; (3) excess water that prevents objectives being met or imposes costs, such as flood events; 
and (4) the loss of a key freshwater ecosystem function or component, such as a wetland. Table 
3.1 describes elements of systemic instability that food-energy-environment-water systems can 
exhibit, with specific examples from water resources management.   
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Element Description Example from water resources 
management 
Threshold effects Unexpected transition or systemic shifts Freshwater eutrophication 
Randomness in a 
strongly coupled 
system 
Mean approximations provide inaccurate 
forecasts of system behavior; strong 
correlations between performance of 
linked systems 
Unpredictable hydrological variability  
Positive feedback Dynamic instability and amplification 
effect, equilibrium or stationary state 
cannot be maintained 
Policies for water-use efficient irrigation 
infrastructure causing a ‘rebound effect’ in 
water consumption and reducing return 
flows to ecosystems 
Wrong timing 
(mismatch of 
adjustment 
processes) 
Over-reaction, growing oscillations, or 
loss of synchronisation 
The disruption of downstream 
environmental flows by hydropower 
operations 
Strong interaction, 
contagion 
Cascade effects Droughts in hydropower-dominated energy 
sectors causing blackouts & impacting 
groundwater extraction for irrigation 
Complex structure Perturbations in one network affect 
another one 
Deforestation for food production causing 
soil erosion and reduced runoff that 
negatively impact aquatic ecosystems 
Complex dynamics Self-organised dynamics, emergence of 
new systemic properties 
Aggregation of total water demand across 
many water users 
Complex function Sensitivity, opaqueness, scientific 
unknowns 
Uncertain origins of non-point source water 
pollution  
Complex control Time for computational solution explodes 
with system size; delayed or non-optimal 
solutions 
The economic value of water across 
different uses varying across time, 
geography, and scale 
Optimisation Orientation at state of high performance; 
loss of reserves or redundancies 
Exposure of multiple agricultural supply 
chains to water insecurity disruptions in one 
location 
Competition Incompatible preferences or goals Rivalrous water consumption under limited 
supply  
Innovation Introduction of new system components, 
designs or properties; structural instability 
Ongoing water reform processes; disruptive 
technologies, such as solar water pumps 
Table 3.1. Elements of systemic instability in food-water-energy-environment systems 
originating from water resources and/or their management. Adapted from (Helbing 2013). 
3.2.2. Multi-Level and Multi-Scale Governance Networks 
Research and practice of managing systemic risks and enhancing resilience provide a range of 
principles for food-energy-environment-water systems (Biggs et al. 2012; Goldin & Mariathasan 
2014; Helbing 2013). They include: (i) preparing for shocks and system failures through 
measurement, analysis, and experimentation; (ii) maintaining or developing system diversity and 
sub-component redundancy; (iii) broadening participation in management decisions; (iv) limiting 
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system size to establish an upper bound on disasters; (v) incorporating frictional mechanisms to 
produce a manageable state when unpredictable instability occurs; (vi) focusing management 
actions on variables that strongly influence the entire system and the feedback effects that cause 
nonlinear changes or regime shifts; and (vii) reducing connectivity across networks to prevent 
contagion if one component fails.  
These management principles require decentralisation, flexibility, and patterns of information 
exchange that are inconsistent with top-down governance. But they also require system-wide 
knowledge and coordination to understand and influence micro-level dynamics. In practice, water 
governance regimes in a given country encompass multiple levels of government (Daniell et al. 
2014; Moss & Newig, 2010). We distinguish national-level systemic water risks as having 
sufficient scope to severely impact the social and economic institutions underpinning a nation 
state. Equally, we could conceive of ‘local-level’, ‘global-level’, or ‘transboundary’ systemic 
water risks corresponding with the geographic scale of impact and governance. Importantly, water 
governance is more than just government: it involves the structures and processes through which 
both public and private actors interact to regulate the development and management of water 
resources (OECD 2011; Pahl-Wostl 2009). Governance regimes are networks with multiple scales 
ordered across different levels, including: the administrative scale of government and the 
ministries, departments and agencies at different levels; the institutional scale for rules governing 
social and economic interactions; the management scale of strategies, programs, and projects; and 
private stakeholders and decision-makers (Daniell & Barreteau 2014).  
Figure 3.1a. illustrates examples of the interactions that can occur across water governance 
networks through the material/non-material flows and costs/benefits imposed on a particular 
level/scale by decisions at another level/scale (Cash et al. 2006; Daniell & Barreteau 2014). The 
national government provides funding and policy directions to the provincial level of 
administration. Local agencies provide information to provincial agencies regarding the status of 
local water resources. Large industrial water users pay a pollution charge to provincial authorities. 
Water extraction by upstream farming households decreases inflows to a water supply company’s 
reservoir. Thus, a new strategy to increase irrigation water efficiency requires a change to laws 
and, in turn, results in new supporting regulations and programs, such as drip irrigation subsidies. 
Projects implemented at the local level provide knowledge on how programs should be 
restructured to achieve the objectives of strategies.  
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The actions of and interactions between decision-makers at all levels/scales aggregate into macro-
level phenomena that describe the state or performance of a water system at the national level. 
Figure 3.1b. provides a stylised representation of this aggregation and its implications:  
(i) In period t, actions, decisions and interactions occur within the water governance network 
of a food-energy-environment-water system, such as farmers increasing groundwater 
extractions or a new law to reduce water pollution being implemented through sub-national 
programs. Consequently, macro-level phenomena emerge during period t, such as water 
insecurity or increased resilience of the food-energy-environment-water system. 
(ii) The decisions, actions, and interactions during period t generate dynamics within 
governance networks that cause feedback effects in period t+1. In the case of drip irrigation 
subsidies, farmers might be encouraged to extend their land under cultivation and planting 
perennial crops, thereby increasing overall water consumption. For the water pollution law 
and programs example, industrial water users may invest in pollution mitigation 
technologies rather than pay fines. 
(iii) The macro-level phenomena generated during period t have an impact on governance 
actions, decisions, and interactions within period t+1. For example, water insecurity at time 
t may cause rural populations to migrate to other locations where water is less scarce, or 
prompt local government agencies to re-purpose existing finances to provide emergency 
loans for struggling farmers. 
(iv) Governance actions, decisions and interactions aggregate once again, and new macro-level 
phenomena emerges in period t+1. 
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Figure 3.1. Emergent phenomena in complex food-energy-environment-water systems from 
interactions within water governance networks. Figure 3.1a. (left): Examples of interactions 
between different level and scales of water governance. Adapted from Cash et al. (2006), Daniell 
& Barreteau (2014). Figure 3.1b. (right): The aggregation of governance actions and interactions 
into macro-level phenomena and feedback effects on the next time period. Adapted from Page 
(2015). See main text for further description of both figures.  
In the context of systemic risk management, planning for and attempting to understand the 
dynamic actions and interactions across governance networks is critical to resilient decision-
making. The history of water and land resources management is replete with examples of short-
sighted national policy decisions that caused feedbacks and undermined resilience. Examples 
include: biofuel production subsidies driving up food and energy prices (Mitchell 2008); flood 
levee construction and land re-zoning leading to urban settlement in floodplains and reduced 
perceptions of large-scale flood risks (Ludy & Kondolf 2012); and infrastructure-based incentives 
to recover water for the environment causing reduced return flows and less flexibility of farm 
production systems (Adamson & Loch 2014; Qureshi et al. 2011). Inaccurate mental models of 
natural resource systems and their governance networks have often guided the development of top-
down policy prescriptions that end in failure (Ostrom & Janssen 2004; Ostrom et al. 2007). In 
water resources, new management concepts may snowball in popularity through the practitioner 
and research communities, such that the latest ‘solutions’ are applied inappropriately (Molle 2008).  
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An array of policy prescriptions are gaining traction globally for addressing systemic water risks, 
including: technology-based increases in irrigation water-use efficiency (World Economic Forum 
Water Initiative 2011), public-private partnerships in irrigation infrastructure (Mandri-Perrott & 
Bisbey 2016), multi-purpose operation of hydropower reservoirs (Branche 2015), and the 
establishment of markets to allocate water (Grafton et al. 2016). Although these approaches may 
have been successful in certain contexts, positive translations and outcomes are not guaranteed in 
new ones (Keulertz et al. 2016). Water governance networks respond in dynamic and often 
unexpected ways to national policy interventions. Any policy approach requires an array of 
supporting actions; water markets, for example, are unlikely to produce efficient water allocation 
without well-resourced, accountable institutions for monitoring and compliance. Rather than 
prescriptive solutions to systemic water risks, portfolios of policy options need to be evaluated and 
tested across the dynamics of complex food-energy-environment-water systems and their 
governance networks. 
3.3. Methods 
3.3.1. Causal Risk Modeling 
Conventional approaches to risk assessment and management are, in general, inappropriate for 
systemic risks (van Asselt & Renn 2011). The often-used “risk equals probability times 
consequence” approach, for example, often conflates very high likelihood-insignificant 
consequence events with extremely rare-catastrophic events and does not provides the information 
nor framework for thinking through causation and the effects of management actions (Grafton & 
Little 2017). Further, the multiple consequences from a risk event are inadequately represented by 
a single point in a matrix and uncertainty is rarely incorporated (Aven & Cox 2016). To inform 
better decision-making, an understanding of causality and the uncertainties of costs and benefits 
of risk management options is needed, based on how individuals, groups, and other system 
components will respond to risks and policies (Paté-Cornell & Cox 2014).  
There are many valid definitions of risk and approaches to risk management (see Aven et al., 
(2015) for a review). We consider an event-based, causal approach as appropriate for analysing 
and addressing systemic water risks. Causal models can estimate cause-effect pathways and the 
strength of interdependencies through quantitative tools, such as Bayesian analysis (Fenton & Neil 
2012), and graphical modeling tools, e.g. causal loop diagrams and decision trees (Pearl 2000).  
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3.3.2. Participatory Risk Assessment 
Inputs from technical specialists, decision-makers, and stakeholders are, typically, needed to fully 
understand and manage a systemic water risk. Major technical advances have occurred in modeling 
the physical and economic aspects of water systems, but a critical weakness remains: the inability 
to dynamically represent water management decisions (Brown et al. 2015). Moreover, too often 
water resources modeling is not conducted and communicated in a manner that supports real 
decision-making (Reed & Kasprzyk 2009). Overlaying this need are the increasingly complex 
interconnections between water risks and social systems. As a result, technical experts need to 
work with stakeholders on developing conceptual models of risks, defining objectives, and 
understanding how decision-makers across water governance networks respond to policy 
interventions (Loucks 2017). To mitigate this challenge, participatory and collaborative modeling 
approaches have been developed and successfully applied to inform water resources planning 
under uncertainty (e.g. Kwakkel et al. 2016; Palmer et al. 2013; Werick & Whipple 1994). These 
approaches include: the incorporation of expert judgement where quantitative data is scarce (e.g. 
Hall et al. 2005), challenging and reconstructing decision-makers’ underlying heuristics (e.g. 
Smajgl et al. 2015), and evaluating the robustness of management options across multiple 
scenarios (e.g. Groves et al. 2017). 
Under uncertainty and complexity, scientific analysis by technical specialists is frequently better 
placed to inform decision-making if it incorporates stakeholder and decision-maker knowledge. 
Equally, participatory planning approaches to risk management benefit from the integration of 
specialist knowledge and scientific modeling. Methodologies for and applications of participatory 
processes to the management of water and other natural resources (see Voinov et al. (2016) and 
von Korff et al. (2012) for reviews), typically involve interactive workshops where stakeholders 
and decision-makers interact in structured discussions concerning an objective, such as 
formulating a resource management plan. Their benefits can include greater acceptance of 
decisions by stakeholders (von Korff et al. 2012) and enabling adaptive management (Folke et al. 
2005). But there are also challenges: power imbalances between participants can lead to artificial 
consensus (Few et al. 2007), skilled facilitation is necessary (Reed 2008), and appropriate 
participants need to be engaged (Glicken 2000).  
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In the context of systemic water risks, a key challenge for participatory processes is complexity. 
The practical knowledge and experience of decision-makers and stakeholders may be insufficient 
to delineate and identify causal pathways between complex physical, economic, and social systems 
(Reed 2008). Individuals and groups generally rely on beliefs, values, and heuristics to process 
information (Glynn et al. 2017), and they do not always make rational decisions under uncertainty 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The heterogeneous distributional impacts of risks mean that 
different stakeholders will view outcomes differently (Hallegatte & Rentschler 2015). Sharing 
technical knowledge through skilled facilitation can enable a better understanding of scientific 
principles and an awareness of external shocks and system components that are beyond 
stakeholders’ and decision-makers’ direct experience.  
Scientific modeling and participatory processes can be viewed as different ends of a spectrum of 
risk assessment tools and knowledge. The key point is that they need to be blended through 
participatory modeling, foresight workshops, and other methods where both decision-makers and 
researchers are active participants in the risk assessment process. How this blending occurs and 
when either should be emphasised depends on data availability, the management context, and 
objectives. Importantly, this mixed methods approach to risk assessment and management 
addresses the need for adaptive processes of social learning (see Folke et al. 2005 & Pahl-Wostl 
2009) that, ideally, lead to actual decision-making and/or inform it in a useful way.  
3.3.3. The Risks and Options Assessment for Decision-Making (ROAD) Process 
Advances in risk and decision analysis have resulted in causal approaches to risk-based decision-
making (e.g. Fenton & Neil 2012). Frameworks have been developed for managing risks from a 
systems governance perspective (e.g. International Risk Governance Council 2012), 
conceptualising interactions between food-energy-environment-water systems (e.g. Bizikova 
2013; Smajgl et al. 2016), and analysing the dynamics of social-ecological systems (e.g. Ostrom 
2009). Here, we briefly review a tool whose design draws on those and other developments in the 
analysis of risks and social-ecological systems: the Risks and Options Assessment for Decision-
making (ROAD) process (Grafton et al. 2016).  
The ROAD process provides decision-makers with a tool to understand and manage risks that 
affect the resilience of food-energy-environment-water systems. It is designed to be flexible, 
compatible with other risk assessment and decision-making tools, and adaptable across different 
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institutional contexts. A primary function is to enable decision-makers to identify connections 
across systems and to develop a portfolio of complementary options to address those causal 
linkages. The ROAD process is updated to reflect lessons from real-world applications, and a guide 
and project case studies can be found at the website of the Food Energy Environment Water 
(FE2W) Network (http://www.fe2wnetwork.org).  
While ROAD can be adapted for independent use by decision-makers, trained facilitators play an 
important role in collating knowledge, designing a tailored process, facilitating participatory 
workshops, and other aspects of application.  
The causal, event-based approach to risk in the ROAD process delineates the components of risk 
and management options into the following elements: 
Risk event: an event with uncertain consequences; 
Trigger: an event that is the immediate cause of a risk event; 
Driver: a threat, trend or other risk source causing a trigger to occur; 
Consequence: outcome of a risk event affecting objectives; 
Control: an action that modifies the likelihood or the consequences of a driver or trigger 
causing a risk; 
Mitigant: an action that alleviates the after-the-event consequences of a risk; 
Likelihood: An estimate of the chance that an event will occur. Can be expressed 
quantitatively (as a defined probability between 0 and 1), or as a probability interval (e.g. 
Very Low, Low, Medium...), or qualitatively. 
A key intermediate step in the ROAD process is the definition and iteration of a causal risk model 
using stakeholder and technical knowledge. This graphical tool provides a foundation for assessing 
risk management options and evaluating the outcomes of decisions (see Food Energy Environment 
Water Network (2017) for subsequent steps and stages in the process). Figure 3.2 presents a 
hypothetical causal risk diagram for systemic water insecurity. Water is used to generate energy, 
produce crops, and support wetland ecosystem. Electricity is sourced from local hydropower 
generation and electricity imported through a long-distance transmission cable. Agricultural 
production is increasingly focused on a crop that fetches high prices relative to alternative crops.
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Figure 3.2. Hypothetical causal model of a systemic water risk. Straight arrows indicate cause-
effect relationships. Curved arrows indicate feedback effects, with the signs indicating amplifying 
feedback (+) and dampening feedback (-). The cause-effect linkages targeted by specific controls 
and mitigants are indicated (e.g. C1, M1), as are their secondary impacts (e.g. C2*(-), C4*(+)). 
The negative sign qualifying C2* indicates that scarcity-based water pricing dampens the level or 
reduce the likelihood of crop yield losses. The positive sign qualifying C4* indicates that building 
new water storage will increase the degree or likelihood of wetland degradation. 
The risk event in Figure 3.2 of excess water demand during the growing season is caused by three 
triggers: (1) water withdrawals across all farmers peaking at the same time as the primary crop 
reaches maturity (when watering requirements are highest); (2) a drought; and (3) failure of the 
transmission cable. Trigger 1 is caused by the trend towards less diversity in crop production; 
Trigger 2 is caused by the shift to an extreme phase in a climate oscillation that strongly affects 
weather; Trigger 3 is caused by electricity demand growing beyond the capacity of local 
hydropower generation, leading to an increased reliance on imported electricity. The risk event 
leads to three consequences that generate possible feedback effects: higher crop prices further 
encourage mono-cropping, reduced crop yields drive crop prices higher, and higher electricity 
prices encourage industrial users to improve energy efficiency and develop off-grid generation.  
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A range of options address specific causal linkages and two of them are considered likely to 
generate secondary impacts (or feedback effects); in addition to controlling the level of peak water 
demand, scarcity-based agricultural water pricing is also expected to reduce the level of crop yield 
reductions if farmers become more efficient in their water use. One option, new water storage 
infrastructure, is expected to amplify the degradation of wetlands. The directed arrows in Figure 
3.2 indicate causal pathways between model components and the arrow types estimate the strength 
of the cause-effect relationship, e.g. there is a high likelihood that the climate oscillation phase 
transition could cause drought. 
Real-world participatory process could progressively build the causal model by: (1) sequentially 
identifying the risk, triggers, drivers, and consequences; (2) identifying feedback effects; (3) 
estimating likelihoods; (4) developing options; and (5) identifying secondary impacts associated 
with options. This hypothetical, qualitative example does not need to assume time consistency 
between triggers and consequences; in practice, this may be necessary to inform quantitative 
modeling of options. Both the risk event and consequences are value-neutral in recognition of the 
different perceptions and outcomes for stakeholders.  
3.4. Application 
This section outlines the context and application of an applied research project conducted in Don 
Duong District of Lam Dong Province, Vietnam. The project began at the end of the record-
breaking 2015-2016 drought in Vietnam that provided impetus for the national government to 
accelerate a reform agenda for agricultural water management. The project site is the location for 
a planned pilot of new water management policies by national and provincial government 
agencies. The risk assessment activities undertaken in the research project were an input to the 
design of the policy pilot. 
3.4.1. Case study: Piloting Water Management Reforms in Don Duong District of Lam Dong 
Province, Vietnam. 
3.4.1.1. Systemic Water Risks in Vietnam 
Vietnam is highly exposed to systemic water risks of national significance. Population growth and 
economic development are driving rapid increases in water demand across all sectors; total water 
consumption is projected to almost double between 2013 and 2030 (ADB 2013a). On the supply-
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side, severe drought and saline intrusion have caused major crop losses and reduced household 
water access across key food production and population centers of Vietnam (United Nations 
Disaster Risk Management Team 2015). Flooding and storms are an ever-present threat for any 
coastal country with a monsoonal climate, but Vietnam’s long coast line, mountainous geography, 
and large deltas render households, farming systems, and physical infrastructure particularly 
exposed to climate variability and climate change (ADB 2013b). Freshwater ecosystems have 
steadily degraded, particularly in the Mekong and Red River Deltas where patchworks of canals 
and levees have been built over the last two centuries with the goal of intensive rice production. 
Agricultural productivity and rural health have been undermined by heavy pesticide and fertiliser 
use (Berg et al. 2017) and are increasingly exposed to water pollution from industrial production 
(ICEM 2007).  
These instabilities in Vietnam’s water systems are tightly coupled with broader economic and 
social considerations. In order to maintain pace with annual growth in electricity demand of 10% 
to 12%, major additions in water-dependent power generation technologies are planned to 2030, 
such as coal (39 GW) and hydropower (11 GW) (Government of Vietnam 2016). Despite 
Vietnam’s economic transition, 43% of the population remained dependent on agricultural 
activities in 2015 (World Bank 2017) and agriculture will continue as an important economic 
sector over coming decades (OECD 2015b). The health impacts and economic dislocation caused 
by extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts, and man-made disasters, such as dam 
failures, are a key constraint on rural households’ livelihood security.  
3.4.1.2. Water Governance in Vietnam  
Similar to most countries, policy development and implementation are highly fragmented across 
the administrative scale of water resources governance in Vietnam (see Loan (2012) and Waibel 
(2010) for reviews). The key ministries for water resources management are the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD). MONRE’s mandate covers state management of water and natural 
resources, hydro-meteorological assessment, and climate change. MARD’s mandate includes 
irrigation works, rural water services, and the prevention and control of disasters, such as floods 
and droughts. Since the inception of MONRE in 2002, a series of reforms has addressed 
overlapping mandates and institutional competition between the two ministries (Molle & Hoanh 
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2011). Other national ministries have functions relevant to water governance, including the 
Ministry of Construction (urban water supply and sanitation), the Ministry of Health (drinking and 
household water), the Ministry of Industry and Trade (hydropower), the Ministry of Finance 
(allocation of state budget), and the Ministry of Planning and Investment (water infrastructure 
planning). Administration at the national level is supervised by the Government of Vietnam, which 
includes the Prime Minister and all Ministers. 
Within all national ministries there are many agencies, including: (1) state-management agencies 
that develop policy, implement laws, and undertake administration; (2) non-business agencies that 
conduct research and provide education and other public services; and (3) business agencies, 
including state-owned enterprises. Many research and technical advisory agencies in MARD and 
MONRE are directly involved in water resources management; their mandates often overlap, but 
each typically has a specific function, a geographic focus in some cases, and many have sub-
national units outside Hanoi that interact directly with sub-national levels of administration. 
Laws, distribution of state finances, and overall objectives are determined at the national level, but 
fiscal decentralisation since the 1990s has progressively shifted responsibility for service delivery 
to the provinces and currently provides considerable autonomy to re-allocate expenditure. In 
irrigation management, for example, the provinces take the lead on irrigation planning, 
implementation, and operations and maintenance, but they submit plans and funding requests to 
the national level for review by the Ministry of Planning and Investment (with input from MARD 
agencies). Provincial People’s Committees (PPCs) are the principal level of decision-making in 
provinces. A departmental structure replicates ministries and their functions at the national level, 
i.e. each province has a Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) and 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD). Among the DARD state 
management agencies are sub-departments of irrigation management, while business agencies 
include the irrigation and drainage management companies (IDMCs) that operate and maintain 
irrigation schemes. Departments are supervised by their PPC and the equivalent national ministry. 
This dual supervisory arrangement is replicated at the district and commune scale, i.e. district 
offices are partially supervised by their provincial equivalents and the District People’s 
Committee. In addition, commune-level agricultural cooperatives and water user groups (WUGs) 
are overseen by the district office of MARD/DARD and the Commune People’s Committee. 
Figure 3.3 summarises the administrative scale of water governance in Vietnam.  
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Figure 3.3. Overview of the administrative scale of water governance in Vietnam. Adapted from 
(Loan 2012; Waibel 2010). Arrows indicate a leadership relationship. 
Policy development and planning are conducted at different levels of state administration. The 
national five-year Socio-Economic Development Strategy, master plans and broad objectives are 
developed by the Government of Vietnam. Otherwise, national-level planning often has a single 
sector focus. Ministries and state management agencies follow similar policy development 
procedures to each other but implement them differently. Collaboration can be limited between 
different levels of administration or agencies within the same ministry/department or 
province/district. Vertical and horizontal flows of information and knowledge do occur, but they 
are often blocked due to limited coordination between different levels of administration. 
Complementary to the administrative scale of governance is the Communist Party of Vietnam, 
which interacts with state management at all levels, plays a central role in defining national 
objectives, and is closely linked to the Fatherland Front and other mass organisations that support 
local service delivery, such as the Farmer’s Union, Women’s Union, and Veteran’s Union. 
Other decision-makers and groups within Vietnam’s water governance networks include: farmers 
and the formal and informal groups to which they belong; private Vietnamese agribusinesses; 
international companies with domestic production facilities and global agribusinesses sourcing 
Decision-Making for Systemic Water Risks 
64 | P a g e  
produce from Vietnam; and international organisations, including multi-lateral development 
banks, bilateral donor agencies, and global non-government organisations. Limited coordination 
across these actors and state administration has led to many ad hoc water re-allocation decisions 
in the past (Svendsen et al. 2005).  
3.4.1.3. Agricultural Water Reforms in Vietnam  
The Government of Vietnam is enacting policy plans and measures to address systemic water risks. 
Agricultural water reform is a key focus and the recent history of irrigation water pricing in 
Vietnam demonstrates how national policy generates sub-national governance dynamics. From 
1995, irrigation service fees were collected in rural Vietnam by farmer-run WUGs or commune-
level cooperatives. A small proportion of fees were combined with voluntary labor to maintain and 
manage tertiary canals, with the bulk of fees delivered to the Irrigation and Drainage Management 
Companies (IDMCs) that manage primary and secondary level canal systems. From 2009, 
irrigation services for most farmers were subsidised and paid directly to the IDMCs by the state 
(see Government of Vietnam (2008) for specific exemptions and cost norms). The reform sought 
to provide income relief to farmers, many of whom were struggling under production levies. 
Further, the reform intended to protect the financial viability of the IDMCs, many of which were 
trapped in a downward spiral of barriers to fee collection, low cost-recovery, and poor service 
delivery. Indeed, prior to the subsidy regime, the IDMC sector was the largest debtor to Electricity 
Vietnam (EVN), the state-owned electricity utility (Cook et al. 2013).  
The benefits and costs of the irrigation service fee subsidy have been vigorously debated in 
Vietnam. A review of the fee waiver in three provinces during 2012 found that farmers had gained, 
on average, a small increase of about 400,000 VND (approximately US$20) of net income per year 
and IDMCs were financially stable again (Cook et al. 2013). Nevertheless, problems have emerged 
from fees no longer being sourced from farmers: farmers no longer have direct incentives to 
conserve water; IDMCs have reduced incentives to provide quality services to farmers; and 
cooperation between farmers, IDMCs, and WUGs has been undermined. The annual burden on 
the central budget of irrigation operations and management nearly doubled to 6.2 trillion VND 
(approximately $US 350 million) from 2009 onwards (OECD 2015b) and, given that significant 
investments in new and existing irrigation infrastructure are needed to diversify crop production 
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and adapt to climate change (World Bank 2016), the subsidy program appears financially 
unsustainable. 
Major droughts across Vietnam in 2015-2016 provided momentum for responses to the irrigation 
service fee issue and a discussion about the introduction of measures to increase agricultural water-
use efficiency. Subsequent policy discussions have occurred in the context of broader plans to 
restructure irrigation and the agriculture sector by increasing productivity, enhancing resilience to 
extreme weather, and modernising supply-chains (Government of Vietnam 2013, 2014). Agencies 
within MARD are considering how the new national decree on public-private-partnerships (PPPs) 
(Government of Vietnam 2015b) could encourage private investment in irrigation infrastructure to 
augment dry-season water availability. The policy dialogues resulted in the 2017 Law on Irrigation 
that provides a legal framework for private investment in irrigation schemes, full-cost pricing of 
water services, and irrigation water to be managed as a commodity (National Assembly of Vietnam 
2017). 
3.4.1.4 Policy Pilots in Don Duong District of Lam Dong Province  
Don Duong District, in the mountainous South-Central Highlands province of Lam Dong, is the 
planned site for state management agencies from MARD and Lam Dong DARD to pilot national 
innovations in water policy and management. The local economy is predominantly based on 
commercial agricultural commodities, such as coffee, tea, and vegetables. Similar to the national 
situation, demand- and supply-side pressures on water security are becoming major concerns. 
Trade-offs between water use for agriculture, tourism, industry, and hydropower are exposing 
vulnerability to extreme weather events: the 2015-2016 drought saw water shortages affect 60,000 
ha of coffee and vegetable production fall by 30-40 percent. 
The main growing region of Don Duong is a valley bisected by the Da Nhim river, an upstream 
tributary of the Dong Nai river that discharges into the ocean near Vietnam’s commercial center, 
Ho Chi Minh City. Don Duong has a population of 91,000 and is a center of commercial vegetable 
and flower production. Due to the commercial orientation of agriculture and fertile soil, the average 
income of farming households is approximately double the national average (including both rural 
and urban households). Water availability in the dry season has become a key constraint: 
agricultural water demand is growing, and groundwater resources are becoming degraded by the 
predominant use of unregulated, on-farm wells. On-farm groundwater wells are the main source 
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of irrigation water and a range of irrigation technologies are used from hand-watering to sprinklers 
to high-efficiency drip irrigation. The Da Nhim river is subject to poor water quality due to 
agricultural run-off. 
Upstream of the vegetable growing area in Don Duong is the reservoir of the 160 MW Da Nhim 
hydropower plant which diverts water to neighboring Ninh Thuan province for electricity 
generation and irrigation. Built in the 1960s, the dam pre-dated agricultural activities in the Da 
Nhim valley and has limited capacity to supply downstream water due to operating rules and 
technical constraints. The reservoir is operated by a hydropower company which is majority owned 
by the state-owned electricity utility, Electricity Vietnam (EVN). The 2015-16 drought badly 
affected agricultural production in Don Duong and, although sufficient water was available in the 
reservoir to provide relief, no institutional mechanism existed to transfer it. National directives 
were issued in 2016 for the hydropower company to provide downstream flows during extreme 
droughts, but it is unclear how the directives will work in practice because of an upgrade to the 
power plant (due for completion in 2018) that will divert more water to Ninh Thuan under standard 
operations.      
A policy pilot project is planned to trial national agricultural water management reforms in the 
irrigation command area of an agricultural cooperative in Don Duong. Partners in the pilot project 
include state management agencies of MARD and Lam Dong DARD, an international non-profit 
organisation (NPO), the agricultural cooperative, and district offices. The command area is 
adjacent to the Da Nhim river and distributes water from the river to farmers across a 95-ha area. 
The policy pilot plans to expand the command area to 250 ha and to invest in a larger pumping 
station, concreting of canals, and 100 on-field ponds for water storage. In addition to these supply-
side measures, the project plans to: increase coverage of sprinkler and drip irrigation; expand 
education and training for farmers on water-use, fertiliser-use, and safe vegetable production; and 
pilot models for irrigation water service fees and a public-private-partnership in irrigation services.  
3.4.2. ROAD Project 
Given that agricultural water management in Don Duong is embedded in a complex food-energy-
environment-water system, it is important for partners in the policy pilot to understand systemic 
risks and assess a range of interventions that can be integrated into the project and the broader 
district. To support this analysis, a team of researchers and practitioners under the Food Energy 
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Environment Water (FE2W) Network (http://www.fe2wnetwork.org) applied the ROAD process 
in Don Duong. The facilitation and research activities were undertaken by a project team 
comprising researchers from: the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (IPSARD), a MARD research institute; the Australian National University (ANU); 
and other overseas research organisations, including the International Food Policy Research 
Institute. Technical inputs and peer review were provided throughout the project by government 
officials and researchers in Vietnam, researchers and practitioners from Australia, and local and 
international staff of the international NPO. Figure 3.4 provides a timeline of steps and events, 
including questions and actions adapted from the ROAD process that guided each step (Food 
Energy Environment Water Network 2017). 
 
Figure 3.4. Summary of steps and activities during the ROAD project in Don Duong District. 
3.4.2.1. Field Visit and Preliminary Research  
The project was developed at a multi-day workshop outside Vietnam attended by members of the 
project team and researchers from the FE2W Network. Participants contested elements of the 
prototype ROAD process and its application in Don Duong. The project began with a field visit to 
Hanoi and Lam Dong that included: (1) an inception meeting in Hanoi with researchers from 
MARD and MONRE agencies; (2) a workshop at MARD headquarters where international 
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researchers from the project team presented insights from international experience of agricultural 
water pricing and PPPs in irrigation; (3) a meeting between the project team and a MARD Vice-
Minister; (4) meetings with the Lam Dong PPC, DARD, and DONRE to secure engagement and 
institutional support; and (4) a field visit to Don Duong district. 
Quantitative data and qualitative reports were collected during and following the field visit by 
project team members from IPSARD. A household survey of thirty-nine farmers across Don 
Duong and interviews with six local officials was conducted in a separate field visit. The meetings, 
survey, interviews, and desk-based research of government reports provided the basis for an 
internal scoping report on key risks to water management in Lam Dong and Don Duong.  
3.4.2.2. Participatory Workshop  
The scoping report informed the design of a 1-day workshop during July 2016 in which 
participants collectively assessed agricultural water insecurity in Don Duong and identified 
priority policy options for further analysis by the project team. The workshop scope encompassed 
the entire district rather than the agricultural cooperative because implementation of the policy 
pilot had been delayed (and did not proceed until after the ROAD project). This scope accounted 
for the predominance of different irrigation systems in the cooperative (centralised surface water 
irrigation) and also the planned expansion area and remainder of the district (on-farm groundwater 
wells). Hence, the workshop had a broader geographic scope than the command area of the 
cooperative, but the results and subsequent analysis by the project team were still relevant to the 
planned location of the policy pilot. 
The majority of workshop participants were Don Duong officials working in agricultural water 
management, many of whom farm their own land. A senior official and staff from each of Lam 
Dong DARD and DONRE attended, as well as the Vice-Chair of the District People’s Committee 
and the leader of the agricultural cooperative. The number of participants varied throughout the 
workshop between a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 16. The workshop activities were designed 
by ANU researchers and tested in an educational setting beforehand. IPSARD staff revised the 
process before the workshop and facilitated the event, with ANU researchers present to provide 
technical support.  
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 Participants in the workshop used a variety of tools and methods to define the risk assessment 
scope, build a causal risk model, and identify priority policy options. Participants defined the risk 
event as “water demand exceeds water supply in the dry season” and the stakeholders as “farmers” 
and “agribusinesses”. The following statements provided baselines for water systems in Don 
Duong: “Water scarcity is seasonal and its seriousness each year is increasingly variable due to 
climate change”, “Water allocation across different uses is being contested”, “There are concerns 
about the quality of surface water”, and “Farmers are not seriously measuring their water use, 
though some have invested in advanced irrigation systems”. Elements of this scope were drafted 
by the project team in advance and revised by participants during the workshop.  
Facilitators of the workshop proposed that water releases from the hydropower reservoir be treated 
as an external factor given that this issue is managed at the level of national ministries. 
Consequently, participants did not incorporate the reservoir into the causal risk model or policy 
options despite the issue being raised by participants during the workshop. Participants’ three 
primary objectives were: “Increase farmers’ income through sustainable and high value-added 
agricultural production”, “Stable water supply for agricultural production”, and “Environmental 
protection in agricultural production areas (including farm waste treatment) to improve surface 
and ground water quality”.  
The participants worked individually and collectively to build and define the causal risk model 
and portfolio of controls and mitigants which are depicted in Figure 3.5. Successive exercises 
evaluated: (i) strength of cause-effect relationships within the model; (ii) impacts of options across 
stakeholders, time, and consequences; (iii) compatibility of options with objectives; and (iv) 
whether options could generate negative impacts. For example, participants individually 
completed a template of the collectively defined causal risk model with likelihoods on a 5-interval 
scale from Very Low to Very High. That information was then used in a break-out group 
assessment of options. Throughout the assessment, participants were prompted to consider causes 
and effects across food-energy-environment-water systems by, for example, grouping individual 
‘values’ in a Venn diagram of the four systems to develop collective objectives. 
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Figure 3.5. The causal risk model of dry season water scarcity in Don Duong District developed 
in the ROAD project. The causal risk model and the relevance of controls and mitigants to causal 
pathways were identified by workshop participants. The secondary impacts were identified by the 
project team. ^ represents the trigger or consequence considered to be the most important. Drivers 
and triggers were considered the same in this application. The controls and mitigants chosen for 
further analysis are underlined; the first number in brackets indicates the number of “effort” tokens 
allocated by individual participants and the other number indicates the additional collective 
allocation. * indicates secondary impacts of controls and (+) indicates the control could increase 
the likelihood of the trigger (risk) causing the risk (consequence), e.g. C1*(+) indicates that water 
pricing could increase the likelihood of dry-season water scarcity increasing crop production costs. 
Following the assessment of the risk event and options, participants used a voting system based 
on the JUST-A-GRID method (Ferrand et al. 2014) to collectively select three priority options for 
analysis by the project team. Individuals were first given five tokens that represented the 
investment of effort and resources that should go into developing and implementing each option. 
The group was then given the collective task of distributing a further ten tokens.  
The three priority options were: (1) mobilisation of non-state financial resources for constructing, 
operating, and managing irrigation infrastructure, including irrigation service fees and PPP 
arrangements; (2) construction of surface water irrigation infrastructure, including storage 
facilities and concrete transmission canals; and (3) encouraging cooperation between farmers in 
their agricultural production, including resource-sharing during emergencies and negotiation with 
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agribusinesses. Finally, participants nominated supporting actions to implement the preferred 
policy options and filled in a feedback form regarding the causal risk modeling process used in the 
workshop.  
3.4.2.3. Research and Reporting  
The project team analysed the three priority options and developed a draft policy planning 
document regarding their implementation. One input to this document was a causal risk assessment 
of the irrigation infrastructure option across agricultural production, infrastructure, governance, 
and knowledge. The assessment was conducted in a workshop at the ANU by project team 
members and researchers with experience working in Vietnam. The proposed activities of the 
policy pilot provided the basis for considering how surface water irrigation would be developed 
throughout the district. A range of potential risk events and consequences were identified, 
including: (i) lack of surface water availability due to inadequate storage and increased upstream 
diversions by Da Nhim hydropower plant to Ninh Thuan province, (ii) reduced seepage of water 
from earthen canals into groundwater systems, (iii) higher run-off flow intensity and flood 
damages, (iv) increased pollution concentration in downstream areas and reduced yields, (v) 
reduced incomes due to higher energy costs and production losses, (vi) breakdown of centralised 
irrigation systems due to poor service delivery, and (vii) farmer discontent. These and other 
potential outcomes from surface water irrigation infrastructure construction are represented as 
secondary impacts within the causal risk model in Figure 3.5. A range of options were proposed 
by the project team to manage these secondary impacts, such as the use of green infrastructure to 
line canals and mandating sustainable production standards within the irrigation command area. 
In addition to the risk assessment of infrastructure construction, the draft policy plan also outlined: 
(i) alternative storage technologies, such as managed aquifer recharge; (ii) theoretical and practical 
issues regarding agricultural water pricing; (iii) considerations for implementing PPPs in 
irrigation; (iv) proposals for potential PPP opportunities; (v) a proposal for establishing or 
strengthening three types of special farmer and community groups, including small groups of 
farmers producing the same crops, a high-level community water group, and existing social and 
kinship groups; and (vi) recommended investments in data collection given the limited quantitative 
data available to the ROAD project and officials’ recognition of the need for more extensive and 
improved hydrological data collection, particularly for groundwater management. The underlying 
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analysis for this policy plan included a static water balance model that supported workshop 
participants’ perception of water scarcity as a dry season problem.  
The project team returned to Lam Dong to present the draft policy plan to provincial and district 
officials that participated in the workshop. Staff from the MARD state-management agency and 
international NPO involved in the policy pilot accompanied the project team. Feedback from 
workshop participants and researchers from national agencies were incorporated into: (1) a revised 
version of the policy plan, (2) a policy brief on agricultural water pricing, and (3) a facilitator’s 
guide to designing and implementing risk assessment processes for water management in Lam 
Dong. The preparation of output (3) drew on lessons from the ROAD project and was designed 
for use by provincial research agencies in Lam Dong involved in water management planning. All 
outputs were translated into Vietnamese. These outputs have since been incorporated into the 
international NPO’s programs in Lam Dong, including the policy pilot in Don Duong. 
3.5. Discussion 
3.5.1. Knowledge and Information Transfer Across Governance Levels and Scales 
The ROAD project in Don Duong demonstrated the importance of and barriers to information 
transfer across water governance networks. It is unlikely that special farmer production groups 
would have been identified as a priority if the risk assessment workshop had been conducted above 
the district level. Many of the district officials have direct contact with farmers or are part-time 
farmers themselves and, hence, could identify the local benefits of greater social cohesion under 
droughts. However, this proposal emerged from the particular circumstances of Don Duong where 
unregulated groundwater extraction has caused conflict between farmers. If that proposal were 
transferred up to the national level and deployed across Vietnam without regard to the context, 
then new groups could undermine existing social institutions in locations where stronger 
cooperation already exists.  
3.5.1.1. Sharing Knowledge at the Sub-National Level  
At the local level, irrigation services fees are a potentially divisive issue. That district-level 
officials supported this national-level priority is consistent with their experience: the major impacts 
of the 2015-2016 drought and awareness of the unsustainable trajectory of groundwater 
degradation in Don Duong. The uneven decline of aquifers across the district meant, however, that 
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farmers in Don Duong did not necessarily share officials’ supportive outlook and the field survey 
of farmers prior to the workshop did not contain references to irrigation service fees.  
The contrast between the district officials’ consent to the prospect of change and the project team’s 
concerns in communicating that divisive prospect to farmers demonstrate a fundamental challenge 
of participatory processes: knowledge cannot just be communicated in one step. Instead, a 
sequence of activities is needed to socialise and legitimise the knowledge being transferred, 
particularly where a stakeholder may not agree or see the immediate benefits of a proposal. 
Nevertheless, anonymous written feedback provided by participants at the conclusion of the 1-day 
ROAD workshop underlines that a single participatory activity can still be useful in this regard: 
“The workshop exposed me to new knowledge”, “The process is useful and I am more 
knowledgeable and I have an understanding of what is practically feasible”, and “I have more 
understanding of how to use, manage, and exploit water more effectively”. 
3.5.1.2. Identifying Feedback Effects 
A fundamental challenge of systemic risks is that there are no textbook solutions: policy 
interventions will generate their own cascade of changes that cannot be perfectly anticipated. The 
project team conducted a separate risk assessment of the irrigation infrastructure option to identify 
feedback effects that could amplify water insecurity and reduce resilience. This secondary 
assessment could be conducted with the same set of decision-makers that developed the options. 
In practice, however, decision-makers may not have the requisite scientific knowledge of system 
components or awareness of outcomes from similar actions in different locations. If this is the 
case, facilitators can broker the transfer of external knowledge and experience, or generate new 
knowledge through dedicated research on the responses of governance networks and physical 
systems to policy decisions. Researchers also require stakeholders’ inputs to structure and validate 
secondary assessments and a two-way exchange of knowledge is needed to incorporate feedback 
effects into causal risk assessment.  
3.5.1.3. Practical Limitations of Knowledge Transfer  
The power of national ministries and provincial departments to set the management agenda at the 
district level was evident in the widespread support expressed for water pricing and PPPs during 
the causal risk modeling workshop. Senior provincial officials and the district leader were the most 
prominent speakers in plenary discussions. The project team anticipated that power imbalances 
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might bias the results and structured the development of the causal risk model so that each 
participant first wrote down, for example, a trigger, and then individual nominations were collected 
and posted in front of the group for discussion. Moreover, staff from the MARD state management 
agency and international NPO were not invited by the project team to attend that workshop because 
their presence, and the investment they are bringing into Don Duong, could have influenced district 
officials. Notably, hierarchy was evident when a senior provincial official conducted the 
distribution of collective ‘effort’ tokens across policy options. Although the ranking did not change 
relative to the individual allocations, it was indicative of who had the authority over the final 
decision. 
Reflecting on the constraints of hierarchy in a participatory setting and how the ROAD process 
could support future decision-making in Don Duong, the district leader proposed that causal risk 
assessment processes be conducted in separate workshops for farmers, businesses, and households 
so that their causal risk models could be shared with the administrative scale. Although resource 
constraints prevented multiple workshops in this ROAD project, this could be a useful approach 
to transferring knowledge between water governance scales and across levels of the administrative 
scale. Indeed, other multi-level participatory approaches to risk management have demonstrated 
the utility of breaking groups apart and then, in some cases, bringing them back together (Daniell, 
2012). Replicating processes and producing comparable outputs across levels of administrative 
governance could also increase the legitimacy of alternative perceptions of systemic risks.  
3.5.2. Credibility of the Risk Assessment Process 
The ROAD pilot project could not have proceeded without the approval of decision-makers at 
different levels of the administrative scale. A cascade of consent occurred during the inception 
field visit, beginning with international researchers from the project team meeting the MARD 
Vice-Minister. At the provincial level, the Director of IPSARD accompanied the project team and 
introduced the project to the Vice-Chair of the Lam Dong PPC who provided his approval in front 
of DARD and DONRE officials. At the district level, a senior DARD official began introductions. 
Throughout this process, the reputation of the international researchers and Australian experience 
in water management were stressed by the IPSARD Director to impart credibility on the group and 
the ROAD project.  
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The credibility of risk assessment methods is also important. Workshop participants commented 
that causal risk assessment was a scientific approach, that it used logic, and focused on causes and 
solutions. In Vietnam, education and science are valued highly in society. This cultural context 
may have been reinforced by the Vice-Chair of the Lam Dong PPC being an agricultural scientist 
by training. Positive perceptions of a scientifically credible process, the technical expertise of the 
project team, and skilled facilitation all enable acceptance of participatory risk assessment.  
3.5.3. Balancing Reductionism and Completeness in Systemic Risk Assessment  
Complexity can be a barrier to making decisions and increases the likelihood of bad decisions. 
There is a trade-off in any risk assessment between reducing the system to a manageable size and 
excluding crucial components. Facilitators have an important role to play in achieving a practical 
scope; the exclusion of hydropower operations from the decision space of the participatory ROAD 
workshop is one such example. In addition, the project team had participants construct the core 
causal risk model with the project team later considering feedback effects separately. Importantly, 
such updating can incorporate system dynamics as they emerge, and this is why risk assessment 
processes, including ROAD, typically involve cyclical monitoring and evaluation of decisions. 
This process of updating and further appraisal allows for data analysis, including tests for the 
nonstationary nature of hydrological data (Milly et al. 2008) and what this implies in the context 
of water management (Daniell & Daniell 2006; Matalas 2012). 
A potential avenue for balancing reductionism and completeness in a participatory setting is to 
identify key system variables, their baselines, and thresholds, or ‘tipping points’, which, if 
breached, send the system into a new state (see Lenton 2013). In the ROAD project, this approach 
was incorporated via qualitative baseline statements that were used as reference points for 
assessment of risks and options. Where more quantitative data is available, researchers and 
participants could jointly formulate thresholds for key variables, such as groundwater depth, end 
of wet-season rainfall, or the price of agricultural inputs and outputs.  
Recent research on complex systems indicates that transitions or ‘regime shifts’ can be anticipated 
through slowing down in the rate of system recovery following shocks, flickering between 
alternative system states, and other early warning signs (Scheffer et al. 2012). Targeting 
measurement and structuring assessments around these features of a food-energy-environment-
water systems provide an efficient means to manage risks and guide actions to increase resilience.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
Drawing on concepts in complex systems, multi-level and multi-scale governance, and risk 
analysis, we provide insights about how to improve national level decision-making for systemic 
water risks. Specifically, we develop and test a participatory method for systemic risk assessment 
that can incorporate uncertain sub-national dynamics into national policy. Further, we provide 
guidance to scientists and researchers on how to work with stakeholders and facilitate resilient 
decision-making on complex risks.  
An application of the ROAD process in Vietnam provided insights regarding knowledge transfer, 
the credibility of the risk assessment process, and the trade-offs between reductionism and 
incompleteness. Importantly, we have demonstrated the value of the ROAD process in a 
hierarchical governance context where decision-makers are unaccustomed to participatory 
processes and data and resources are limited. Hence, there is a strong likelihood that ROAD could 
support risk-based decision-making in both similar and less challenging contexts. A range of 
applications are needed to test and further develop the ROAD process across: risk and decision 
analysis methods, risks across food-energy-environment-water systems, and levels and scales of 
decision-making. 
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Water Pricing or Irrigation Quotas?                      
Multipurpose Hydropower Regulation Under Risks 
4.1. Introduction 
Economists typically favour price-based approaches to allocating resources. Water is no exception, 
and for good reason: price signals provided by markets and regulations can efficiently reallocate 
water and infrastructure across different services, users, and time periods (Griffin 2015; Olmstead 
2010). In particular, dynamic water pricing can provide households, industry, and farmers with 
incentives to adjust their consumption to scarcity, variable supply costs, and the optimal timing of 
infrastructure investment (e.g. Grafton et al. 2014; Gysi & Loucks 1971; Hanke & Davis 1971; 
Moncur & Pollock 1988). Importantly, this demand-side adjustment process means that a central 
regulator or water provider need not know the demand function of every water user for water to 
be allocated efficiently.  
However, pricing is not always the best planning instrument when the future is uncertain. 
Weitzman (1974) showed that, in a general context, quantity-based instruments can be more 
efficient (i.e. generate greater net benefits) than prices if marginal benefits fall more slowly than 
marginal costs rise. If marginal benefits are relatively steep, prices are more efficient. Weitzman’s 
initial analysis focused on a set of goods or commodities that are assumed to be desirable. His 
general insights on ‘prices versus quantities’ would go on to play a key role in subsequent work 
on pollution control (e.g. Adar & Griffin 1976; Newell & Pizer 2003; Parsons & Taschini 2013), 
and instrument choice for regulatory frameworks across a range of policy areas (see Goulder & 
Parry 2008 and Hepburn 2006 for reviews).  
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the intuition of the ‘prices vs. quantities’ planning problem in the context 
of water allocation to a single consumer. Under perfect information regarding marginal benefits 
(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) and marginal costs (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸), there is a price-quantity pair (𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and 𝑞𝑞𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄) 
that maximises the total benefits of water provision across the supplier and consumer; regulating 
allocation by price or quantity is therefore equivalent. But if marginal cost is higher than expected 
(𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴), the water allocation in both cases is inefficient (i.e. net benefits are not maximised 
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since 𝑞𝑞 ≠ 𝑞𝑞∗). The price instrument under allocates water (𝑞𝑞𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 𝑞𝑞∗) and the quantity 
instrument over allocates water (𝑞𝑞𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑄 > 𝑞𝑞∗). The loss of efficiency, or ‘deadweight loss’, is 
determined by the initial instrument choice, the direction and magnitude of the changes in marginal 
costs, and the relative steepness of the marginal benefit and cost functions. In Figure 4.1a, I assume 
that the marginal benefit function, or water demand, is relatively flat compared to the marginal 
cost function because: (i) the consumer can substitute water for other goods as price rises and, (ii) 
additional supply requires additional infrastructure investments. In this case, the deadweight loss 
under the price instrument is lower (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 <  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑞𝑞). In Figure 4.1b, the consumer finds it harder 
to substitute water and marginal costs increase more slowly because infrastructure costs are front-
loaded. Now quantities are the preferred regulatory instrument (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 >  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑞𝑞).  
 
Figure 4.1. Illustration of the policy instrument choice problem: prices versus quantities for a 
single water consumer. Adapted from Hepburn (2006). 
This simple illustration of the instrument choice problem highlights an important consideration for 
the regulation of water resources: under uncertain shifts in the marginal benefits and costs of water 
provision, ex ante price- and quantity-based planning instruments will both generate efficiency 
losses relative to the optimal ex post water allocation. Deviations between the expectation and 
realisation of costs and benefits render the optimum water allocation hypothetical. Yet, efficiency 
gains can be achieved if planning instruments for water allocation are selected according to their 
relative performance under the risks and uncertainty prevailing in a given policy context (see 
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Olmstead and Stavins 2009 for analysis of price and nonprice approaches to urban water 
conservation). 
The hydropower sector is an arena of water governance with growing need for efficient regulation 
under dynamic conditions. Three key issues predominate. First, there are emerging trade-offs to 
manage. The hydropower industry and other stakeholders have advocated for increased 
investments in multipurpose hydropower development to provide essential water services, such as 
agricultural water storage, drinking water supplies, and flood control (e.g. Branche 2015; IEA 
Hydropower Agreement 2017; IFC/TNC 2017). Key multilateral banks and development 
agencies/facilities now emphasise multipurpose operations in their hydropower lending practices 
and policies (e.g. Rex et al. 2014). More large, multipurpose reservoirs could, in theory, help 
address major global challenges, such as climate change and securing access to food, energy, and 
water resources. But, in practice, the provision of additional water services, including 
environmental protection, typically involves opportunity costs: reduced hydropower generation, 
foregone profits, and, in some cases, additional infrastructure investments (Krchnak et al. 2009; 
Zeng et al. 2017). Efficient provision of water services from multipurpose reservoirs requires 
regulation of trade-offs between hydropower profits and broader public and private benefits. 
Second, the task of regulating trade-offs is becoming more complex. Shifts in precipitation trends 
and weather variability under climate change will markedly alter reservoir inflows (van Vliet et al. 
2016). Water demand is increasing globally under population and economic growth. The price that 
hydropower generation receives in markets will shift under the technological and policy changes 
associated with the renewable energy transition (Gaudard et al. 2016). Here, I think of the 
associated shifts in water supply, water demand, and hydroelectricity revenues as risks, or “events 
with uncertain consequences” (Wyrwoll et al. 2018). These risks alter the marginal benefits and 
marginal costs associated with the provision of water services from multipurpose reservoirs. 
Traditional approaches to hydropower regulation, on the other hand, are generally static, with 
multi-decade licenses stipulating, for example, minimum/maximum downstream flows, 
minimum/maximum storage levels, and fixed entitlements to water services. There is a growing 
need for dynamic regulation that provides hydropower operators with the flexibility and discretion 
to provide the efficient level of water services under risks (Pittock & Hartmann 2011; Viers 2011).  
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Finally, there is the matter of scale. Approximately 875 large hydropower reservoirs (>100 MW 
capacity) and 2775 medium-sized reservoirs (1 to 100 MW capacity) are estimated to be under 
construction or planned globally to 2035 (Zarfl et al. 2014). Many of these reservoirs will or could 
be multipurpose; the construction boom is focused on developing and emerging economies where 
water and energy security challenges are already acute, such as South and South-East Asia. Today, 
there already around 3900 multipurpose dams in operation globally that generate hydropower 
(Naughton et al. 2017). Opportunities exist to: (i) add additional purposes to existing, single-
purpose hydropower reservoirs; (ii) generate energy services from single-purpose irrigation and 
water supply reservoirs; and (iii) build new reservoirs in areas of the world with untapped 
hydropower potential, such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Branche 2015; DOE 2016; IHA 2018). Both 
the upward trajectory of hydropower development and growing emphasis on multipurpose 
operations elevate the importance of getting hydropower regulation right. 
A range of methods are used to allocate multipurpose reservoir storage across energy and water 
services (see Branche 2015 and IEA Hydropower Agreement 2017 for case studies). While price-
based approaches to water allocation are broadly applied and researched in other areas of water 
management (see Griffin 2015; Johansson et al. 2002; OECD 2010; Olmstead & Stavins 2009; 
Wichelns 2013), their application to hydropower regulation has been limited to a few locations. 
On the other hand, quantity-based approaches (e.g. minimum downstream flows, minimum 
operating levels, and water abstraction rights) are common features of the water license regimes 
that govern hydropower operations in many countries (IFC 2015).  
This Chapter examines the efficiency of using either irrigation water pricing or irrigation quotas 
to allocate multipurpose reservoir storage under risks. Specifically, I seek to better understand the 
conditions under which regulators may consider adopting water pricing to increase the total 
benefits of reservoir operation across hydropower and irrigation. Or, on the other hand, I seek to 
identify when water pricing does not provide relative efficiency gains compared to the guaranteed 
provision of a fixed volume of water to irrigators. I use stochastic dynamic programming to solve 
a model of a multipurpose hydropower reservoir where there are stochastic shifts in both the 
marginal cost of irrigation water (i.e. foregone hydroelectricity revenues) and the marginal benefit 
of irrigation water (i.e. variable irrigation water demand under weather variability). I extend this 
basic model to analyse risks across water supply, water demand, electricity prices, and energy 
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policy. The remainder of this section provides a literature review and an outline of the Chapter’s 
contribution. Section 4.2 develops a hydro-economic model of the operation and governance of a 
multipurpose hydropower reservoir. Section 4.3 calibrates the model to a case study in Tasmania, 
Australia. Section 4.4 presents the results, including the risk analysis and a sensitivity analysis of 
key parameters. Section 4.5 discusses the policy implications. Section 4.6 concludes with an 
overview of the study’s limitations and provides directions for further research.  
4.1.1. Literature Review and Contribution 
There is a large literature on hydro-economic modelling of reservoir operations and the analysis 
of water systems (see Brown et al. 2015; Castelletti et al. 2008; and Harou et al. 2009 for reviews). 
Research into multipurpose hydropower operations has estimated the marginal value of water 
allocation across different uses and locations (Tilmant et al. 2008, 2009). Other studies have 
optimised reservoir operations under regulatory constraints (Edwards et al. 1999) and hydropower-
irrigation trade-offs (Chatterjee et al. 1998). The costs and benefits of alternative hydropower 
governance regimes have been assessed (Guisández et al. 2013; Kotchen et al. 2006), with a 
particular focus on natural flow restoration (Rheinheimer et al. 2013; A. Tilmant et al. 2010) and 
environmental constraints (Harpman 1999). A number of studies have assessed the impacts of 
climate change and/or uncertain electricity prices on reservoir operations (Anghileri et al. 2018; 
Gaudard et al. 2016; Madani & Lund 2010; Steinschneider & Brown 2012) and developed 
financial instruments to manage hydrological risks (Brown & Carriquiry 2007; Foster et al. 2015).  
Previous studies have considered the application of economic instruments to the governance of 
multipurpose reservoirs. Houston and Whittlesey (1986) use a linear programming model of the 
production of multiple crops to evaluate the sale of water rights from irrigators to hydropower 
producers, finding mutual benefits from trade. Brown and Carriquiry (2007) model options 
contracts for urban water suppliers to purchase water from agricultural users during drought years 
as an alternative to infrastructure expansion. The costs of purchasing water are smoothed through 
an inflows index-based insurance contract. Tilmant et al. (2009) model the transfer of water from 
irrigators to hydropower operators in a cascade of multipurpose reservoirs. A financial 
compensation mechanism provides the basis for efficient reallocation of water under dynamic 
weather conditions.  
Water pricing or irrigation quotas? 
82 | P a g e  
Maas et al. (2017) model water allocation markets and fixed water allocation for a multipurpose 
reservoir under dynamic water supply and water demand. The value of water infrastructure is 
quantified using a stochastic dynamic programming model. Water leasing markets maximise water 
infrastructure value, with fixed water allocations reducing value by up to 13% and causing storage 
augmentation benefits to become ambiguous. Foster et al. (2015) develop a set of index-based 
insurance contracts for hydropower generators to manage hydrological risk. Kern and Characklis 
(2017) estimate the costs of downstream flow-rate restrictions limiting a hydropower companies’ 
capacity to respond to sub-daily electricity price shifts. The authors show that falling natural gas 
prices reduce the cost of these constraints and there are opportunities to reallocate water efficiently 
by enabling downstream water users to purchase restrictions (i.e. compensate the hydropower 
company for the opportunity cost of restricting changes in downstream flow-rates). In order to 
mitigate stochastic weather and electricity prices, a collar contract insures downstream users 
against the variable cost of restrictions.  
The current Chapter is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first study to model the 
application of volumetric water pricing to the regulation of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs. 
While most of the studies highlighted in the previous two paragraphs consider stochastic changes 
in either weather or electricity prices, I consider both. The major contribution is the extension of a 
basic model to analyse a range of risks associated with shifts in the marginal benefit and marginal 
cost of allocating water to irrigation. This extension provides general insights into the conditions 
under which water pricing or fixed irrigation quotas may be preferred as regulatory instruments. 
4.2. Model of Multipurpose Hydropower Operations and Governance 
I develop a stochastic dynamic programming model of reservoir operation and regulation to 
analyse the impact of water pricing and fixed irrigation quotas on the efficiency of water allocation 
under: (i) stochastic weather and electricity revenues, and (ii) risks associated with shifts in water 
supply, water demand, electricity prices, and energy policy. The model focuses on the optimisation 
problem of a profit-motivated hydropower company managing a multipurpose reservoir.  
Appendix 4.A1 summarises all variables and parameters. 
The reservoir supplies water to electricity generation, irrigation, and environmental flows. The 
marginal benefit of allocating water to electricity production, irrigated agriculture, or storage 
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varies according to stochastic changes in reservoir inflows, electricity market prices, and irrigation 
water demand. Alternative governance and operation scenarios are defined to compare the 
efficiency of price-based and (fixed) quantity-based regulation of irrigation water provision. 
4.2.1. Hydropower Production 
The quantity of hydroelectricity produced during period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑎𝑎  × 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  
where 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 is the volume of water scheduled for release from the reservoir to the hydropower plant 
during period 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑎𝑎 is the fixed production parameter of water that specifies the volume of water 
required to produce a unit of electricity.  
4.2.2. Water Balance and Weather  
The volume of water stored in the reservoir at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1, is the sum of 
the water entering and exiting the reservoir during period 𝑡𝑡: 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡� − 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸� (1) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 is the volume of water in storage at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡, 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡�  is inflows, 𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡� is irrigation 
water extractions, 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 is the seasonal rate of evaporation, 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 are seasonal environmental flows 
delivered to a connected river or lake, and 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 is the maximum storage volume. Water extractions 
for hydropower, irrigation, and environmental flows are rivalrous, with no reuse by, say, an 
irrigator downstream of the hydropower plant (see Figure 4.2). The hydropower operator schedules 
water allocation to electricity generation at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 before inflows, irrigation 
extractions, and evaporation occur. Following Maas et al. (2017), a tilde accent (~) indicates 
variables which are not known when the hydropower operator makes the scheduling decision at 
the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 (i.e. irrigation extractions and inflows). Irrigators can access the residual 
water in storage after electricity generation is scheduled and inflows occur during period 𝑡𝑡, net of 
evaporation and environmental flows.  
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Figure 4.2. Overview of the water balance equation. 
Inflows to the reservoir are a function of season type, weather variability, and random inflow 
shocks. I specify a bi-annual time-step and two seasons: summer (𝜙𝜙 =  1) and winter (𝜙𝜙 =  2). 
Environmental flows and the evaporation rate of storage vary according to the season: 
𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑣𝑣𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=1 if 𝜙𝜙 =  1𝑣𝑣𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=2 if 𝜙𝜙 =  2 � ;  𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 =  �𝜉𝜉𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=1  if  𝜙𝜙 =  1𝜉𝜉𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=2  if  𝜙𝜙 =  2 �  
with 𝜉𝜉𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=1 >  𝜉𝜉𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=2 (i.e. the evaporation rate is higher in summer). The hydropower company 
considers a finite planning horizon 𝑡𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, … . . ,𝑇𝑇. Adapting the approach of Grafton et al. 
(2011), the model incorporates three weather types: wet (𝑤𝑤), normal (𝑚𝑚), and dry (𝑑𝑑). The weather 
state in each season is a random variable correlated with weather in the previous season. Hence, a 
hydropower operator scheduling generation at the beginning of the current winter season, for 
example, forms an expectation regarding current period inflows based on the weather during the 
previous summer season. Formally, the weather state is defined by a discrete, first-order, time-
heterogeneous Markov chain. 
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Probability of Dry, Normal, and Wet 
Weather in the forthcoming Winter Season 
(𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 =  2) 
 Probability of Dry, Normal, and Wet 
Weather in the forthcoming Summer Season 
(𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 =  1) 
?̃?𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑  ?̃?𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤 
𝑑𝑑 0.6 0.3 0.6  𝑑𝑑 0.5 0.2 0.3 
𝑚𝑚 0.3 0.4 0.3  𝑚𝑚 0.4 0.6 0.4 
𝑤𝑤 0.1 0.3 0.1  𝑤𝑤 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Table 4.1. Transition probabilities between weather states: An example for forecasting weather at 
the beginning of the winter season (left) and summer season (right). Adapted from (Grafton et al. 
2011). 
Table 4.1 illustrates a hypothetical relationship between the forthcoming weather in the current 
season, ?̃?𝐶𝑡𝑡, and the previous season, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡. Each cell describes the 
probability of a weather type in the current period given the weather type during the previous 
period. For example, the probability of dry weather this winter given that last summer was dry is 
0.6. The probabilities in each column add to 1. The transition of 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 over time is the probability 
distribution: 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 
?̃?𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1  =  � 𝑑𝑑 if the weather in the current period will be dry𝑚𝑚  if the weather in the current period will be normal
𝑤𝑤 if the weather in the current period will be wet �  
The combination of weather types and seasons means that there are six possible pairs of 
weather/season states in the model. Inflows into the reservoir are a function of the rainfall 
associated with these weather/season states, evapotranspiration in the reservoir catchment, 
upstream extractions, and groundwater seepage into the reservoir. Using subscripts to indicate 
summer (𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 =  1), winter (𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 =  2), and the weather type (𝑑𝑑,𝑚𝑚,𝑤𝑤), I consider a matrix of six 
different inflow volumes: 
𝐹𝐹 =  �𝐹𝐹𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝐹𝐹𝜙𝜙=1,𝑚𝑚 𝐹𝐹𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝐹𝐹𝜙𝜙=2,𝑚𝑚 𝐹𝐹𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤�  (2) 
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Inflows in the forthcoming period are:  
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� = 𝐹𝐹�𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡�  × 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  
where 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is a random shock with a discrete probability distribution, median = 1 and 𝑘𝑘 values. A 
set of parameters, 𝜀𝜀1, 𝜀𝜀2, … . , 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘, generates 𝑘𝑘 proportional shifts in the aggregate inflows in the 
forthcoming season:  
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 =  
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝜀𝜀
1 𝑤𝑤.𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃1
𝜀𝜀2 𝑤𝑤.𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃2…
𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 𝑤𝑤.𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘  
with ∑𝑃𝑃1 + 𝑃𝑃2, … , +𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘 =  1; 𝜀𝜀1, 𝜀𝜀2, … . , 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘 ∈ (0,2) and 𝐸𝐸(𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡) =  1. The random inflow shock 
integrates into the model: (i) natural variability in the rainfall associated with a given 
weather/season state, and (ii) random changes in upstream water extractions or land use.  
4.2.3. Electricity and Carbon Markets 
The marginal revenue from hydroelectricity generation, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, during period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 =  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 +  𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡  
where 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 is the forward price of electricity generation during period 𝑡𝑡. The electricity price is 
established through a futures market, swap, or other hedging instrument. The forward price for a 
unit of hydroelectricity traded in renewable energy certificate (REC) or carbon offset (CO) markets 
(henceforth ‘carbon markets’) is 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡; if this price is constant, then 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 is equal to some initial value, 
𝑐𝑐0. In both electricity and carbon markets, the hydropower operator is a price-taker (i.e. their 
generation decisions do not affect the market price) and the price for the forthcoming period is 
known when the scheduling decision is made. The hydropower operator participates in only one 
type of carbon market and the coefficient 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐 ∈ (0, 1) specifies the number of certificates or offset 
units accredited per unit of hydroelectricity generation. Under REC schemes, 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐 incorporates 
baselines and other conditions associated with market participation. For CO markets, 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐 is a 
conversion factor between the marginal value of hydroelectricity generation and the unit price of 
avoided greenhouse gas emissions, subject to project-specific parameters and market rules.  
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 Electricity Markets 
The representation of the electricity sector assumes the presence of competitive wholesale 
electricity markets with stochastic prices. The hydropower operator can sell electricity forward in 
a secondary market such that 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 is known at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 when the generation planning 
decision is made. However, forward contracts only cover a single period and the profit-maximising 
operator must account for stochastic price changes in subsequent periods. The six-month forward 
electricity prices are uncorrelated with past weather and expectations regarding the current period's 
weather; this assumption may not hold in all real-world applications of the model. 
Probability of Low, Medium, and High Electricity Price in period t+1 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = ℎ 
𝑙𝑙 0.3 0.2 0.2 
𝑚𝑚 0.4 0.5 0.4 
ℎ 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Table 4.2. Example transition probabilities for electricity market price levels. 
To account for uncertain price variability, I adapt the approach to modelling weather in Section 
4.2.2 by considering three forward electricity market price levels: low (𝑙𝑙), medium (𝑚𝑚), high (ℎ). 
Table 4.2 presents a hypothetical relationship between the electricity price level in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, 
𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡, and the current period, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡. There is no seasonal variation in price levels. This approach is 
analogous to the Markov regime-switching models for forecasting spot market prices (see 
Huisman & Mahieu 2003; Janczura & Weron 2010; Weron 2014).  
Formally, the transition of 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 over time is 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 , 𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1  =  � 𝑙𝑙 if the electricity price will be low𝑚𝑚 if the electricity price will be medium
ℎ if the electricity price will be high �  
Using the price type as a subscript, I consider three states for electricity market price levels: 
𝐷𝐷 =  {𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 𝐷𝐷ℎ}  
with 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡(𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙) <  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡(𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚) < 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡(𝐷𝐷ℎ).  
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Carbon Markets 
The average price received per unit of hydroelectricity in carbon markets in period 𝑡𝑡 is defined as: 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑐𝑐0(1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐)𝑡𝑡 if 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤  𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒0 otherwise �  
where 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the first operational period of the carbon market, 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 is the final period, 𝑐𝑐0 is the 
starting price, and 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 is the rate of price change per period. This deterministic specification enables 
analysis of the impact of announced policy changes, such as revision of targets and scheme 
introduction, and their impact on hydropower operators’ returns from energy generation. 
4.2.4. Water Demand and Irrigation Profit   
A single irrigation offtake from the reservoir is managed by a company that provides water to 
farmers within an irrigation scheme. The hydropower reservoir is the scheme’s only form of water 
storage. I consider two specifications for the extraction of irrigation water, 𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕, from the reservoir. 
In the first case, the seasonal quota of irrigation water is fixed: 
𝑚𝑚̅𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼(𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡)  
𝐼𝐼 =  �𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙=1𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙=2�  
where 𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙=1and 𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙=2 are the fixed volumes of irrigation extractions during the summer and winter 
seasons respectively. In the second case, the volume of irrigation extractions varies according to 
the weather/season state (via shifts in farmers’ aggregate demand for water) and the volumetric 
water price. Under water pricing, the hydropower operator does not know the current period 
volume of irrigation extractions when generation is scheduled at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡. 
Irrigation extractions are determined by the intersection of the marginal benefit and marginal cost 
of irrigation water: farmers instruct the irrigation company to extract additional water until the 
additional revenue from an extra unit no longer exceeds the additional costs (i.e. the volumetric 
water price) for any farmers within the scheme. The volumetric water price is the opportunity cost 
to the hydropower company of providing irrigation water, i.e. the marginal value of foregone 
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hydroelectricity revenue. I assume that the hydropower company incurs no fixed costs associated 
with irrigation water provision, such as infrastructure construction. 
The irrigation company pays the hydropower operator to extract water from the reservoir and 
distributes the cost across members of the scheme through a water tariff. I disregard within-scheme 
costs of distributing water to farmers (e.g. pumping and infrastructure costs), assume full cost pass 
through within the same period, and specify that the irrigation company makes zero profits. During 
period 𝒕𝒕, the irrigation company can access: (i) residual water storage in the reservoir after the 
hydropower operator has allocated water to electricity generation at the beginning of the period, 
and (ii) reservoir inflows that occur during period 𝒕𝒕, net of evaporation and environmental flow 
deliveries.  
To determine irrigation water demand under water pricing, I define a constant elasticity function 
for the marginal benefit of irrigation water. This function aggregates the demand functions of the 
farmers accessing the scheme: 
𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡� = 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼 (3) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡  >  0 is a parameter and 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (−1, 0) is the constant price elasticity of demand. The price 
elasticity of demand lying between -1 and 0 indicates that: (i) water demand has an inverse 
relationship with price, and (ii) an increase in price of a given percentage will lead to a reduction 
in water demand of less than that percentage or, in other words, the price elasticity of water demand 
is inelastic.  
The price per unit of water, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, is the marginal revenue of hydroelectricity generation divided by 
the production parameter of water:  
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎   
Weather and season influence the extent to which irrigation water is needed to complement rainfall 
and meet crop water requirements. Hence, the marginal benefit of irrigation water increases 
(decreases) during dry (wet) periods. Consistent with the specification of inflows in Equation 2, I 
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define six realisations of 𝛾𝛾 for each pair of weather (dry, normal, wet) and season (summer, winter) 
states: 
𝛾𝛾 =  �𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑚𝑚 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑚𝑚 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤�  
Figure 4.3 shows how the marginal benefit of irrigation water and irrigation water extractions shift 
in response to weather and price variability. The marginal cost of irrigation water is the volumetric 
water price, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡. Irrigation water deliveries increase in dry weather relative to normal weather, 
whereas wet weather sees reduced extractions (Figure 4.3a). For a given season/weather state, a 
higher (lower) price level will lead to lower (higher) irrigation water extractions (Figure 4.3b). 
Note that 𝜸𝜸 can be specified so that the fixed irrigation quota for a given season is equivalent to 
the volume of irrigation extractions under water pricing if, say, the weather is normal and 
electricity price level is medium. In this case, there is a duality in the price- and quantity-based 
approaches to regulating irrigation extractions. 
 
Figure 4.3. Variability in irrigation water demand according to (a) weather and (b) water price. 
In order to calculate the benefits accruing to farmers under water pricing and fixed irrigation 
extractions, I manipulate the water demand function in Equation 3. The constant elasticity form of 
the function entails that demand will be nonzero for small values of 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 regardless of how high the 
price becomes, leading to infinite total benefits for a given volume of water delivery. I define a 
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'choke price', 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸, which is the highest price that a farmer in the irrigation scheme will pay for 
water, equivalent to the maximum marginal benefit of irrigation water, and a corresponding 
volume of water delivery, 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡, that varies according to the weather/season state. In the case of 
water pricing, demand for water becomes perfectly elastic (i.e. falls to zero) above the choke price. 
 
Figure 4.4. Choke price and calculation of irrigation net profit. 
Next, I define an inverse demand function for the portion of the demand curve to the right of the 
choke volume by inverting Equation 3 so that 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = �?̃?𝚤𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡�1𝛼𝛼   ∀   𝚤𝚤̃ ≥  𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸  
Farmers' net irrigation net profit is presented graphically in Figure 4.4. Under water pricing, net 
profit (Area A + B) = total benefits from water extractions (Area A + B + C + D) - total cost of 
water extractions (Area C + D). Under fixed irrigation extractions, there is no cost for water and 
irrigators accrue all of the total benefits (Area A + B + C + D).  
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For water pricing, net irrigation profit can be found by solving: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃(𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡) =  � 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 + 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 × 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 −  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  ×  𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡?̃?𝚤𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
  
                                               =  𝛼𝛼
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡
1
𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 + 1) �𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 − 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 �  + 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 × 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 −  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  ×  𝚤𝚤?̃?𝑡  
𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)� 
𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = �𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑛𝑛 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑛𝑛 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤 
Assuming that both 𝛼𝛼 and  𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 are fixed, irrigation profits change via: (i) shifts in the water 
price that leads to a movement along the demand curve, and (ii) a change in the weather/season 
state that shifts the demand curve and establishes a new volume of water delivery at which the 
marginal cost of irrigation water equals the marginal benefit. The fixed choke price and shifts in 
the demand function mean that 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  varies and has six different values according to the 
summer/season state. Note that for 𝚤𝚤̃ ≥  𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  the inelastic demand function means that, all other 
things being equal, higher water prices will reduce irrigation net profit and irrigation extractions 
at a decreasing rate as price increases.  
In the case of fixed irrigation quotas, I calculate net irrigation profits by substituting 𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡 with 𝚤𝚤?̅?𝑡 in 
the water price case and omitting the cost of water extractions: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃(𝚤𝚤?̅?𝑡) =  𝛼𝛼
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡
1
𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 + 1) �𝚤𝚤?̅?𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 − 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 � + 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 × 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸  
4.2.5. Operation Constraints  
The available volume of water is bounded by a maximum level of storage, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸, and a minimum 
level of storage, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀, from which water can be extracted. Hydropower and irrigation extractions 
can only be supplied if reservoir storage is above 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀. Therefore, storage in period 𝑡𝑡 is bounded: 
𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 ≤  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ≤  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 (4) 
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Furthermore, the total volume of water extracted for hydropower in a given period is limited by 
physical and operational constraints: 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 (5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 = � 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡  ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶max (0, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶) 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒 
𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 < 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 is the maximum volume of hydropower extractions; 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡 is the maximum physical   
volume of water that transmission infrastructure can extract from the reservoir and convey to the 
power station in a given period; 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 is the level of storage required to manage environmental 
quality in the reservoir and ensure that irrigation extractions are guaranteed when storage levels 
are low. This operation constraint means that that the hydropower operator cannot extract water if 
storage is below 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 and, hence, there is a buffer level of storage maintained. Note that water 
can be extracted for irrigation below 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 but only down to 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀. 
4.2.6. Profit Functions and Optimisation Problems 
I assume that there are no fixed costs associated with electricity generation and irrigation water 
supply. These costs are not included because the focus of the model is on the variable opportunity 
cost of water provision, i.e. foregone hydropower revenue. In the case of fixed irrigation 
extractions, hydropower profits, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶, are total hydroelectricity generation revenue: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) =  1𝑎𝑎 × 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 × 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡(𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)  
In the case of water pricing, hydropower operator profits also encompass revenue from supplying 
irrigation water in the previous period. Hence hydropower profits are:  
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) =  1𝑎𝑎 × 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ×  𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡(𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)  +  𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−1(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡) × 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡)  
where 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 is the electricity price level in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1.  
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 The irrigation net profit function, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 , for water pricing can be expressed as: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)1𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 + 1)�𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) − 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)�                     + 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 × 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡) −  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)  × 𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)   
and the equivalent equation for irrigation net profit under fixed irrigation quotas is: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)1𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 + 1)�𝚤𝚤?̅?𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 − 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)� +  𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡) × 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸  
The hydropower operator controls the volume of water released to the power station in each period 
to maximise the net present value of expected profits over time. In the case of water pricing, the 
irrigator maximises the within-period benefits of its water extractions subject to the water price. 
In the case of fixed quotas, the irrigation company does not make any decisions.  
Figure 4.5 summarises the timing of decision-making and the realisation of variables within a 
single period where irrigation water pricing is in place. 
 
Figure 4.5. The timing of decision-making and the realisation of random variables under water 
pricing. Arrows indicate inflows and outflows from the reservoir.
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I solve the hydropower operators' optimisation problem under (i) water pricing and (ii) fixed 
irrigation quotas. For (i), the irrigator’s water extractions (and profits) in a given period are a 
function of the water price, the weather/season state, and the residual storage after hydropower 
extraction, environmental flow deliveries, and evaporation. The hydropower operator only directly 
controls the amount of water allocated to hydropower generation. The amount of irrigation 
revenues from the previous period vary according to irrigation water demand. For (ii), the 
irrigator’s water extractions are fixed each period but profit varies as the marginal benefit function 
shifts with the weather/season state. The hydropower operator does not receive any irrigation 
revenues under fixed irrigation quotas. 
I define a finite planning horizon, 𝑡𝑡 = (1,2, … .𝑇𝑇), initial values of the state variables, and the 
transition probabilities in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. There are no irrigation extractions nor inflows in the 
terminal period. The profit of the hydropower operator in the final period is the sum of the value 
of the accessible water in storage and, where applicable, irrigation revenues from the penultimate 
period: 
𝜋𝜋𝐸𝐸
𝐶𝐶(𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸 ,𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸 , 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 , 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸) = (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 − 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀)  × 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸(𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸)𝑎𝑎  +  𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸−1(𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸 ,𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸) ×  𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸−1(𝐾𝐾𝐸𝐸) (6) 
The formal problem is 
max
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐸𝐸1�
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) (1 + 𝜌𝜌)𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡=1  
subject to: operation and regulatory constraints defined in Equations 4 and 5; the initial conditions 
for the season (𝜙𝜙1), initial electricity price level (𝐷𝐷1), previous period’s weather (𝑀𝑀1), and price 
level (𝐾𝐾1); the terminal profit condition (Equation 6); and the transition of the state variables 
(𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡), including the water balance (Equation 1).  
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The transition of state variables is summarised below.   
𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡 + 1  
𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1 = 3 −  𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡  
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡� − 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸�  
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 =  �𝑑𝑑 𝑤𝑤. 𝑝𝑝.  Pr (?̃?𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)𝑚𝑚 𝑤𝑤. 𝑝𝑝.  Pr (?̃?𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)
𝑤𝑤 𝑤𝑤. 𝑝𝑝.  Pr (?̃?𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡)    𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1 =  �
𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑤.𝑝𝑝.  Pr (𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙|𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)
𝑚𝑚 𝑤𝑤.𝑝𝑝.  Pr (𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚|𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)
ℎ 𝑤𝑤.𝑝𝑝.  Pr (𝑀𝑀�𝑡𝑡 = ℎ|𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)  
𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  
The profit-maximising hydropower generation schedule from 𝑡𝑡=1 to 𝑡𝑡=𝑇𝑇 is found using stochastic 
dynamic programming (SDP). The Bellman equation is 
𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 ,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) =  max
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) +  11 + 𝜌𝜌  𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1)�  
I solve the model with stochastic dynamic programming using backward induction. I briefly 
review the algorithm below. Beginning in 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇, the hydropower operator calculates the value of 
each combination of state variables for each period. In 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇, these values correspond to the 
different volumes of accessible storage, the current electricity price levels, and, in the case of water 
pricing, irrigation revenues associated with the different weather and price levels states in 𝑡𝑡=19. 
In 𝑡𝑡 = 19, the hydropower operator calculates the optimal value of hydropower extractions for each 
combination of state variables. It does this on the basis of the profits it will receive in 𝑡𝑡 = 19 across 
all possible hydropower extractions, plus the expected value of the level of storage at the beginning 
of 𝑡𝑡=20 resulting from those extractions. The operator goes through this iterative process for all 
possible volumes of hydropower extractions and combinations of state variables in each time 
period until 𝑡𝑡=1. A key assumption is that, no matter how the hydropower operator arrived at, say, 
a given level of storage in 𝑡𝑡=10, all decisions from 𝑡𝑡=1 to 𝑡𝑡=9 were optimal. Note that the value 
of a combination of state variables in 𝑡𝑡=1 includes the expected value of the optimal time-path 
from 𝑡𝑡=1 to 𝑡𝑡=20. The overall result, in this case, is two 6-dimensional matrices (i.e. one dimension 
per state variable, including time): one matrix defines the value of each possible combination of 
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states, and the other defines the optimal level of hydropower extractions corresponding to each 
combination of those states.  
In order to solve the model, starting conditions for the state variables are defined and the model is 
simulated forwards. Beginning in 𝑡𝑡=1, the hydropower operator schedules the optimal volume of 
electricity generation based on the storage level, season, price level, and last period’s weather and 
price. Random shifts occur in the weather and price level, evaporation occurs, environmental flows 
are extracted, the irrigator extracts water, and there is a new starting level of reservoir storage (as 
per the decision-making sequence in Figure 4.5). Based on the resulting storage volume and values 
of the other state variables, the hydropower operator schedules the optimal volume of extractions 
in 𝑡𝑡=2, and so on. Conducting multiple simulations provides insights into the performance of 
different water allocation instruments across a range of time-paths for the state variables.  
4.2.7. Dynamic (In)Efficiency Under Stochastic Weather and Prices 
In the stochastic modelling framework described above, the hydropower operator makes an 
optimal water extraction decision each period on the basis of expected outcomes from a range of 
different values of random variables (e.g. inflows, irrigation extractions, and future electricity 
prices), not the actual values that eventually occur. In other words, the operator extracts water to 
maximise expected profits on the basis of the probabilistic transition of weather and electricity 
prices. This is important because it means that the optimal ex ante decision will almost always be 
different from the optimal ex post decision. Hence, the two water allocation instruments I examine 
here (i.e. water pricing and irrigation quotas) will both involve some deadweight efficiency loss in 
each period of each simulation simply because the future is uncertain when decisions are made. 
The task is to find the relative efficiency gains from deploying one instead of the other. Below I 
adapt the graphical approach to the general prices vs quantities choice problem in Figure 4.1 to 
illustrate where some of these relative gains may emerge. 
First, consideration is required of how irrigation extractions and benefits change under variable 
weather and water prices. In Figure 4.6a the fixed irrigation quota is defined so that it equates to 
irrigation extractions under water pricing with a medium price and normal weather. If the weather 
is wet then extractions are lower under water pricing and irrigation benefits are higher by Area (A) 
under quotas. On the other hand, if the weather is dry then extractions are higher with water pricing 
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and the gain in total benefits (Area 𝑀𝑀 + 𝐶𝐶) from deploying that water allocation instrument is 
shared between net irrigation profits (Area 𝑀𝑀) and irrigation revenues to the hydropower operator 
(Area 𝐶𝐶). Figure 4.6b shows that, under normal weather, fixed quotas generate relatively higher 
total benefits under high prices (Area 𝐷𝐷), and pricing generates higher total benefits under low 
prices (Area 𝐸𝐸 +  𝐹𝐹) that are distributed between net irrigation profits (Area 𝐸𝐸) and irrigation 
revenues for the hydropower company (Area 𝐹𝐹). 
 
Figure 4.6. Change in benefits under pricing and quotas for variable weather and electricity prices. 
Whether or not the shifts in irrigation extractions and benefits shown in Figure 4.6 will result in 
overall efficiency gains depends on the change in total benefits associated with the resulting 
transfers between different water uses and time periods. Identifying whether or not a specific 
transfer is efficient is difficult in a stochastic model: the hydropower operator’s decisions are made 
with respect to dynamic profit expectations and the optimal hydropower extraction in, say, period 
𝑡𝑡=3 is influenced by the joint probabilities of an extremely large number of future states that could 
occur from 𝑡𝑡=4 to 𝑡𝑡=20. The inherent complexity of optimising across an expanding state space is 
why large SDP models require significant computing power to be solved. However, if the gap 
between 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 and 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 is sufficiently large (i.e. so that there is no excess irrigation water demand 
under either allocation instrument), the discount rate is disregarded, and there are only two periods, 
then some preliminary insights can be obtained into how relative efficiency gains can emerge from 
either pricing or quotas.  
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The decision-making sequence shown in Figure 4.6 highlights a critical point in the allocation of 
water between irrigation in period 𝑡𝑡 and hydropower in 𝑡𝑡+1. First, I assume that 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑧𝑧 >
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 − 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀, i.e. there is sufficient residual storage at the beginning of 𝑡𝑡+1 such that hydropower 
extractions, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1, are possible. Second, I assume that the hydropower operator schedules all of that 
available storage such that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1= 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 and 𝑧𝑧 =  𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1. Recall that there can be a stochastic 
change in the electricity price at the beginning of 𝑡𝑡+1. This would equate to a shift in the marginal 
cost of irrigation water provision between the time that irrigation water is extracted at the end of 𝑡𝑡 
and hydropower is scheduled at the beginning of 𝑡𝑡+1. If this shift occurs, then there could be a 
relative efficiency gain depending on the water allocation instrument in place and the direction of 
shift in marginal cost (i.e. the water price). 
 
Figure 4.7. A downward shift in the marginal cost of irrigation water causes benefits to be higher 
under fixed quotas. 
Figure 4.7 demonstrates. Here, irrigation extractions in period 𝑡𝑡 are less under water pricing; this 
would be consistent with a higher electricity/water price in this example. The fixed irrigation quota 
equates to the efficient extraction under the lower price. Table 4.3 summarises the calculation of 
total benefits under water pricing and fixed quotas if the price stays the same or falls. If prices 
remain high, then total benefits under water pricing will be higher by the value of Area C. 
Conversely, if prices fall then fixed quotas generate Area D of additional benefits. Note the 
curvature of the water demand function implies Area C > Area D.  
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 Irrigation net 
benefits 
Hydropower 
benefits (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
Total benefits 
(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
Hydropower 
benefits (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
Total benefits 
(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠) 
Water pricing E  A + B + C + D + F 
+G+H 
A + B + C + D 
+E + F +G +H 
A + F + G + H A + E + F +G + 
H 
Fixed quotas D+ E + F + G 
+ H 
A + B A + B + D + E 
+ F + G + H 
A  A + D + E + F+ 
G + H 
Net benefits of water pricing compared to fixed quotas C  - D 
Table 4.3. Total benefits under pricing and quotas for constant and falling electricity prices.  
Figure 4.8 shows the converse situation: higher extraction under water pricing with a lower initial 
water price. The outcomes are reversed: if the electricity price remains low then water pricing 
generates benefits of Area D, but quotas increase efficiency by Area C if prices become higher. 
  
Figure 4.8. An upward shift in the marginal cost of irrigation water causes benefits to be higher 
under water pricing. 
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Figure 4.9 considers a situation where the change in prices is greater. Here, the initial water price 
is low in period 𝑡𝑡. The fixed quota is equivalent to some medium water price. If the electricity 
price level is higher in period 𝑡𝑡+1, the efficient allocation of water is 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1
∗ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ, i.e. allocating more 
water to hydropower than occurs under either fixed quotas or water pricing. The difference is that 
efficiency losses are Area M + N + O under water pricing, but only Area O under the fixed quota. 
On the other hand, if prices were high in both 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 then water pricing would generate a 
relative gain in total benefits of Area O.  
 
Figure 4.9. An upward shift in the marginal cost of irrigation water causes efficiency losses to be 
lower under fixed quotas. 
In summary, the cases illustrated in Figures 4.6 to 4.9 provide insights into the potential causes of 
efficiency gains from the use of water pricing or fixed quotas to regulate irrigation extractions in 
multipurpose reservoirs. The relative efficiency gains from applying alternative water allocation 
instruments may be a function of: (i) the slope of the price elasticity of irrigation water demand; 
(ii) the difference between the three electricity price levels; (iii) the transition of electricity prices 
and, hence, water prices; and, in the case of Figure 4.7a, (iv) the relative shifts in water demand. 
These insights guide our sensitivity analysis of the model results in Section 4.4.  
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4.3. Model Calibration to Arthurs Lake, Tasmania 
The model outlined in Section 4.2 is applied to Arthurs Lake, a multipurpose reservoir located in 
the Central Highlands of the Tasmania, an island state 240km off the coast of Australia. In this 
section I describe key elements of the system, relevant policy settings, and the parameterisation of 
the model. All monetary values are reported in 2018 Australian dollars (AUD). 
4.3.1. The Arthurs Lake-Great Lake System 
The Arthurs Lake catchment consists of 25,900 hectares that are primarily conservation areas with 
some agricultural land and small settlements. Average annual rainfall in the catchment is 
approximately 855 mm. The reservoir has a storage capacity of 448,790 ML and is operated as an 
auxiliary hydropower storage for the adjacent Great Lake (3,063,300 ML). Water is pumped from 
Arthurs Lake over a hill to the Great Lake via a pipeline with a 1.7MW capacity turbine on the 
downward side. Water held in the Great Lake is released to either the 313MW Poatina Power 
Station or the Shannon and Ouse Rivers. Downstream of Poatina is the 100MW Trevallyn Power 
Station.  
Since 2014, water has been extracted from Arthurs Lake to supply irrigation water for the Midlands 
Water Scheme. In addition to providing water for energy generation and irrigation, Arthurs Lake 
is Tasmania’s most popular recreational trout fishery and contains endangered, native Galaxiid 
fish species. Hydro Tasmania releases water from Arthurs Lake to manage water levels in the 
adjacent Woods Lake. Woods Lake is a shallow, man-made lake built to manage irrigation 
extractions from the downstream Lake River. Both Woods Lake and the Great Lake are also 
popular sites for recreational trout fishing and support populations of Galaxiid species. In addition 
to the Midlands Scheme and Woods Lake, water is also extracted for irrigation below the Poatina 
Power Station and from the Lake and Shannon Rivers. Figure 4.10 presents the main features of 
the Arthurs Lake-Great Lake system. The focus in this Chapter is the operation of Arthurs Lake to 
supply water to the Midlands Irrigation Scheme, Great Lake, and Woods Lake.  
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Figure 4.10. Schematic diagram of the Arthurs-Great Lake system. 
4.3.2. Hydro Tasmania 
Hydro Tasmania is a state-owned enterprise that pays dividends to the Tasmanian State 
Government. It generates approximately 90% of Tasmania’s electricity through a network of 
around thirty hydropower stations and 50 dams. This network is operated as a system, with two 
large reservoirs (the Great Lake and Lake Gordon-Pedder) providing inter-annual storage. Hydro 
Tasmania sells electricity into Australia’s wholesale National Electricity Market (NEM), which is 
separated into sub-national state regions including Tasmania. Since 2006, Hydro Tasmania has 
sold electricity into the Victorian region of the NEM via the 500MW capacity Basslink long-
distance transmission cable. This connection also allows Tasmania to import electricity from the 
mainland. The company can also trade in: (i) electricity futures and options through the Australian 
Stock Exchange, and (ii) hedging instruments entered into with NEM participants (i.e. other 
generators, retailers, and large electricity consumers) directly or via a broker. Hydro Tasmania 
generates additional revenue by selling large-scale generation certificates (LGCs) to electricity 
retailers under Australia’s Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme. The company holds water 
and energy licenses that are respectively overseen by the Department of Primary Industries, Parks, 
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Water and Environment (DPIPWE) and the Office of the Tasmania Economic Regulator 
(OTTER). In addition, Hydro Tasmania and the Inland Fisheries Service have agreements 
regarding the hydropower company’s management of water levels in particular reservoirs. 
4.3.3. The Midlands Water Scheme 
The Midlands Water Scheme is operated by the state-owned Tasmania Irrigation (TI) company. 
The scheme was commissioned in 2014 and financed through federal and state government 
funding, the sale of water entitlements to farmers and investors, and private investment in on-farm 
infrastructure. The scheme encompasses 55,484 ha. Production activities prior to the  
commissioning included poppies, cereals, canola, pasture seeds, lucerne, potatoes, and livestock 
pasture (Tasmania Irrigation 2017a). The district is in the rain shadow of the Central Highlands 
(that includes the Arthur’s Lake catchment) and receives approximately 500mm of rainfall per 
year. Areas of the new irrigation district may be suitable for dairy conversion and perennial 
horticulture for high-value crops (e.g. berries and hazelnuts) due to the augmentation of water 
supplies. Established irrigation schemes are located in the north of the broader Midlands region, 
including the Whitemore and Cressy-Longford schemes which accesses water from the Poatina 
tailrace. In 2010, the total value of agricultural production for the entire Midlands region (774,600 
ha) was estimated to be $211.57 million (AK Consultants 2012). 
The Midlands scheme owns and operates a 6MW hydropower station at the end of the delivery 
pipeline from Arthurs Lake. The scheme supplies farmers with up to 38,500 ML of water per year 
across two periods: 15,812 during a 150-day summer delivery period (October-February) and 
22,688 ML during a 215-day winter delivery period (March-September). Participants in the 
scheme hold water entitlements that determine the amount of water that can be accessed per 
delivery period. Farmers pay a fixed charge per ML of entitlement each season and a volumetric 
price for water deliveries that incorporates: (i) the Hydro Tasmania water price, plus (ii) pumping 
costs to different points within the scheme, less (iii) a proportion of revenue from the scheme’s 
power station. Trade in both water entitlements and seasonal allocations is facilitated by scheme 
management. As of 2018, the scheme is still in the early stages of operation: only 75% of available 
water entitlements had been purchased, trading activity was minimal in the 2016/17 growing 
season (1,540 ML for allocations), and the delivered volumes for the first three years (2014/15, 
2015/16, 2016/17) were 17%, 67%, and 28% of capacity respectively (Tasmania Irrigation 2017b).  
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4.3.4. Pricing and Managing Water Extractions  
Hydro Tasmania’s water license stipulates that the company can enter into commercial 
arrangements for the sale of water at a price that represents the opportunity cost of foregone 
hydroelectricity revenue. Hydro Tasmania publishes a schedule of water prices at the beginning of 
each financial year for extractions from different reservoirs (e.g. Hydro Tasmania 2015, 2017) that 
specifies the foregone electricity per unit of water (MWh/ML) and the marginal value of foregone 
generation. The marginal value of hydroelectricity generation is calculated from the sum of: (i) the 
average forward electricity price for the charge period, (ii) half the value of foregone LGCs per 
unit of electricity, and (iii) a water scarcity premium. Prior to 2017, component (i) was calculated 
as the average of the over-the-counter Victorian Swap Contract Market price across separate 
annual, summer (December-April) and winter (July-November, May-June) prices. From 2017, the 
average electricity price is the annual forecast price determined by OTTER annually. The 
weighting of the foregone LGCs reflects that, on average, Hydro Tasmania’s hydropower station 
are accredited with approximately half a MWh of renewable energy per unit of electricity 
generated due to the baselines set under the RET.  
The water scarcity premium incorporates: (i) the higher prices that Hydro Tasmania bids into the 
wholesale market when water storages are low, and (ii) the need to import more electricity at peak 
prices from Victoria when local generation cannot sustainably supply Tasmania’s demand. Prior 
to 2017, a water scarcity factor was calculated from a moving average of the previous two years 
of inflows and multiplied by the difference between peak and average electricity prices. In 
addition, the peak-average difference was calculated from Victorian swap contracts. From 2017 
onwards, the water scarcity premium is calculated using a constant 5% water scarcity factor and 
the peak-average difference for the Tasmanian Regulated prices forecast by OTTER annually. A 
further change in 2017 was that Hydro Tasmania began calculating water prices for extractions 
from their storages on the basis of a five-year rolling average to insulate irrigators from a sharp 
upward shift in electricity prices; this averaging approach was subsequently extended to 10 years 
in 2018. However, the Midlands Water Scheme is exempt from this price smoothing as it is hedged 
against higher water prices via higher revenues generated by operating its 6MW power station. 
Hydro Tasmania operates the Arthurs Lake reservoir according to storage operating rules 
associated with its water license and agreements with stakeholders. Environmental risk bands are 
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defined for the endangered fish species in the lake: Medium (948-947.5 metres above sea level 
(MASL)); High (947.5-947 MASL); Extreme (Below 947 MASL). Tasmania Irrigation (TI) and 
Hydro Tasmania have entered into a renewable 25-year water supply agreement to achieve a 
minimum reservoir level of 949 MASL on 1 June and 950 MASL on 1 November each year. TI 
can extract up to 40,000 ML a year according to the pricing schedule determined at the beginning 
of each financial year. In addition, Hydro Tasmania has an agreement with the Inland Fisheries 
Service (IFS) to ensure the reservoir level is above 949 MASL during the brown trout angling 
season (1 August to 30 April). The IFS agreement is conditional on the Great Lake being above 
its Medium Environmental Risk Level; if it is not, the level targets are reduced by 1 metre. Hydro 
Tasmania also has a written agreement to pump water to Woods Lake to protect Galaxiid species 
and support trout fishing in that reservoir. Water is pumped from Arthurs Lake to Woods Lake to 
maintain the level of the latter above 736.2 MASL (10,689 ML). The maximum extraction rate of 
the pump from Arthurs Lake to the Great Lake is approximately 4.2 cubic metres per second, or 
approximately 131,725 ML per year. In practice, water is typically pumped from Arthurs to the 
Great Lake whenever the reservoir is above the levels stipulated by the TI water supply agreement. 
4.3.5. Model Parameterisation  
In order to model the operation of Arthurs Lake under fixed irrigation quotas and water pricing, I 
define two seasons: summer (October-March) and winter (April to September). The minimum 
storage volume is set at the bottom of the High Environmental Risk band (947 MASL) = 114,650 
ML, rounded up to 115,000 ML to discretise storage volumes into 500 ML units. Similarly, the 
maximum storage volume is rounded up to 449,000 ML from 448,790 ML (952.82 MASL). The 
environmental risk level below which the hydropower operator cannot extract water (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶) is set 
at the top of the medium environmental risk level (948 MASL) which equates to 164,000 ML. The 
median inflows associated with the six different weather/season states are estimated for the Arthurs 
Lake catchment from 1970-2016. The definition of weather types (dry, normal, wet) follows from 
Robinson et al. (2005) and Grafton et al. (2011). If rainfall during a winter/summer season is: (i) 
above the 75th percentile it is a wet winter/summer, (ii) below the 25th percentile it is a dry 
winter/summer; and (iii) equal to or between the 25th and 75th percentile it is a normal 
winter/summer. The inflow volumes by weather/season state are calculated using monthly rainfall 
data for the Miena gauge from 1970-2016 and average monthly evapotranspiration and 
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evaporation data for the Central Highlands region (BOM 2018) (see Appendix 4.A2 for further 
details on this calculation and underlying assumptions). The random inflow shock is defined as a 
uniform probability distribution. The parameters that scale the random inflow shock are estimated 
by calculating the average ratio of the corresponding percentiles (20th and 80th, 40th and 60th) across 
all weather types and seasons (see Appendix 4.A3 for further details). The rate of evaporation from 
Arthurs Lake (by the storage volume at the beginning of the period) is estimated by: scaling 
seasonal pan evaporation estimates for Arthurs Lake catchment (BOM 2018) by the factor for 
Woods Lake used in Ling et al. (2009) (to accommodate water temperature and other factors 
decreasing actual evaporation from the reservoir’s surface), estimating evaporation volume (by 
surface area) across all possible storage levels (𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 to 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸), and calculating a seasonal average 
rate of evaporation as a percentage of storage volume. 
The electricity price levels are defined by adapting the inflow calculation approach to average 
monthly spot prices from the Victoria region of the NEM from 1999-2016. The electricity prices 
are adjusted for inflation and are reported in 2018 dollars. The transition probabilities between 
electricity price states are estimated by calculating conditional probabilities from the frequency of 
events within the observed time series (see Appendix 4.A4). The weather state transition is defined 
using the same method. I use the 2015 Q1 LGC spot market price of $41.11 as the starting carbon 
market price and assume no deterministic trend in the basic model; this specification is consistent 
with the relatively stable average price for LGCs from 2011 to 2015, after which there was a rapid 
increase to around $90 through 2015-2017. Trend and level shifts in marginal electricity revenues 
are captured in the risk analysis in Section 4.4.2. 
Given the early stage of the Midlands Water Scheme (MWS) operations, I use the estimate of the 
price elasticity of seasonal water demand for Victoria’s largest irrigation district calculated by 
Wheeler et al. (2008). This implies that for every 1% increase in the water price, irrigation water 
demand decreases by 0.81%. A choke price of $611 is defined on the basis of the highest reported 
price for water allocations in Tasmanian irrigation water markets from 2011-2016 (ABARES 
2016). I calculate fixed water extractions, scaling parameters for the water demand function and 
choke volumes using the maximum seasonal extractions defined for the MWS, rainfall data for the 
MWS, the choke price, and other parameters already defined for prices and the water demand 
function (see Appendix 4.A5). Fixed irrigation quotas in each season equate to irrigation 
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extractions under water pricing for normal weather and a medium electricity price level, i.e. there 
is typically a duality in price- and quantity-based planning. 
The model only incorporates water extractions from Arthurs Lake. However, I assume that all 
water pumped from Arthurs Lake to the Great Lake is subsequently used in the same period to 
generate electricity at the Poatina and Trevallyn Power Stations. The factor for converting water 
into electricity consistent with this assumption is derived from Hydro Tasmania’s water pricing 
schedule (Hydro Tasmania 2015) and includes foregone generation from both Poatina and 
Trevallyn Power Stations. The pumping capacity restriction (from Arthurs to the Great Lake) 
means that the maximum extractions for hydropower generation are 66,044 ML and 65,681 ML 
for winter and summer respectively. Electricity generation from Tod’s Corner and the Midlands 
Scheme hydropower station are not incorporated into the model. The water scarcity component of 
Hydro Tasmania’s irrigation water tariff and any within-scheme charges for water delivery are not 
incorporated either. Seasonal environmental flows delivered from Arthurs Lake to Woods Lake 
are assumed to be constant and estimated on the basis of historical shifts in storage levels for 
Woods Lake. Table 4.4 summarises the parameter values. Figure 4.11 shows the various 
permutations in the summer season for the marginal benefit and marginal cost of irrigation water, 
as well as the corresponding levels of irrigation extractions under water pricing. Since direct 
rainfall in the MWS command area is relatively evenly distributed across seasons, Figure 4.11 also 
approximates the corresponding marginal benefit functions and irrigation extractions for the winter 
season.
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Table 4.4. Summary of parameters for the model calibration to Arthurs Lake.
Parameter Mathematical Notation Value 
Minimum and maximum storage volume 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 115000 ML, 449000 ML 
Risk storage volume 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 164000 ML 
Inflows, by season and weather type 
 𝐹𝐹 =  �𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=1,𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=1,𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=1,𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=2,𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=2,𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=2,𝑙𝑙� �18227 ML 22679 ML 39375 ML59850 ML 88207 ML 122905 ML� 
Random inflow shock 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 =  
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
0.87  w. p 0.20.97 w. p 0.21 w. p 0.21.03 w. p 0.21.13 w. p 0.2  
Evaporation rate of storage 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 = �𝜉𝜉𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=1 𝜉𝜉𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=2  � �0.138 0.049  � 
Seasonal environmental flows 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑣𝑣𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=1 if 𝜙𝜙 =  1𝑣𝑣𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=2 if 𝜙𝜙 =  2 � �4000 ML1000 ML � 
Electricity price levels ($/MWh) 𝐷𝐷 =  {𝐷𝐷 𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 𝐷𝐷ℎ} {$31.96 $44.40 $67.71} 
Production parameter of water for conversion of hydropower 
releases into electricity (MWh/ML) 𝑎𝑎 0.5272 
Maximum extractions for hydropower 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 = �𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=1𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=2� �65681 ML66044 ML� 
Price elasticity of water demand 𝛼𝛼 -0.81 
Fixed seasonal irrigation extractions (ML) 
 𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡 =  �𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡=1𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡=2� �15114 ML14895 ML� 
Weather and electricity price transition matrices See Appendix 4.A3  
Carbon market starting price ($/MWh) 𝑐𝑐0 $41.11 
Accreditation per unit of hydroelectricity generated 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐  0.5 
Scaling parameter for the water demand/marginal benefit 
function 𝛾𝛾 = �𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑙𝑙� 952477 746125 503291960030 735314 500033 
Choke price for irrigation water ($/ML) 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 $611 
Choke volume for irrigation extraction (ML by 
weather/season) 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = �𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤 �5274 ML 4131 ML 2787 ML5316 ML 4072 ML 2769 ML� 
Number of time periods 𝑡𝑡 20 seasons (10 years) 
Initial reservoir volume 𝑆𝑆0 310000 ML 
Discount factor (per seasonal time-step) 𝜌𝜌 0.015 
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Figure 4.11. Summer irrigation water demand functions and irrigation extractions under alternative under weather/price pairs.
𝑝𝑝ℎ  
𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙   𝚤𝚤̃𝑒𝑒,𝜙𝜙=1 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚  𝚤𝚤̃𝑚𝑚,𝜙𝜙=1  𝚤𝚤̃𝑙𝑙,𝜙𝜙=1 
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4.4. Results  
4.4.1. Efficiency of Alternative Water Allocation Instruments  
I calculate the total benefits of multipurpose reservoir operations across three alternative scenarios 
for regulating water allocation: 
A. Hydropower only – There are no irrigation extractions and the reservoir is operated only 
for hydropower. The hydropower company schedules generation at the beginning of the 
period when current period inflows are unknown;  
B. Fixed irrigation quotas – A fixed, seasonal volume of irrigation water is extracted from the 
reservoir each period after inflows and evaporation occur. Irrigators do not pay for water; 
C. Water pricing – The irrigator extracts water from the reservoir according to shifts in the 
water demand function and water price. Current-period irrigation extractions are weather-
dependent and, hence, unknown when the hydropower scheduling decision is made. The 
hydropower operator receives revenue in period 𝑡𝑡 from period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 irrigation extractions. 
I conduct 1000 random simulations of the three scenarios. The sequence of stochastic shifts in the 
weather, electricity price, and random shocks are the same in each simulation, i.e. for simulation 𝑗𝑗 
the time paths of the state variables, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, the random shock, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡, and inflows, 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, are the same 
across different scenarios. I calculate the net present value (NPV) of benefits for hydropower and 
irrigation for each period within each simulation across the scenarios.  
In order to understand the conditions under which water pricing leads to a more efficient water 
allocation, I examine both aggregate results and individual simulations. There are two reasons for 
this multi-faceted approach. First, there are multiple sources of stochastic change in the model: 
electricity prices, weather, and the random inflow shock. These sources of randomness affect 
decision-making and outcomes in multiple ways. Hence, the results of a given simulation do not 
indicate that fixed quotas will always outperform water pricing, or vice versa, from an efficiency 
perspective. The aggregate results presented in this section indicate the relative merits of different 
regulatory scenarios under an array of different time-paths for the stochastic variables and, 
importantly, the reasons causing aggregate variations in total benefits, such as the change in water 
extractions for a particular water use. On the other hand, aggregate results mask the potentially 
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large distribution of outcomes across different simulations and may not provide significant insights 
into the dynamics of the model. Hence, I also present the results from particular simulations to 
understand how pricing or quotas can outperform the other as water allocation instruments. 
 
Hydropower Irrigation Total 
Average 
water 
extractions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV 
of benefits 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
water 
extractions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV of 
benefits 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
water 
extractions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV of 
net benefits 
(Standard 
deviation) 
(A) Hydro 
only 
657.3 GL 
(65.3 GL) 
$81.5 million 
($9.1 million) 
Not 
Applicable Not Applicable 
657.3 GL 
(65.3 GL) 
$81.5 million 
($9.1 million) 
(B) Fixed 
irrigation 
quotas 
474.6 GL 
(60.7 GL) 
$54.3 million 
($7.7 million) 
300.1 GL 
(0 GL) 
$89.8 million 
($2.7 million) 
774.7 GL 
(60.7 GL) 
$144.0 million 
($6.1 million) 
(C) Water 
pricing 
480.8 GL 
(71.4 GL) 
$86.6 million 
($8.4 million) 
294.3 GL 
(18.6 GL) 
$58.0 million 
($3.1 million) 
775.1 GL 
(59.6 GL) 
$144.6 million 
($6.0 million) 
Table 4.5. Aggregate model results across regulatory scenarios. Averages reported for 1000 
simulations. Each simulation experiences the same stochastic variations across periods as the 
corresponding simulation in a different scenario. The simulations span 20 seasons (10 years). 
Table 4.5 presents a summary of aggregate results for the NPV of benefits and the volume of water 
extractions for Scenarios A, B, and C. On average, water pricing generates a small 0.4% 
improvement in the efficiency of water allocation compared to fixed irrigation quotas. This result 
is not surprising given that (i) the model is calibrated so that irrigation extractions under Scenario 
B and C are the same under normal weather and medium electricity prices, and (ii) the specification 
of the electricity price and weather transition result in a balanced distribution of different states; 
for the 20,000 time periods modelled, the price level is medium in 53% of periods, low in 22.5%, 
and high in 24.5%. The corresponding values for the weather state are 54.8% (normal), 22.3% 
(dry), and 22.9% (wet). Both multipurpose operation scenarios represent an overall improvement 
in total benefits compared to Scenario A. The large difference in hydropower and irrigation 
benefits across B and C reflect that irrigation water is provided free in B and the hydropower 
operator receives revenues from providing irrigation water in C. Although the primary focus in 
this section is total benefits, it is notable that, compared to Scenario A, the application of water 
pricing enables the hydropower operator to increase profits whilst extracting, on average, around 
28% less water for electricity generation. The substantial standard deviations across water 
extractions and, to a lesser extent, benefits reflect the stochastic nature of the model.  
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Figure 4.12. Frequency of the difference in NPV of Total Profits between Scenario C (water 
pricing) and Scenario B (fixed irrigation quotas) for 1000 model simulations. Positive values 
indicate that NPV Total Profits Scenario C > NPV Total Profits Scenario B. 
Figure 4.12 shows the frequency of differences in total benefits between Scenarios C and B, e.g. 
NPV total benefits for simulation 𝑗𝑗 under water pricing minus NPV total benefits for simulation 𝑗𝑗 
under fixed irrigation quotas. Although the differences remain fairly small, there are a significant 
number of simulations where either water pricing leads to a gain in net benefits in excess of $1 
million or fixed quotas lead to a slightly more efficient water allocation. 
In order to gain preliminary insights into the model’s dynamics and how water is allocated by 
alternative regulatory instruments, I review the results from a particular simulation. Comparing 
Scenarios B and C, water pricing under this simulation generates an additional $1.3 million total 
benefits and, overall, hydropower extractions are higher (+ 8156 ML) and irrigation extractions 
are lower (- 4939 ML). Figure 4.13 presents the time-path of: (i) reservoir levels; (ii) inflows, the 
electricity price, and weather state; (iii) hydropower extractions; and (iv) irrigation extractions. 
Results are reported for Scenarios A, B, and C. The first point to note when comparing A to B and 
Water pricing or irrigation quotas? 
114 | P a g e  
C is that the introduction of irrigation extractions changes the operating mode of the reservoir from 
one where hydropower extractions vary seasonally but, in general, there is hydropower generated 
each season unless weather is very dry (Figure 4.13c). By contrast, water is typically extracted for 
hydropower in B and C only at the beginning of the summer season following winter inflows. This 
is because the hydropower operator cannot extract water if the reservoir level is below the 
environmental risk level (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶) but irrigation extractions can (see Figure 4.14a). 
Figures 4.13b and 4.13d show how, under water pricing, irrigation extractions increase (decrease) 
in response to dry (wet) weather states and low (high) electricity/water prices. These shifts are 
important drivers of the variation in outcomes compared to fixed quotas. Recall from Figure 4.5 
that hydropower generation is scheduled at the beginning of the period before inflows and other 
outflows occur (i.e. irrigation, evaporation and environmental flows). Hence, increased 
(decreased) irrigation extractions in period 𝑡𝑡 will reduce (increase) reservoir storage at the 
beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 and decrease (increase) potential hydropower extractions in period 𝑡𝑡 +1, 𝑡𝑡 + 2 and so on. For example, reduced irrigation extractions during periods 8 to 11 enable the 
hydropower operator to extract more water in periods 10, 11 and 13 when electricity revenues are 
higher. On the other hand, higher irrigation extractions during periods of dry weather and low 
water prices (periods 1, 6, 7 and 15) are followed by periods of low or medium electricity prices. 
Dynamic efficiency is increased because, on aggregate, the increased benefits associated with re-
allocating water to one use exceeds the reduced benefits from less water allocated to the other.  
Section 4.5 provides a detailed discussion of the policy implications of all modelling results. In 
short, however, it can be seen that, on aggregate, neither water pricing nor fixed quotas may 
represent a significant improvement over the other when quotas are calibrated to irrigation water 
demand prevailing under normal weather and medium price conditions. Once again, this result is 
expected given how the model is calibrated to approximate a duality in price- and quantity-based 
water allocations. On the other hand, the detailed results of a particular simulation provide insights 
into how some relative efficiency gains could emerge. I use the results from this basic model of 
stochastic weather and electricity prices as a baseline for the risk analysis further below. 
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Figure 4.13. Time-path of key variables for a simulation where water pricing generates relative efficiency gains under the basic model specification. 
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4.4.2. Risk Analysis 
I incorporate water and energy risks into Scenarios B and C to examine the conditions under which 
pricing or quotas allocate water more efficiently. Although these risks are calibrated to the 
conditions prevailing in the Arthurs Lake system considered here, they also reflect challenges 
facing regulators, hydropower operators, and irrigators globally. I replicate the process used in the 
basic specification of the models reported in Section 4.4.1, with 1000 simulations conducted of 
only Scenario B and Scenario C for each risk. Note that the transition of the weather and electricity 
price states remain the same for corresponding simulations, but the realisation of key variables, 
such as hydroelectricity revenues and irrigation extractions, may be different. The risks include: 
• Climate change – Summer season inflows are reduced by 60% for all weather types; winter 
season inflows are reduced by 25% for all weather types. These shifts correspond to projected 
changes in run-off for the Arthurs Lake catchment by 2030 compared to historical climate 
(CSIRO 2009). The random inflow shock and irrigation water demand are unchanged. 
• Price spike – The high electricity price level increases from $67.71 to $102.31. The latter value 
is the Victorian average wholesale spot price of electricity in the first quarter of 2018. Historic 
price spikes occurred around this period in Australia’s National Electricity Market because 
policy uncertainty caused deferment of investment in new generation (to replace retiring coal-
plants) and, in turn, increased vulnerability of the system to high demand events. In a broader 
context, such price spikes could also reflect: extreme weather events; shocks to coal and gas 
supply markets, such as transportation bottlenecks or processing plant failures; failure of large 
thermal plants and interconnections; sudden retirement of large generation plants; and exercise 
of market power by large generators in wholesale markets with limited competition.  
• Energy policy change – I consider two variations: (i) The carbon market ends in 𝑡𝑡=10, causing 
a downward level effect in hydroelectricity revenues and water prices, and (ii) the carbon 
market is introduced in 𝑡𝑡=10. In each case, these are deterministic changes that the hydropower 
operator is aware of in advance. For the Arthurs Lake system, (i) reflects the sharp fall in the 
LGC spot market price expected in 2021-2022 due to a shift in 2020 from a rising to fixed 
target under the Australian Renewable Energy Target. More broadly, both (i) and (ii) reflect 
medium- and long-term level effects that can occur in electricity markets due to other policy 
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changes, such as: the introduction, removal, or other reform of carbon pricing; deregulation of 
wholesale markets; and changes to the dispatch merit order in centrally planned markets. 
• Price trend – Once again, I consider two variations: (i) a 3.8% seasonal increase in the LGC 
price such that it rises from $44.11 in 𝑡𝑡=1 to $83.50 in 𝑡𝑡=20, (ii) an equivalent percentage 
decrease in the LGC price such that it falls from $44.11 in 𝑡𝑡=1 to $19.31 in 𝑡𝑡=20. Variation (i) 
approximates the peak price that occurred in the Australian REC market in 2017-2018 due to 
excess demand for LGCs caused by under-investment in new renewable energy generation 
during a period of policy uncertainty. Since only half the volume of generation is attributed to 
LGCs, marginal hydroelectricity revenues increase or decrease by 1.75% per season. Although 
the price trend emerges from the carbon market component of hydroelectricity revenues, these 
shifts could also represent long-term trends associated with electricity market risks, such as: 
phased retirement of coal-fired power plants; entrance of new generation plants; and 
technological change, such as increasing uptake of electric vehicles. 
• Increasing irrigation water demand – The scaling parameter of the irrigation water demand 
function (γ) and corresponding choke volume (𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸) shift 3.5% each season for each 
weather/season state. In the case of the Arthurs Lake system, this growth models increasing 
uptake of higher value agricultural production in the Midlands Water Scheme, and the broader 
expansion of high-value irrigation that is central to long-term economic planning in Tasmania 
(see West 2009). In the case of water pricing, this means that by 𝑡𝑡=19 irrigation water 
extractions would be 85% higher for the corresponding weather type. For example, a dry 
season with medium electricity price would involve 15,644 ML irrigation extractions in 𝑡𝑡=1 
and 29,058 ML in t=19. In a broader context, these incremental shifts could also represent 
exogenous drivers of increasing demand for agricultural commodities, such as improved 
supply-chains and removal of import tariffs in overseas markets. 
• Doubled irrigation water demand – The scaling parameter of the irrigation water demand 
function (γ) and corresponding choke volume (𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸) are doubled for each weather/season 
state and remain constant across all 20 periods. The risk in this case is misspecification of the 
fixed quotas in the first place such that there is always excess demand for water by irrigators. 
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Table 4.6 provides summary results for total benefits across the different risks and Figure 4.14 
presents the distribution of differences between Scenario C and Scenario B across all simulations. 
Below I consider the results for each risk in more detail. The specific simulations discussed in each 
case are chosen to demonstrate the broader context of how and when price- or quantity-based water 
allocation may be more efficient. 
 Average total 
benefits fixed 
irrigation quotas 
(Standard deviation) 
Average total 
benefits irrigation 
water pricing 
(Standard deviation) 
Average 
efficiency 
gains from 
water pricing 
(Percentage) 
Basic model $144.0 million ($6.1 million) 
$144.6 million 
($6.0 million) 
$0.5 million  
(0.4%) 
Climate change – Dry season inflows fall by 60% 
and wet season inflows fall by 25% 
$1124 million 
($4.1 million) 
$113.6 million 
($4.0 million) 
$1.25 million  
(1.1%) 
Price spike – High electricity price level increases 
from $67.71 to $102.31 
$150.3 million 
($10.0 million) 
$150.6 million 
($10.9 million) 
$0.25 million  
(0.2%) 
Energy policy change – Renewable Energy 
Certificate revenue ends at 𝑡𝑡 =10   
$137.4 million 
($5.4 million) 
$139.1 million 
($5.2 million) 
$1.7 million  
(1.2%) 
Energy policy change – Renewable Energy 
Certificate revenue begins at 𝑡𝑡 =10   $134.9 million ($5.6 million) $135.8 million ($5.3 million) $0.8 million  (0.6%) 
Price trend - Renewable Energy Certificate price 
grows at 3.5% per period 
$149.7 million 
($6.8 million) 
$150.3 million 
($7.0 million) 
$0.6 million  
(0.4%) 
Price trend - Renewable Energy Certificate price 
falls at 3.5% per period 
$140.3 million 
($5.7 million) 
$141.1 million 
($5.5 million) 
$0.9 million  
(0.6%) 
Increasing irrigation water demand – Scaling 
parameters (γ) and choke volumes increase by 3.5% 
per period 
$162.9 million 
($5.7 million) 
$169.5 million 
($5.5 million) 
$6.7 million  
(4.1%) 
Doubled irrigation water demand - Scaling 
parameters (γ) and choke volumes doubled 
$186.2 million 
($6.1 million) 
$207.2 million 
($4.8 million) 
$21 million  
(11.3%) 
Table 4.6. Comparison of total benefits under water pricing and fixed quotas for various risks.  
Chapter 4 
119 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 4.14. Histograms of difference in total benefits between Model C and Model B under risks. Benefits are 
stated in $ million units. Positive values indicate total benefits with pricing > total benefits with quotas. 1000 
simulations are conducted for each risk.
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4.4.2.1. Climate Change 
Compared to the results for the basic stochastic model reported in Section 4.4.1, average annual 
inflows are 34% lower under projected climate change. Irrigation extractions remain the same for 
both Scenario B and C because irrigators can access the buffer storage below 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶. The burden 
of reduced water availability falls on electricity generation, with hydropower extractions more than 
halving for both water allocation instruments. However, the average efficiency gains from water 
pricing are higher than under the basic model (Table 4.7). Figure 4.15 presents results from a 
simulation where the overall benefits of Scenario C exceed Scenario B by $2.5 million, or 2.2% 
of Model B total benefits. Reduced inflows mean that there is limited storage available for 
hydropower scheduling at the beginning of each summer season after the evaporation losses, 
environmental flows, and irrigation extractions (Figure 4.15a). Under water pricing, however, 
decreased irrigation extractions during wet and or high price periods enable the transfer of water 
from irrigation to hydropower. Similar to the simulation presented in Figure 4.13, the ‘stickiness’ 
of higher electricity prices (Figure 4.15c) ensures that these water reallocations are efficient 
overall.  
 
Average 
hydropower 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
hydropower 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
irrigation 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
irrigation 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
total 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
total net 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Climate change – Dry season inflows fall by 60% and wet season inflows fall by 25% 
(B) Fixed 
quotas 
192.3 
(45.3) 
$22.6  
($5.4) 
300.1 
(0) 
$89.8 
($2.7) 
492.3 
(45.3) 
$112.4 
($4.1) 
(C) Water 
pricing 
 204.3 
(54.3) 
$55.6 
($5.7) 
294.3 
(18.63) 
$58.0 
($3.1) 
 498.6 
(43.7) 
$113.6 
($4.0) 
Table 4.7. Aggregate benefits and water extractions for fixed quotas and water pricing under 
reductions in inflows due to projected climate change. Averages reported for 1000 simulations. 
Each simulation experiences the same stochastic variations across periods as the corresponding 
simulation in a different scenario. The simulations span 20 seasons (10 years). 
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Figure 4.15. Key results under climate change: Time series of Model C (Water pricing) and Model B (Fixed quotas) extractions and reservoir levels 
for a selected simulation. The inflows, weather state, and electricity price state are the same for Model B and C in each time period.
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4.4.2.2. Electricity Prices and Energy Policy 
High Price Spike 
The risk of high price spikes does not lead to any substantial change in the relative efficiency of 
pricing and quotas. On average, however, more water is transferred from irrigation to hydropower 
as irrigators cutback their demand more when electricity prices are higher. The aggregate result is 
ambiguous from an efficiency perspective. Notably, the relative benefits of pricing over quotas, or 
vice versa, across different simulations become more distributed (see Figure 4.14). Compared to 
the distribution of simulations for basic model (Figure 4.12), there are more occasions where water 
pricing generates substantial efficiency gains or losses in excess of $2 million and above. Once 
again, the transition of electricity prices is an important determinant of where water reallocation is 
efficient. Figure 4.16 presents a simulation where fixed quotas generate relative efficiency gains 
of $4.2 million because the benefits generated by increased hydropower extractions (30 GL) are 
outweighed by the benefits lost from reduced irrigation extractions (61 GL). One-period price 
spikes in 𝑡𝑡=3 and 𝑡𝑡=13 (Figure 4.16b) cause major contractions in irrigation extractions (Figure 
4.17d) that lead to increased hydropower extractions in 𝑡𝑡=4 and 𝑡𝑡=15 (Figure 4.16c) when 
electricity prices are very low (Figure 4.16b).  
 
Average 
hydropower 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV 
hydropower 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
irrigation 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV 
of irrigation 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
total 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV 
total net 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Price spike – High electricity price level increases from $67.71 to $102.31 
(B) Fixed 
quotas 
 459.3 
(57.3) 
$60.6 
($11.3) 
300.1 
(0) 
$89.8 
($2.7) 
759.4 
(57.3) 
$150.3 
($10.0) 
(C) Water 
pricing 
458.3 
(69.0) 
$95.2 
($14.0) 
281.7 
(23.0) 
$55.4 
($3.9) 
740.0 
(58.2) 
$150.6 
($10.9) 
Table 4.8. Aggregate benefits and water extractions for fixed quotas and water pricing in the 
presence of price spikes. Averages reported for 1000 simulations. Each simulation experiences the 
same stochastic variations across periods as the corresponding simulation in a different scenario. 
The simulations span 20 seasons (10 years). 
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Figure 4.16. Key results under high price spike: Time series of Model C (Water pricing) and Model B (Fixed quotas) extractions and reservoir levels 
for a selected simulation. The inflows, weather state, and electricity price state are the same for Model B and C in each time period.
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Energy Policy Change & Price Trends 
The removal or addition of the carbon market has level effects on marginal hydroelectricity 
revenues and, hence, the water price. In the case of removal, water pricing enables the transfer of 
more water to irrigation from 𝑡𝑡=10 onwards. On the other hand, the addition of the carbon market 
𝑡𝑡=10 means that more water is transferred to electricity generation in later periods. For both cases, 
pricing generates efficiency gains relative to quotas. The aggregate benefits remain small, albeit 
more substantial in the case of market removal compared to the basic model. Similarly, water 
pricing allocates water more efficiently under both increasing and decreasing price trends. More 
water is extracted for hydropower (irrigation) as the water price steadily rises (falls). Figure 4.17 
demonstrates how the electricity price and, hence, irrigation extractions change for corresponding 
simulations under carbon market removal and an increasing price trend. 
 
Average 
hydropower 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV 
hydropower 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
irrigation 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV 
of irrigation 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
total 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average NPV 
total net 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Energy policy change – Renewable Energy Certificate revenue ends at t=10   
(B) Fixed quotas  469.1 (60.3) 
$47.7 
($6.9) 
300.1 
(0) 
$89.75 
($2.7) 
  769.2 
(60.3) 
$137.4 
($5.4) 
(C) Water pricing 437.4 (74.8) 
$75.8 
($7.6) 
349.7 
(26.52) 
$63.3 
($3.5) 
 787.1 
 (60.1) 
$139.1 
($5.2) 
Energy policy change – Renewable Energy Certificate revenue begins at t=10   
(B) Fixed quotas  448.9 (58.1) 
$45.2 
($7.1) 
300.1 
(0) 
$89.8 
($2.7) 
749.0 
(58.1) 
$134.9 
($5.6) 
(C) Water pricing 416.0 (72.7) 
$71.7 
($7.9) 
348.8 
(25.5) 
$64.1 
($3.6) 
764.8 
(57.2) 
$135.8 
($5.3) 
Price trend - Renewable Energy Certificate price grows at 3.5% per period 
(B) Fixed quotas  473.0 (59.9) 
$60.0 
($8.5) 
300.1 
(0) 
$89.8 
($2.7) 
773.1 
(59.9) 
$149.7 
($6.8) 
(C) Water pricing 491.1 (68.6) 
$95.9 
($9.2) 
267.9 
(16.0) 
$54.5 
($2.9) 
 759.3 
 (58.7) 
$150.3 
($7.0) 
Price trend - Renewable Energy Certificate price decreases by 3.5% per period 
(B) Fixed quotas  474.9 (60.9) 
$50.5 
($7.2) 
300.1 
(0) 
$89.8 
($2.7) 
775.0 
(60.9) 
$140.3 
($5.7) 
(C) Water pricing 460.8 (73.3) 
$80.6 
($7.9) 
317.1 
(2.1) 
$60.6 
($3.3) 
778.0 
(60.8) 
$141.1 
($5.5) 
Table 4.9. Aggregate benefits and water extractions for fixed quotas and water pricing under 
energy policy changes and price trends. Averages reported for 1000 simulations.   
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Figure 4.17. Marginal hydroelectricity revenues and irrigation extractions under carbon market removal and an increasing price trend. (a) Marginal 
hydroelectricity revenues and (c) irrigation extractions under carbon market removal. (b) Marginal hydroelectricity revenues and (d) irrigation 
extractions under an increasing price trend. Results reported for the same simulation (i.e. time-path of state variables is identical). 
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4.4.2.3. Increasing and Doubled Irrigation Water Demand 
These risks demonstrate how fixed quotas can lead to inefficient water allocation over time. In the 
case of increasing water demand, there are substantial benefits from water pricing being able to 
gradually allocate more water away from hydropower to irrigation. The benefits are even larger 
for the case where irrigation water demand is doubled and stays the same over time; this represents 
a situation where fixed quotas have been determined poorly and there is excess irrigation water 
demand from the outset. Figure 4.18 shows the time series of hydropower and irrigation extractions 
for the same simulation of the weather and electricity price transition. In the case of a gradual 
increase in water demand, summer hydropower extractions are lower, but it is only in the final 
year that they almost cease. On the other hand, if irrigation water demand is doubled then water 
pricing entails that the main purpose of the reservoir becomes irrigation extractions. Note that this 
does not mean that the hydropower operator becomes less profitable; on the contrary, it is just that 
irrigation water supply becomes the main source of revenue. By comparison, under the original 
specification for irrigation water demand in Section 4.4.1 the hydropower operator generates 
average profits of $86.6 million under water pricing from 480.8 GL of hydropower extractions. If 
fixed quotas are misspecified or not adjusted to changing irrigation water demand, water pricing 
enables the hydropower operator to capture higher profits whilst producing less electricity. 
 
Average 
hydropower 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
hydropower 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
irrigation 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
irrigation 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
total 
extractions 
GL 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average total 
net benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Increasing irrigation water demand – Scaling parameters (γ) and choke volumes increase by 3.5% per period 
(B) Fixed quotas  474.6 
(60.7) 
$54.3 
($7.7) 
300.1 
(0) 
$100.9 
($2.9) 
774.7 
(60.7) 
$162.9 
($5.7) 
(C) Water pricing 389.5 
(76.97) 
$88.9 
($8.3) 
416.4 
(27.3) 
$80.6 
($4.5) 
805.8 
(60.6) 
$169.5 
($5.5) 
Doubled irrigation water demand - Scaling parameters (γ) and corresponding choke volumes doubled 
(B) Fixed quotas  474.6 
(60.7) 
$54.3 
($7.7) 
300.1 
(0) 
$132.0 
($2.8) 
774.7 
(60.7) 
$186.2 
($6.1) 
(C) Water pricing 242.0 
(79.6) 
$91.3 
($7.7) 
588.6 
(37.3) 
$116.0 
($6.3) 
830.6 
(57.1) 
$207.2 
($4.8) 
Table 4.10. Aggregate benefits and water extractions for fixed quotas and water pricing under 
increasing and doubled irrigation water demand. Averages reported for 1000 simulations.   
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Figure 4.18. Irrigation and hydropower extractions for increasing and doubled irrigation water demand risk scenarios. Time series of Model C (Water 
pricing) and Model B (Fixed quotas) extractions for the same simulation of inflows, weather states, and electricity price states. 
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4.4.2.4 Multiple Risks 
Table 4.11. shows that the presence of multiple risks can either amplify or dampen any efficiency 
gains from water pricing. For example, the sum of gains under climate change ($1.3 million) and 
increasing irrigation water demand ($6.7 million) alone are less than gains if both risks are present 
($11.8 million). On the other hand, the presence of price spikes dampens efficiency gains under 
increasing irrigation water demand and climate change. 
 
Average 
hydropower 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
hydropower 
benefits 
$ millions 
Average 
irrigation 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
irrigation 
benefits 
$ 
millions 
Average 
total 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
total 
benefits 
$ 
millions 
Efficiency 
gains from 
water pricing       
$ millions (%) 
Climate change & Energy policy change (Carbon market removal) $3.6 (3.3%) 
(B) Fixed quotas  192.3  $21.1 300.1 $89.8 494.3 $110.8  
(C) Water pricing 177.7 $51.1 349.7 $63.3 527.4 $114.4  
Climate change & Increasing price trend $0.5 (0.4%) 
(B) Fixed quotas  192.3 $24.1 300.1 $89.8 494.3 $113.8  
(C) Water pricing 218.4 $59.8 267.9 $54.5 486.3 $114.3  
Climate change & Price spike $0.4 (0.3%) 
(B) Fixed quotas  189.5 $25.1 300.1 $89.8 489.6 $114.9  
(C) Water pricing 206.0 $59.9 281.7 $55.4 487.7 $115.2  
Climate change & Increasing irrigation water demand $11.8 (9.0%) 
(B) Fixed quotas  192.3 $22.6 300.1 $108.6 492.3 $131.2  
(C) Water pricing 151.7 $62.4 416.4 $80.6 568.1 $143.0  
Increasing irrigation water demand & Energy policy change (Carbon market removal in 𝒕𝒕=10) $54.6 (35.0%) 
(B) Fixed quotas  469.1 $47.7 300.1 $108.6 769.2 $156.3  
(C) Water pricing 334.4 $79.2 508.0 $131.7 842.4 $172.8  
Increasing irrigation water demand & Increasing price trend $4.2 (2.5%) 
(B) Fixed quotas   473.0 $60.0 300.1 $108.6 773.1 $168.6  
(C) Water pricing 418.5 $97.8 373.9 $75.0 792.4 $172.8  
Increasing irrigation water demand & Price spike $4.6 (2.7%) 
(B) Fixed quotas  459.3 $60.6 300.1 $108.6 759.4 $169.1  
(C) Water pricing 392.1 $96.9 398.1 $76.9 790.2 $173.8  
Table 4.11. Aggregate benefits and water extractions for fixed quotas and water pricing under 
multiple risks. 
4.4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
4.4.3.1. Price Elasticity of Demand 
The price elasticity of demand (𝛼𝛼) defines the slope of the marginal benefit function for irrigation 
water demand. The value used above (𝛼𝛼 = -0.81) implies that the demand for water decreases by 
0.81% for every 1% increase in price. A lower value (i.e. 𝛼𝛼 < -0.81) indicates the marginal benefit 
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function has a flatter slope and lower choke water volume for a given weather/season state. 
Conversely, a higher value (i.e. 𝛼𝛼 > -0.81) indicates a steeper slope and higher choke volume. 
Changes to 𝛼𝛼 affect the size of additional benefits from higher irrigation extractions (Figure 4.6), 
relative efficiency gains or losses from transferring water from irrigation to hydropower (Figures 
4.7-4.10), and the volume of irrigation extractions under pricing for a given weather/season state 
and electricity price level (Figure 4.12). Table 4.12 demonstrates net effects for the basic model 
and selected risks: efficiency gains from water pricing are reduced (increased) for lower (higher) 
values of 𝛼𝛼, except for climate change and carbon market removal.   
 
Average hydropower benefits  
($ millions) 
Average irrigation benefits 
($ millions) 
Average total benefits 
($ millions) 
Model 
B 
Model 
C 
Model C -
Model B Model B 
Model 
C 
Model C -
Model B 
Model 
B 
Model 
C 
Model C -
Model B 
Basic model 
α= -0.81 54.3 86.6 32.3 89.8 58.0 -31.8 144.0 144.6 $0.5 
α= -0.9 54.3 86.5 32.2 85.6 53.8 -31.8 139.9 140.0 $0.2 
α= -0.7 54.3 86.7 32.4 95.4 63.7 -31.7 149.7 150.4 $0.7 
α= -0.5 54.3 86.9 32.6 107.6 76.1 -31.4 161.9 163.0 $1.1 
Price spike 
α= -0.81 60.6 95.2 34.6 89.8 55.4 -34.4 150.3 150.6 $0.3 
α= -0.9 60.6 95.1 34.5 85.6 51.3 -34.3 146.2 146.4 $0.2 
α= -0.7 60.6 95.5 34.9 95.4 61.0 -34.4 156.0 156.5 $0.5 
α= -0.5 60.6 96.0 35.4 107.6 73.1 -34.4 168.2 169.1 $1.0 
Increasing irrigation water demand 
α= -0.81 54.3 88.9 34.6 89.8 55.4 -34.4 162.9 169.5 $6.7 
α= -0.9 54.3 88.8 35.3 103.3 74.8 -28.5 157.6 163.6 $6.0 
α= -0.7 54.3 89.0 34.7 115.6 88.6 -27.0 169.9 177.6 $7.7 
α= -0.5 54.3 89.2 34.9 129.3 105.9 -23.4 183.6 195.1 $11.5 
Climate change & Energy policy change (Carbon market removal in 𝒕𝒕=10) 
α= -0.81 21.1 51.1 30.0 89.8 63.3 -26.5 110.8 114.4 $3.6 
α= -0.9 21.1 51.4 30.3 85.6 59.2 -26.4 106.7 110.6 $3.9 
α= -0.7 21.1 50.8 29.8 95.4 68.9 -26.5 116.5 119.8 $3.3 
α= -0.5 21.1 50.5 29.4 107.6 81.1 -26.4 128.4 131.6 $3.3 
Table 4.12. Sensitivity analysis of average benefits to the price elasticity of demand. 
4.4.3.2. Weather-Based Shifts in Water Demand 
An additional driver of the results are the scaling parameters of the water demand function (γ). 
These parameters determine the distance between the irrigation water demand functions for a given 
season and, therefore, the variation in irrigation extractions between, say, a normal and dry summer 
season under the same water price. In terms of the two different water allocation instruments, the 
γ parameters determine how closely fixed quotas approximate water pricing under variable 
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weather. To demonstrate the outcomes with regards to efficiency, I consider two alternative 
specifications of gamma. The first doubles the gap between the normal and dry weather marginal 
benefit functions for both seasons (see Appendix 4.A5 for full details of the original derivation of 
parameters). In practice, this involves a rightward shift of the marginal benefit function for dry 
weather in Figure 4.12 and means that, for example, the irrigator will extract 23,474 ML in a dry 
summer under a medium electricity price level. This is 4,180 ML more than dry summer 
extractions under the original specification and, in turn, a further 4,180ML higher than normal 
summer extractions in all cases (including fixed quotas). The choke volume is also doubled for dry 
summers and dry winters. The second specification considers the inverse case: the contraction of 
the water demand function in wet weather is doubled, or a leftward shift of the wet weather 
marginal benefit function. Formally, the values of γ and 𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 for the first alternative are: 
𝛾𝛾 = �𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑙𝑙� = �1158829 746125 5032911184746 735314 500033� 
𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = �𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤� =  �6417 ML 4131 ML 2787 ML6560 ML 4072 ML 2769 ML� 
and as follows for the enhanced contraction of wet weather water demand: 
𝛾𝛾 = �𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,𝑙𝑙� = �952477 746125 260458960030 735314 264752� 
𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = �𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤� =  �5274 ML 4131 ML 1442 ML5316 ML 4072 ML 1466 ML� 
Table 4.13 presents the outcomes in terms of average water extractions, benefits, and efficiency 
gains from water pricing for the basic model and selected risks considered in Section 4.3.2. For 
the alternative specification of dry weather water demand, irrigation (hydropower) extractions 
under water pricing are higher (lower) than under the original. Conversely, a leftward shift of wet 
weather water demand results in irrigation (hydropower) extractions under water pricing to be 
lower (higher) compared to the original. For both changes to the water demand function the 
efficiency gains under water pricing are higher. This indicates that the further away that fixed 
quotas are from the (within-period) level of efficient water extractions (i.e. the volume under water 
pricing that matches the marginal cost and marginal benefit of irrigation water), then the greater 
the average efficiency gains from water pricing.  
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4.4.3.3. Electricity Price Transition 
The electricity price transition can also influence the results. This was highlighted in the 
presentation of specific simulations in Sections 4.4.1-4.4.2 and the discussion of relative efficiency 
gains in Section 4.2.7. Here, I consider an alternative specification of the electricity price transition 
such that: (i) the probability of successive high electricity price levels is higher (increasing from 
0.43 to 0.60), (ii) the movement from a high to low electricity price level is no longer possible 
(decreasing from 0.14 to 0), and (iii) the probability of moving from a high to medium price level 
is slightly reduced (decreasing from 0.43 to 0.40). Formally, the electricity price transition is now 
described by the following transition matrix (with the changes highlighted in bold): 
 
tL  
l m h 
1tL +  
l 0.5 0.17 0 
m 0.5 0.55 0.4 
h 0 0.28 0.60 
Table 4.14 presents the outcomes in terms of average water extractions, benefits, and efficiency 
gains from water pricing for the basic model and selected risks. Across the 20,000 time periods 
simulated, the percentage of high electricity price states rises relative to the original electricity 
price transition (from 24.5% to 32.2%), the number of low-price periods declines (from 22.5% to 
15.9%), and proportion of medium price states increases slightly (51.9% to 53.0%). With more 
‘sticky’ high electricity prices, the efficiency gains from water pricing only rise by a modest 
amount under the basic model and price spikes. On average, however, there is a substantial transfer 
of water from irrigation to hydropower. Further, the standard deviation of benefits under the price 
spike are substantially higher, indicating a larger distribution of efficiency gains/losses compared 
to the histogram in Figure 4.15 and more outcomes where the relative efficiency gains of pricing 
or quotas are large. In terms of the other risks, efficiency gains from water pricing are reduced on 
aggregate but the standard deviation is slightly higher; this is due to the original efficiency gains 
under these risks largely arising from higher irrigation extractions and farmer profits under water 
pricing. 
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Average 
hydropower 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
hydropower 
benefits 
$ millions 
Average 
irrigation 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
irrigation 
benefits 
$ millions 
Average 
total 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
total 
benefits 
$ 
millions 
Efficiency 
gains from 
water 
pricing             
$ millions 
(%) 
Basic model $0.5 (0.4%) 
Fixed quotas 474.6 $54.3  300.1  $89.8  774.7  $144.0   
Water pricing 480.8  $86.6  294.3  $58.0  775.1  $144.6   
Basic model – Doubled high shift  $1.6 (1.1%) 
Fixed quotas  474.6  $54.3  300.1  $92.6 774.7  $146.9   
Water pricing 464.0  $86.8  313.6  $61.7  777.6  $148.5   
Basic model – Doubled low shift $2.1 (1.5%) 
Fixed quotas  474.6  $54.3  300.1  $83.6  774.7  $137.9   
Water pricing 497.3  $86.3  272.4  $53.7  769.7  $140.0   
Price spike $0.3 (0.2%) 
Fixed quotas  459.3  $60.6  300.1  $89.8  759.4  $150.3   
Water pricing 458.3  $95.2  281.7  $55.4  740.0  $150.6   
Price spike – Doubled high shift $1.1 (0.7%) 
Fixed quotas  459.3  $60.6  300.1  $92.6  759.4  $153.2   
Water pricing 453.9  $95.4  300.1  $59.0  754.0  $154.3   
Price spike – Doubled low shift $2.1 (1.5%) 
Fixed quotas  459.3  $60.6  300.1  $83.6  759.4  $144.2   
Water pricing 472.2  $95.0  260.8  $51.3  733.0  $146.3   
Climate change & Energy policy change (Carbon market removal in 𝒕𝒕=10) $3.6 (3.3%) 
Fixed quotas  192.3  $21.1  300.1  $89.8  494.3  $110.8   
Water pricing 177.7  $51.1  349.7 $63.3  527.4  $114.4   
Climate change & Energy policy change (Carbon market removal in 𝒕𝒕=10)– Doubled high shift $6.1 (5.3%) 
Fixed quotas  192.3  $21.1  300.1  $92.6  492.3 $113.7   
Water pricing 169.7  $52.3  372.9  $67.4  542.6  $119.7   
Climate change & Energy policy change (Carbon market removal in 𝒕𝒕=10) – Doubled low shift $4.3 (4.1%) 
Fixed quotas  192.3 $21.1  300.1  $83.6  492.3  $104.7   
Water pricing 194.6 $50.4  323.5  $58.6  518.1  $109.0   
Table 4.13. Sensitivity analysis of average benefits and water extractions to specification of the 
water demand function for different weather/season states. 
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Average 
hydropower 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
hydropower 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
irrigation 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
irrigation 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Average 
total 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
total 
benefits 
$ millions 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Efficiency 
gains from 
water 
pricing      
$ millions 
(%) 
Basic model $0.5 (0.4%) 
(B) Fixed 
quotas 474.6 
$54.3 
($7.7) 300.1 
$89.8 
($2.7) 774.7 
$144.0  
($6.1)  
(C) Water 
pricing 480.8 
$86.6 
($8.4) 294.3 
$58.0  
($3.1) 775.1  
$144.6  
($6.0)  
Basic model – Increased ‘stickiness’ of high electricity price level $0.9 (0.6%) 
(B) Fixed 
quotas  475.9  
$56.1 
($8.3) 300.1 
$89.8  
($2.7) 776.0  
$145.6  
($6.7)  
(C) Water 
pricing 490.3  
$89.6 
($9.2) 286.0 
$56.9  
($3.3) 776.3  
$146.4  
($6.6)  
Price spike  $0.3 (0.2%) 
(B) Fixed 
quotas 459.3 
$60.6  
($11.3) 300.1 
$89.8  
($2.7) 759.4 
$150.3  
($10.0)  
(C) Water 
pricing 458.31 
$95.2  
($14.0) 281.7 
$55.4  
($3.9) 740.0 
$150.6  
($10.9)  
Price spike – Increased ‘stickiness’ of high electricity price level $0.8 (0.5%) 
(B) Fixed 
quotas  447.5 
$64.4  
($13.6) 300.1 
$89.8  
($2.7) 747.6 
$154.1  
($12.6)  
(C) Water 
pricing 466.3 
$101.5  
($17.0) 269.3 
$53.5  
($4.6) 735.6 
$155.0  
($13.1)  
Increasing irrigation water demand   $6.7 (4.1%) 
(B) Fixed 
quotas  474.6 
$54.3 
($7.7) 
300.1 $100.9 
($2.9) 
774.7 $162.9 
($5.7) 
 
(C) Water 
pricing 389.5 
$88.9 
($8.3) 
416.4 $80.6 
($4.5) 
805.8 $169.5 
($5.6) 
 
Increasing irrigation water demand – Increased ‘stickiness’ of high electricity price level $6.1 (3.7%) 
(B) Fixed 
quotas 475.9 
$56.1 
($8.3) 300.1 
$108.6 
($2.9) 776.0 
$164.7 
($6.6)  
(C) Water 
pricing 400.0 
$91.8 
($9.2) 403.8 
$79.0 
($4.7) 803.8 
$170.8 
($6.0)  
Climate change & Energy policy change (Carbon market removal in 𝒕𝒕=10) $3.6 (3.3%) 
(B) Fixed 
quotas  192.3 
$21.1 
($4.7) 
300.1 $89.8 
($2.7) 
494.3 $110.8  
($3.6) 
 
 
(C) Water 
pricing 177.7 
$51.1 
($4.7) 
349.7 $63.3 
($3.5) 
527.4 $114.4 
($3.7) 
 
Climate change & Energy policy change (Carbon market removal in 𝒕𝒕=10) –  
Increased ‘stickiness’ of high electricity price level $3.1 (2.8%) 
(B) Fixed 
quotas 192.3 
$21.6 
($5.0) 300.1 
$89.8 
($2.7) 492.3 
$111.3 
($3.8)  
(C) Water 
pricing 184.9 
$52.5 
($5.3) 336.3 
$62.0 
($3.7) 521.2 
$114.4 
($3.9)  
 
Table 4.14. Sensitivity analysis of the specification of electricity price transition. 
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4.5. Discussion  
This section discusses the policy implications of the modelling results in Section 4.4. The focus is 
on the broader regulation of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs rather than the location that the 
model is calibrated to. The discussion is framed by six key insights. 
(i) Quotas can provide a suitable approximation to efficient water allocation if they can be 
appropriately (re)calibrated and there is limited variation in the demand for water services 
All approaches to regulating water allocation will involve some implementation costs. For 
example, measuring deliveries, monitoring payments or operation decisions, and enforcing 
penalties for infractions. In the above modelling, I have not incorporated transaction costs 
associated with water pricing. In cases where there are multiple offtakes from a reservoir to provide 
water services, transaction costs may become high for the hydropower operator, regulator, and 
water consumers. By contrast, the relative efficiency gains from water pricing in this model are 
modest when quotas are calibrated to the water price prevailing under normal weather and medium 
electricity prices. Quotas may be simpler to implement than pricing and provide a suitable 
approximation if they can be regularly updated and there is sufficient information available 
regarding the demand for water services. Further, quotas may suffice when the demand for water 
services is not growing markedly or does not vary substantially with changes in weather or market 
prices. 
(ii) Water pricing provides greater flexibility to reallocate water efficiently under variability in 
the demand for water services, imperfect information, water supply scarcity, and structural 
changes to energy policies and markets 
In practice, there are often many barriers to efficiently re-allocating water through command-and-
control, quantity-based regulation (Grafton et al. 2017; Marston & Cai 2016). In the case of 
hydropower regulation, prominent barriers include lack of information (e.g. estimating irrigation 
water demand across different farmers) and vested interests (e.g. an increased irrigation water 
quota being a direct opportunity cost to the hydropower operator, or quotas being determined 
through political negotiations rather than economic calculations). These barriers are why 
hydropower re-licensing processes can take many years and typically stipulate operation 
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regulations spanning several decades (see Kosnik 2013; Tonka 2015; Viers 2011). In this Chapter, 
I find that that water pricing can, on average, allocate water more efficiently over a ten-year 
planning horizon for the following risks: water scarcity, increasing irrigation water demand, and 
level shifts in the value of hydroelectricity generation under energy policy reforms. Although the 
absolute value of the efficiency gains for our modelling of a single reservoir may appear modest 
in some of these cases, a 1-2% increase in the efficiency of multipurpose reservoir operations 
would represent substantial economic benefits for a jurisdiction containing many such reservoirs. 
(iii) Instrument design is an important consideration for water pricing; further efficiency gains 
could be obtained by incorporating intertemporal opportunity costs into irrigator’s decision-
making 
I have also shown in this Chapter how the application of volumetric water pricing under 
uncertainty can cause inefficient water allocation. In the model, a key source of dynamic 
inefficiency is the mismatch between the water price determining irrigation extractions in period 
𝑡𝑡 and the actual opportunity cost of foregone generation in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 if the electricity price level 
changes. Given that irrigators will prefer ex ante water prices to inform cropping decisions for a 
given season and hydropower companies sell electricity outside of spot markets, this is a 
reasonable representation of how water pricing could be structured if it were more widely applied 
to multipurpose hydropower regulation. In practice, therefore, expectations of the opportunity cost 
of water services (i.e. future hydroelectricity revenues) may need to be incorporated into the water 
price. Weather expectations may also be an important consideration. In this calibration of the 
model, these is no excess irrigation water demand for either quota- or pricing-based regulation. 
But if irrigation extractions could not occur, say, below 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶, then irrigation extractions in period 
𝑡𝑡 could detract from irrigation extractions in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 when the weather may be dry and water 
demand higher. Water rationing imposes large costs and methods are available to incorporate 
intertemporal opportunity costs into water pricing (see Grafton et al. 2014; Griffin 2016; Moncur 
& Pollock 1988). Further research is required into how real-world applications of water pricing to 
multipurpose hydropower reservoirs should augment the simple, volumetric approach modelled 
here to address dynamic sources of inefficiency.  
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(iv) There can be large discrepancies in the outcomes from pricing- and quota-based water 
allocation, and regulators also need to consider externalities when choosing policy instruments 
In this Chapter I have only modelled the direct benefits accruing to a hydropower operator and 
irrigators from water use. In reality, there may be significant economic benefits associated with 
other aspects of the model, such as the level of storage and the volume of environmental flows. 
For example, the benefits from recreational fishing or the non-market values associated with 
habitat for endangered native fish species. Further, both irrigation and hydroelectricity can 
generate positive externalities, such as rural employment in the former case and reduced air 
pollution in the latter. Hence, regulators have more objectives than maximising the average 
efficiency of water allocation when choosing planning instruments. Under projected climate 
change, for example, the average efficiency gains from water pricing may be less important than 
quotas maintaining higher storage levels and protecting a fishery in the reservoir (see Table 4.7). 
On the other hand, those efficiency gains from pricing may be amplified by higher hydroelectricity 
generation occurring under water pricing. The point is that the regulatory context is important and 
the efficiency of water allocation may be only one of several considerations. 
(v) For profit-motivated hydropower companies, water pricing is the preferred regulatory 
instrument for transitioning to multipurpose operations 
Section 4.4.1. showed how pricing water services can increase hydropower profits even if the price 
is set at the approximate opportunity cost of foregone electricity generation. This result partly 
reflects the model specification: irrigation extractions can occur below 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 and more water can 
be extracted from the reservoir than if it is operated for hydropower only. However, there is a more 
general insight here that is reinforced by fixed, free irrigation quotas requiring substantial foregone 
hydropower profits across the various risks modelled in Section 4.4. For hydropower companies 
operating existing single-purpose reservoirs, regulatory reforms that simply reallocate water to a 
new service represents a direct, win-lose trade-off that benefits only the users of those new water 
services. Pricing can remove operators’ vested interest in maintaining single-purpose hydropower 
operations or providing the bare minimum of water services required by regulation. Further, the 
potential to generate irrigation revenues can provide greater flexibility to reallocate water as the 
value of energy and water services change. The water demand risks in Section 4.4.2.3. provided 
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an example where, under irrigation water pricing, overall efficiency benefits can be consistent with 
higher hydropower operator profits even if electricity generation declines markedly under water 
reallocation. Further, obtaining private finance for multi-purpose reservoirs can be challenging 
without significant public co-financing arrangements (Naughton et al. 2017), and water pricing 
could support the potential benefits of multipurpose operations being realised in practice.  
(vi) For profit-motivated irrigators, a fixed quantity of free water will always be preferred if the 
volume of deliveries is guaranteed and calibrated to variable water demand 
The profits of irrigators are higher under quotas for all the aggregate results reported in Section 4. 
This is due to: (i) the quota being provided free of charge, (ii) irrigation extractions being 
guaranteed due to the storage buffer created by hydropower extractions being forbidden below 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶, and  (iii) the quota being carefully calibrated so that there is a duality between price- and 
quantity-based irrigation water allocation under normal weather and medium electricity prices. In 
practice, none of these favourable conditions are necessarily guaranteed. Irrigators may be charged 
a fixed fee for their allocation and could prefer a dynamic volumetric price that provides the 
flexibility to access more or less water as their water demand changes. Storage may not be 
regulated to ensure that irrigation has priority under water scarcity and, in fact, a volumetric water 
price could be defined to provide a hydropower operator with an economic incentive to ensure that 
there is no excess irrigation water demand. Finally, quotas may be set at an inadequate initial level 
or not updated to reflect rising irrigation water demand such that the total cost of paying for water 
is outweighed by the foregone revenue from not being able to access enough of it. I have not 
modelled these scenarios in this study, but they deserve further research and, from a practical 
standpoint, consideration for real-world applications. 
6. Conclusion 
This study has examined the efficiency of multipurpose hydropower regulation under price- and 
quantity-based instruments. The extensive range of risks considered, and the sensitivity analysis 
of the results, ensures the calibration of the model to a specific reservoir still provides general 
insights. I find that the total benefits of reservoir operations are generally higher under water 
pricing. In particular, pricing is a superior instrument for reallocating water between energy and 
water services under shifting water demand, water scarcity, and level effects in hydroelectricity 
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revenues. However, fixed quotas may be sufficient for multipurpose hydropower regulation where: 
(i) they provide a central estimate of the shifting demand for and opportunity cost of water services, 
or (ii) they can be updated to reflect dynamic changes in the value of water and energy services, 
e.g. through the periodic relicensing governance instrument that was outlined in Chapter 2. In 
practice, however, the  real world is not static and there are many risks for hydropower operators, 
regulators, and irrigators to manage. Volumetric water pricing should therefore be considered for 
broader application because it is a flexible method to efficiently allocate water in multipurpose 
hydropower storage and realise the capacity for hydropower reservoirs to deliver water services. 
There are a range of limitations that may provide avenues for further research. The water price 
only includes a volumetric component and I do not consider the fixed component of water tariffs 
that are generally used to cover capital expenditure, nor do I model other elements of price design 
to incorporate intertemporal opportunity costs. Our model assumes that there is no correlation 
between weather and electricity price levels, and I do not consider stochastic changes in the market 
value of agricultural produce. Importantly, I have treated environmental flows as fixed when it 
may be optimal for them to vary with weather and, indeed, to include the economic benefits of 
environmental flows within calculations of the economic efficiency of water allocation. I have 
only considered one type of water service (irrigation water supply), when there are many others 
where water pricing could be used to regulate water reallocation, such as flood control, urban water 
supply, and environmental flow provision. Finally, the calibration of the model means that there 
is never any excess irrigation water demand under either pricing or quantity-based regulation. 
While this specification enables a direct analysis of intertemporal trade-offs between irrigation in 
period 𝑡𝑡 and hydropower in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, it prevents a more thorough consideration of the 
opportunity costs between hydropower in period 𝑡𝑡 and irrigation in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 or irrigation 
extractions in period 𝑡𝑡 and irrigation extractions in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1.  
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Appendix 4.A1. Summary of Variables and Parameters.  
Variable/Parameter Mathematical Notation 
Quantity of hydropower production (MWh) 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 
Production parameter of water (MWh/ML) 𝑎𝑎 
Volume of hydropower extractions (ML) 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 
Volume of water in reservoir storage at beginning of period 
𝑡𝑡 (ML) 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 
Volume of reservoir inflows (ML) 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡�  
Volume of irrigation water extractions (ML) 𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡� 
Season type (summer, winter) 𝜙𝜙 = 1,𝜙𝜙 = 2 
Seasonal evaporation rate of storage 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 = �𝜉𝜉𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=1 if 𝜙𝜙 =  1𝜉𝜉𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=2 if 𝜙𝜙 =  2 � 
Seasonal environmental flows (ML) 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑣𝑣𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=1 if 𝜙𝜙 =  1𝑣𝑣𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=2 if 𝜙𝜙 =  2 � 
Weather type (dry, normal, wet) 𝑑𝑑,𝑚𝑚,𝑤𝑤 
Forthcoming weather in the current time period 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡�  
Weather in the previous time period 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  
Inflow types, by season and weather (ML) 𝐹𝐹 =  �𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=1,𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=1,𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=1,𝑙𝑙
𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=2,𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=2,𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝜙𝜙=2,𝑙𝑙� 
Random inflow shock (with proportional shifts and 
associated probabilities) 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 =  �𝜀𝜀1 𝑤𝑤. 𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃1𝜀𝜀2 𝑤𝑤. 𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃2…
𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘  𝑤𝑤. 𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘 
Marginal revenue from hydroelectricity generation ($/MWh) 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 
Forward price of electricity generation ($/MWh)  𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 
Carbon market price ($/MWh) 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 
Coefficient specifying proportion of certificates or offset 
units accredited per unit of hydroelectricity generation 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐 
Electricity price level in the next time period ($/MWh) 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡�  
Electricity price level in the current time period ($/MWh) 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 
Electricity price level in the previous time period ($/MWh) 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 
Electricity price level type (low, medium, high) 𝑙𝑙,𝑚𝑚, ℎ 
Electricity price levels ($/MWh) 𝐷𝐷 =  {𝐷𝐷 𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 𝐷𝐷ℎ} 
Rate of carbon market price change 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 
Initial carbon market price ($/MWh) 𝑐𝑐0 
Fixed seasonal irrigation extractions (ML) 
 𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡 =  �𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡=1𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡=2� 
Scaling parameter for the water demand/marginal benefit 
function 𝛾𝛾 = �𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑒𝑒 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑙𝑙� 
Price elasticity of water demand 𝛼𝛼 
Water price 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  
Choke volume for irrigation extraction  
(ML by weather/season) 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = �𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤  
Choke price for irrigation water ($/ML) 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑄𝑄𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸  
Minimum and maximum storage volume (ML) 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 
Environmental risk storage volume (ML) 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 
Maximum extractions for hydropower 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 = �𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=1𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=2� 
Number of time periods 𝑡𝑡 
Initial reservoir volume 𝑆𝑆0 
Discount factor (per seasonal time-step) 𝜌𝜌 
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Appendix 4.A2. Calculation of Inflow Volumes for Weather/Season States 
To calculate the dry, normal, and summer inflow volumes for summer and winter I first calculate 
the total rainfall for all months between April 1970 and September 2016. I then obtain the total 
inflows per season (e.g. April 1970-September 1970; October 1970-March 1970, etc.). For each 
season type I then identify the 25th and 75th percentile of inflows and categorise seasons below the 
25th percentile as dry, between the 25th and 75th percentile as normal, and above the 75th percentile 
as wet. I then estimate evapotranspiration for each summer/winter by summing the average 
monthly evapotranspiration in the Arthurs Lake catchment across seasons (i.e. winter = April-
September; summer = October-March). Inflows for a particular winter season are estimated as: 
𝐹𝐹 = Rainfall × 65.629  + (Rainfall −  Evapotranspiration𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡=2)  ×   189.271 
where the surface area of Arthurs Lake is 65.629km2 and the surface area of the Arthurs Lake 
Catchment is 251.9km2 (i.e. catchment area-lake surface area = 189.271 km2). In the case of all 
dry summers and a minority of normal summers from 1970-2016, estimated evapotranspiration in 
the catchment was larger than rainfall. Hence, I assume that summer inflows during dry and normal 
summers are equal to direct rainfall. The six different types of weather/season states were grouped, 
and the median calculated of each group to estimate inflows in a dry winter, normal winter, wet 
winter, dry summer, normal summer, and wet summer. 
Appendix 4.A3. Calculation of Random Inflow Shock Parameters 
The inflow shock integrates seasonal rainfall variability into the model. In order to estimate a 
measure of natural variability that could apply to both winter and summer seasons, I calculate the 
20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile of inflows for each of the six weather/season states and the 
absolute value of the distance between each percentile and the median value for the corresponding 
weather/season state. I then calculate the ratio of this distance to the median to estimate, for 
example, the percentage fall in inflows associated with the 20th percentile and the percentage 
increase in inflow associated with the 80th percentile. I then average the ratios for the furthest 
percentiles (20th and 80th) and the closest percentiles (40th and 60th) to the median across all 
weather/season states, weighting winter values according to the ratio of the volume of dry winter 
inflows to dry summer inflows, normal winter inflows to normal summer inflows, etc.   
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Appendix 4.A4. Calculation of Weather/Electricity Price Transitions 
I estimate the weather and electricity price transition by calculating the conditional probability of 
a weather/price type occurring given the weather/price type in the previous time period for the 
respective time series. Using the electricity price to illustrate: 
Pr(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 =  𝑑𝑑|𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚) =  𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑑𝑑,𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚 ) 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 (𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑚𝑚 )  
The transition matrices for the calibration in Section 4 can be found below. 
𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=1 
(summer) 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 
d n w 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 
d 0.46 0.16 0.2 
n 0.27 0.6 0.6 
w 0.27 0.24 0.2 
  
𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=2 
(winter) 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 
d n w 
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡+1 
d 0.1 0.2 0.46 
n 0.7 0.56 0.27 
w 0.2 0.24 0.27 
 
 
tL  
l m h 
1tL +  
l 0.5 0.17 0.14 
m 0.5 0.55 0.43 
h 0 0.28 0.43 
Appendix 4.A5. Calculation of Irrigation Quotas and Water Demand Functions  
To calculate water demand parameters, I first re-align the MWS irrigation delivery periods 
(summer = 5 months from October to February; winter =7 months from March to September) with 
the six-month time-step of the model by averaging the monthly winter allowance and adding the 
share for March to the summer period in the model. I use the adjusted maximum summer volume 
(19,294 ML) and maximum winter volume (19,447 ML) for the MWS as benchmarks to determine 
the irrigation extractions under water pricing for dry weather and a medium electricity price level. 
I then use 1994-2017 rainfall data from the Ross gauge (BOM 2018) to estimate the levels of 
rainfall in the MWS across the three possible weather states for each season. Average annual 
rainfall of 487mm is divided roughly evenly between summer (243mm) and winter (245mm). The 
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ratio of dry weather rainfall to normal weather rainfall is used to estimate the shift in the 
corresponding shift in the water demand function for each season and, hence, the volume of 
irrigation extractions under water pricing for normal weather and a medium electricity price level. 
These volumes correspond to the level of fixed irrigation extractions in the summer (15,114 ML) 
and winter (14,895 ML). The same process is used to calculate irrigation extractions under dry 
weather and a high electricity price level (summer – 10,195 ML, winter – 10,129 ML). I then use 
point expansion of the weather demand functions to find the values of parameter 𝛾𝛾 for different 
season/weather states. Finally, I substitute the choke price into the marginal benefit function to 
find the values of the choke price corresponding to the six values of parameter 𝛾𝛾. Note that the 
calculations above and their use in the model involve several assumptions. First, weather states in 
the MWS and Arthurs Lake are perfectly (positively) correlated. Second, reservoir inflows and 
water demand are inversely correlated. Third, water demand in the MWS changes in proportion to 
shifts in rainfall.  
  
Chapter 5 
The Cost of Price Stability Controls on Dynamic Water Tariffs 
5.1. Introduction 
Opportunity costs are fundamental to the management and governance of water resources. Water 
extracted from storage today detracts from tomorrow’s supply. Scarce water allocated to one user 
limits its availability for others. The foregone benefits of alternative water management decisions 
are factored into the implicit and explicit cost-benefit analyses that water users conduct every day. 
Importantly, it is not just private decisions that generate opportunity costs. Different approaches 
to public regulation of water resources management generate different outcomes. In the design and 
implementation of water regulation, there is an inherent trade-off between: (i) the revenues or 
profits of the regulated entity (e.g. a water utility), and (ii) the net public benefits from imposing 
regulation on that entity. Ultimately, the process of balancing that trade-off, including the resulting 
distribution of welfare, encompasses social and political considerations beyond water governance. 
Yet, understanding the economic costs and benefits of alternative regulatory approaches is 
necessary to assess whether, in practice, the selected approach is the appropriate way to achieve 
social objectives and, if not, to guide potential reforms. 
Water pricing is used to allocate water in many countries (see Dinar et al. 2015; OECD 2010) and 
there are opportunity costs from deploying alternative water tariff designs.1 One of the classical 
conflicts between water pricing objectives is cost recovery versus economic efficiency. Since 
water systems have large, up-front capital costs, average-cost volumetric pricing will generally 
lead to inefficiently low levels of water extraction. On the other hand, marginal-cost volumetric 
pricing may not enable water providers to fully recover their costs (Sibly 2006). The textbook 
solution is the optimal two-part tariff, including a fixed access charge and a volumetric price (see 
                                                 
1 In this Chapter I distinguish between a ‘water price’ and ‘water tariff’ as follows. A water price is a volumetric 
charge per unit of water extracted and/or consumed. A water tariff includes the whole package of charges related to 
water provision, such as a fixed access charge, new connection fee, a volumetric price, and additional charges related 
to temporal opportunity costs or water scarcity. Hence, a water tariff equates to a volumetric water price if there are 
no other charges applicable.  
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Feldman 1972), that is widely used in many urban water systems. However, there are more 
objectives to consider in tariff design, such as revenue stability, equity and fairness, simplicity, 
and legality (Griffin 2016). Resolving conflicts across multiple water policy objectives is no 
simple matter. In fact, failing to account for the potential outcomes from prioritising one objective, 
or implementing a particular tariff design, can create sub-optimal and, sometimes, perverse 
outcomes. For example, the Increasing Block Tariff (IBT) structures commonly used to promote 
equity in urban water provision can actually be regressive: low or no volumetric price on initial 
volumes of consumption can lead to higher access charges, with multiple poor households that 
share a single connection subsidising rich households who have their own (Dahan & Nisan 2007; 
Whittington 1992; Wichelns 2013; Young & Whittington 2016).  
In theory, the social benefits derived from water resources could be raised by incorporating the 
marginal opportunity cost of withdrawals into the volumetric component of water tariffs (see 
Griffin 2016 for a detailed discussion). These opportunity costs may include: (i) the marginal value 
of natural water, or the in-situ value of an additional unit of water in a river or lake; and (ii) 
marginal capacity cost, or the additional volumetric charge required to balance total supply and 
total demand when water is scarce, and thereby efficiently schedule water supply expansion (see 
Grafton et al. 2014; Turvey 1976). In the context of water storage which is depletable in the short- 
and/or long-term, such as an aquifer or reservoir, a third type needs to be considered: marginal 
user cost. This is the foregone benefit of having an additional unit of water available in the future. 
If the time-discounted marginal benefit of an additional unit of future water extraction or storage 
is higher than the marginal benefit of a present-day extraction, then there is an opportunity cost 
associated with not leaving that water in storage. The intuition is straightforward: groundwater 
extractions today increase tomorrow’s marginal pumping costs; low surface water supplies in the 
future may require urban water systems to bring costly desalination plants online; or, the value of 
irrigation extractions may be higher in a future dry and/or hot season when rainfall is lower and/or 
evapotranspiration is higher.  
The marginal user cost of water extractions can be estimated and valued (see Moncur & Pollock 
1988). In practice, however, opportunity costs are rarely incorporated into water tariffs and the 
potential benefits of dynamically efficient, scarcity-based water pricing are not realised. Under 
droughts or other supply constraints, water regulators and utilities generally pursue non-price 
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approaches, such as rationing or supply-side investments, to manage excess demand for water 
(Olmstead & Stavins 2009). There is a large literature on the resulting welfare losses and, more 
generally, the potential gains from efficient water pricing (e.g. Garcia & Reynaud 2004; Grafton 
& Kompas 2007; Grafton & Ward 2008; Lopez-Nicolas et al. 2018; Molinos-Senante & Donoso 
2016; Nauges & Whittington 2017; Renzetti 1992; Roibas et al. 2018; Sağlam 2015; Timmins 
2002).  
Why, then, is marginal user cost not commonly incorporated into water tariff design? Two 
potential reasons standout. First, it is difficult to calculate marginal user cost precisely. Foregone 
future benefits need to be estimated on the basis of the future state of dynamic natural, social, and 
economic systems. If scientific and economic modelling is used to form those estimations, and the 
resulting water prices, then the process may be too complex for water users to understand and 
accept. In that case, an important set of objectives for water tariff design, namely simplicity and 
transparency, may be violated. Second, and perhaps most importantly, a key consequence of 
incorporating marginal user cost into tariffs is that water price spikes will occur in the presence or 
expectation of water scarcity, excess water demand, or other circumstances where the future 
benefits of maintaining water in storage become very high. Rapid increases in the price of an 
essential service are politically undesirable for governments that own water providers and/or 
oversee their regulation. The persistent challenge of cost recovery in water services provision (see 
Easter and Liu 2005) demonstrates that social norms regarding fairness and equity, or perceptions 
thereof, have historically been prioritised over economic efficiency in the formulation and 
regulation of water tariffs. A range of other social, political, and economic justifications may be 
proposed for controlling price variability and underpricing water, such as promoting investment in 
an emerging industry or protecting the welfare of a powerful interest group. Whatever the reasons 
for not incorporating marginal user cost into water tariffs, the foregone benefits should be 
estimated to enable decisions on whether they are actually outweighed by the perceived benefits 
of economically inefficient water pricing. 
This Chapter estimates the costs of prioritising price stability over economic efficiency in water 
tariff design. I use hydro-economic modelling to compare outcomes from: (i) a price stability tariff 
wherein the volumetric price is averaged over several periods and there is a fixed water scarcity 
premium; and (ii) a dynamic tariff structure that estimates the marginal user cost of water 
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extraction and includes a water scarcity premium that is contingent on expected storage levels. I 
consider these alternative regulatory approaches for an emerging application of water pricing: the 
provision of irrigation water from multipurpose hydropower reservoirs. In this context, the 
hydropower operator is also a water services provider that sells water to irrigators according to a 
tariff overseen by a regulatory agency. The opportunity cost of irrigation withdrawals is foregone 
hydroelectricity generation. In order to model the price stability and marginal user cost tariffs, I 
draw on current and previous iterations of the tariff structure used in one of the first real-world 
applications of water pricing to the governance of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs (see Hydro 
Tasmania 2015, 2017). I simulate the application of these tariff structures to water allocation using 
stochastic dynamic programming and estimate the relative costs of deploying price stability 
controls across: (i) foregone hydropower profits, (ii) foregone hydroelectricity generation, (iii) 
additional electricity purchases by the hydropower company, and (iv) the reduced efficiency of 
water allocation (i.e. the total net benefits of water use). A key component of the model is an 
electricity supply obligation that requires the hydropower operator to purchase electricity, and 
thereby incur additional costs, if there is insufficient water storage to fulfil that obligation.  
Although I consider a specific application of water pricing to multipurpose hydropower reservoirs, 
the insights are relevant to other applications where the variable costs of water provision can 
fluctuate significantly, such as: energy-intensive irrigation systems; urban water systems that 
include an expensive backstop technology, such as desalination or wastewater treatment plants; 
and water systems where additional supply can be purchased in water markets at variable prices. 
The remainder of this section provides a review of related literature and describes the Chapter’s 
contribution. Section 5.2 outlines the hydro-economic model of reservoir operations and irrigation 
extractions, with a focus on alterations to the model already outlined in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
Section 5.3 provides details on how the model is recalibrated to Arthurs Lake, Tasmania. Section 
5.4 presents the results, including a detailed sensitivity analysis of key parameters associated with 
electricity markets, water demand, and operating constraints. Section 5.5 discusses the policy 
implications of the results. Section 5.6 concludes with an overview of the study’s limitations and 
directions for further research.  
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4.1.1. Literature Review and Contribution 
Many previous studies have considered the theory of water tariff design and the application of 
water pricing to urban, agricultural, and industrial water systems. (see reviews by Dinar et al. 2015; 
Griffin 2015; Johansson et al. 2002; Tsur & Dinar 1997). Building on foundational research on the 
marginal cost of water supply (Hanke & Davis 1973; Turvey 1976), two-part tariffs (Feldman 
1972), and the scarcity value of water (Moncur & Pollock 1988), various studies have shown that 
dynamic water pricing allocates water more efficiently than non-price approaches, such as water 
rationing, and water tariffs that do not account for intertemporal opportunity costs (Grafton & 
Kompas 2007; Grafton & Ward 2008; Olmstead & Stavins 2009). The welfare costs of sub-optimal 
approaches to water pricing have been assessed in detail for specific urban contexts (e.g. Mansur 
& Olmstead 2012; Renzetti 1992). The trade-offs between competing objectives in water tariff 
design, such as cost recovery and equity, have been considered (Ruijs 2009; Schoengold & 
Zilberman 2014), and a variety of tariff structures have been proposed to address specific topics, 
such as providing incentives for sustainable water use (Elnaboulsi 2009), jointly addressing equity 
and scarcity considerations (Molinos-Senante & Donoso 2016), and enabling water systems to 
supply peak water demand (Feldman 1975; Hanemann 1997).  
In the context of reservoirs and water storage management, Pulido-Velazquez et al. (2013) 
presented a process to determine the basin-wide ‘marginal resource opportunity cost’ of water 
extractions. The authors conduct hydro-economic simulations to estimate the MROC, or user cost, 
of water extractions for a given set of system states. The raw values are then processed into a 
storage-dependent step function for particular reservoirs. Macian-Sorribes et al. (2015) use the 
aforementioned approach to assess the benefits of a scarcity-based pricing regime for a multi-
reservoir irrigation system, creating a schedule for marginal user cost that is a function of the 
cumulative reservoir storage across the basin. Lopez-Nicolas et al. (2018) also use the step-based 
MROC approach to model a dynamic, increasing block tariff for urban water pricing where the 
second (highest) block increases across four levels as basin-wide storage falls below corresponding 
thresholds.  
Khadem et al. (2018) estimate the economic value of interannual storage for a large multi-storage 
and multi-purpose water system. Incorporating these values into optimal reservoir operations 
reduces the severity and costs of water scarcity. Chu and Grafton (2018) explain and derive ‘risk-
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adjusted user cost’ (RAUC) in the context of dynamic, scarcity-based urban water pricing that 
enables optimal timing of supply-side investments and avoids welfare-reducing water restrictions. 
The RAUC premium accounts for the magnitude and frequency of rainfall variability, the risk 
aversion of water consumers to water restrictions, the ratio of return flows to transmission system 
leakage, and the intertemporal discount rate. The authors calculate the RAUC for Canberra, 
Australia and discuss the policy implications, including that large water users should be charged a 
higher RAUC. Grafton et al. (2014) use stochastic dynamic programming to define dynamically 
efficient water prices for an urban water system subject to inflow uncertainty. It is shown that the 
management of water demand through dynamic, scarcity-based pricing could have prevented large 
welfare losses from premature investment in costly, supply-side infrastructure. 
The current Chapter makes two contributions. First, it is the only study to date that considers water 
tariff design in the context of regulating multipurpose hydropower reservoirs. This is an important 
emerging topic as new and existing hydropower reservoirs are called on to provide more water 
services in response to climate change and burgeoning water demand (see the detailed discussion 
of this issue in Chapter 2 of this thesis). Although water pricing has significant potential to provide 
hydropower companies with the flexibility and incentives to deliver these services to irrigators, 
cities, and other water users, its effectiveness is contingent on tariff design and, in particular, 
whether and how opportunity costs are incorporated. For multipurpose hydropower reservoirs, 
marginal user cost is an important consideration. From the perspective of hydropower companies, 
key features of the global energy transition include: (i) the increased value of hydropower 
providing firming capacity as the proportion of variable electricity generation from solar and wind 
increases, and (ii) wholesale price volatility as markets restructure and climate and energy policies 
change (Anghileri et al. 2018; Gaudard et al. 2016). In competitive wholesale electricity markets, 
both these factors may cause rapid increases in the marginal revenue from hydroelectricity 
generation. Further, variability in reservoir inflows and the demand for water services means that 
multipurpose operations could, in the presence of water scarcity, constrain hydropower companies’ 
electricity production and revenues. Under dynamic water tariffs that incorporate marginal user 
cost, both electricity price spikes and water scarcity would lead to water price spikes. While water 
price variability may generate some negative externalities or be inconsistent with social norms, 
other areas of water governance demonstrate that price controls and inefficient tariffs generate 
social welfare losses and impose costs on water providers. This Chapter provides regulators and 
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hydropower operators with insights into these trade-offs in order to support the increased provision 
of water services by multipurpose hydropower reservoirs. 
The second contribution of the Chapter is the demonstration of a heuristic to estimate marginal 
user cost under stochastic conditions that does not require hydro-economic modelling and could 
be explained to all water users. This heuristic can be adapted to allocating water in a range of water 
systems where rapid increases can occur in the variable costs of water provision and/or excess 
water demand imposes additional costs on the water service provider. Although previous studies 
have used mathematical programming and other techniques to estimate marginal user cost and 
show how it could be incorporate it into real-world water tariffs (Chu & Grafton 2018; Macian-
Sorribes et al. 2015), these approaches may not be possible in all contexts because the requisite 
data or software is not available, the institutional capacity does not exist to use them, or they are 
not accepted by water users and other stakeholders because the calculation process is not readily 
understandable by a layperson. 
5.2. Model of Multipurpose Hydropower Operations and Water Tariffs 
I modify the stochastic dynamic programming model of reservoir operations developed in Section 
4.2 of Chapter 4. The model considers the optimisation problem of a profit-motivated hydropower 
company managing a multipurpose reservoir. The reservoir supplies water to electricity 
generation, irrigation, and environmental flows; water withdrawals are rivalrous between these 
uses. The marginal benefit of allocating water to electricity production, irrigated agriculture, or 
storage varies according to stochastic changes in reservoir inflows, electricity market prices, and 
irrigation water demand.   
The modifications to the hydro-economic model outlined in Chapter 4 are summarised as follows. 
The hydropower company is obliged to sell a minimum level of electricity each period; if a 
shortfall occurs, then the company must make up the deficit by purchasing electricity in the local 
market or importing it from a neighboring market. In either case, these purchases are subject to a 
premium that is a fixed proportion of the prevailing price the company receives for generating 
hydroelectricity in the same period. Reservoir operations are regulated so that water cannot be 
extracted for hydropower below a specified level of storage, thereby guaranteeing a minimum level 
of irrigation extractions. Further, irrigators cannot extract water below a specified storage to 
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protect aquatic ecosystems and the recreational fisheries they support in the reservoir. The analysis 
focuses on two alternative approaches to irrigation water pricing: (i) a price stability tariff wherein 
the water price incorporates the average electricity price across previous periods and there is a 
constant water scarcity premium; and (ii) a marginal user cost tariff that incorporates the expected 
marginal hydroelectricity revenue in the forthcoming period, plus a dynamic water scarcity 
premium that is applied when reservoir levels in the forthcoming period are expected to be low 
(and the hydropower company expects to purchase electricity at a premium). In addition, I consider 
the water tariff from Chapter 4 wherein the volumetric water price is the marginal value of 
hydropower generation in the same period. 
Below I redefine certain key variables and explain modifications to the model. Section 4.2 of 
Chapter 4 provides an in-depth exposition of the original model and Table 5.1 in Section 5.3 of 
the current Chapter provides a summary of the model parameters for this application. 
5.2.1. Electricity Supply Obligation and Spot Market Purchases 
Recall that the quantity of hydroelectricity produced during period 𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑎𝑎  × 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  
where 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 is the volume of water releases from the reservoir to the hydropower plant that are 
scheduled at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑎𝑎 is the fixed production parameter of water that 
specifies the volume of water required to produce a unit of electricity.  
The hydropower operator is required to supply a minimum level of electricity each period, 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 
in order to satisfy a quantity-based contractual or licensing arrangement, such as a purchase power 
agreement or energy security obligations. The maximum amount of electricity supply per period, 
𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, equates to the electricity generated by the maximum level of hydropower extractions per 
period, 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. If hydroelectricity generation is less than 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, the hydropower company must 
purchase the shortfall in a forward market. There is a penalty associated with this purchase that 
reflects either: (i) the cost of importing electricity through a transmission connection from a 
neighboring market; (ii) the additional cost of exercising a hedging instrument or entering a 
contract market to meet supply obligations; (iii) the higher cost of alternative generation 
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technologies, or (iv) the opportunity cost of constraints on the hydropower company’s market 
activity, e.g. being unable to sell high-value, low-probability options contracts or having reduced 
flexibility to bid into the wholesale spot market. 
The marginal cost of the hydropower company’s electricity purchase is 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡, where 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) is the 
price of the forward contract that the hydropower company sells for the generation it schedules at 
the beginning of each period; 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is the electricity price level in period 𝑡𝑡; and 𝜓𝜓 is a constant, 
deterministic parameter. I specify that 𝜓𝜓 > 1 so that the electricity company’s forward contract 
purchase is more expensive than the electricity it sells and, hence, there is a penalty for not meeting 
𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. The total cost of purchasing electricity in period 𝑡𝑡 is the marginal cost, 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡), multiplied 
by the volume of electricity purchases, max (0, 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡)). Note that the hydropower company 
may have no choice to purchase electricity, and incur the associated penalty, due to insufficient 
water being held in reservoir storage, or optimally choose to do so because electricity prices are 
expected to be higher in the following period.    
5.2.2. Excess Demand for Irrigation Water and Storage Constraints 
The specification of irrigation water demand is modified to allow excess water demand. Here, the 
irrigation company cannot extract water if residual storage (after hydropower extractions, inflows, 
evaporation losses, and environmental flow extractions) is less than 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, the minimum level of 
storage required to manage environment quality in the reservoir’s ecosystems and support 
recreational fishing. Hence, irrigation extractions in period 𝑡𝑡 are  
𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡� = � 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅max (0, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  
I carryover the specification in Chapter 4 of a fixed value for 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 across both summer and winter 
seasons. Note that the environmental risk condition means that irrigation extractions are now a 
function of the weather state in the previous period, 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, the water price, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, and hydropower 
extractions, i.e. 𝚤𝚤?̃?𝑡 = 𝚤𝚤?̃?𝑡(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡). Since irrigation extractions occur after all other extractions in a 
given period (see Figure 4.6 in Chapter 4), the volume of hydropower extractions and inflows 
affect whether enough storage is available to meet irrigators’ total water demand. However, a 
storage buffer manages the possibility of excess irrigation water demand occurring. The 
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hydropower company is prevented from extracting water below a constant minimum level, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. I 
define the storage constraints such that 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 < 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, where 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 is the physical minimum 
level of functional reservoir storage. The size of the gap between 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 each season 
determines the guaranteed minimum level of water available for irrigation extractions after 
inflows, evaporation, and environmental flows occur. This minimum level may be set to ensure 
that excess irrigation water demand does not occur, or that it is limited. 
5.2.3. Water Tariffs 
I consider three water tariff structures: (i) Standard Volumetric Tariff (SV Tariff), (ii) Price 
Stability Tariff (PS Tariff), and (iii) Marginal User Cost Tariff (MUC Tariff). An irrigation 
company earning zero profits pays the hydropower company to withdraw water from the reservoir 
on behalf of its customers. As in Chapter 4, I do not include the fixed costs of dam construction or 
water conveyance in the water tariff. Further, I assume full cost-pass through by the irrigation 
company to farmers in the same period. This means that the water tariff in all three cases consists 
of a volumetric water price. 
5.2.3.1. Standard Volumetric Tariff  
This reference case is the volumetric approach defined previously in Chapter 4. The hydropower 
operator charges the irrigation company a water price that reflects the value of foregone generation 
in the same period:  
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑎𝑎  × (𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) +  𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐̅)  
where 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is the forward electricity price level in the current period and 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡= {𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 𝐿𝐿ℎ} is one 
of three possible forward electricity price levels (low, medium, high); 𝑐𝑐̅ is the constant price per 
unit of hydroelectricity in renewable energy certificate (REC) or carbon offset (CO) markets 
(henceforth ‘carbon markets’); and 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐 ∈ (0, 1) is a constant parameter specifying the number of 
certificates or offset units accredited per unit of hydroelectricity generation.  
Chapter 5 
153 | P a g e  
 5.2.3.2. Price Stability Tariff 
This approach adapts the SV Tariff in two ways. First, a fixed scarcity premium is included to 
reflect that electricity will need to be purchased by the hydropower company in some years when 
storage levels are low. The premium consists of: (i) a parameter, 𝜔𝜔, that represents the long-term 
probability of electricity purchases being required in a given period; and (ii) the additional cost of 
those purchases relative to selling hydroelectricity, (𝜓𝜓 − 1) × 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡).  
Second, fluctuations in the water tariff that farmers face as electricity revenues change are 
smoothed by averaging the water tariff across 𝑛𝑛 periods, including the current period and the 
previous 𝑛𝑛 − 1 periods. This requires a state variable to be defined for the electricity price level 
for each of the 𝑛𝑛 − 1 previous periods. Recall that Chapter 4 defined the following variables 
affecting the hydropower company’s generation scheduling decision at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡: 
the current period electricity price level,  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, and the previous period electricity price level, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡. 
Hence, there are an additional 𝑛𝑛 − 2 state variables mapping the history of electricity price level 
movements. For the purposes of a simple illustration, I use the 𝑛𝑛 = 3 case that is modelled in 
Section 5.5 of this Chapter to outline the water tariff structure in this case: 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑎𝑎  × �(1 + 𝜔𝜔(𝜓𝜓 − 1))𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) + (1 + 𝜔𝜔(𝜓𝜓 − 1))𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡) + (1 + 𝜔𝜔(𝜓𝜓 − 1))𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡) 3 + 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐̅�  
where 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 is the electricity price level two periods ago at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡. Note that this 
tariff structure captures the main elements of the one used in practice (from 2017 onwards) by the 
hydropower company operating the multipurpose reservoir which the model is calibrated to in 
Section 5.3 (see Hydro Tasmania 2017c, 2018).  
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 5.2.3.3. Marginal User Cost Tariff 
The marginal user cost of irrigation water extractions in period 𝑡𝑡 is the time-discounted, expected 
value of a one unit increase in reservoir storage in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, or 
MUC𝑡𝑡 = 11 + 𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸(𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1)𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 ) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 is the volume of reservoir storage at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 and 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1 is the value 
of a particular combination of states across storage volumes, season (𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1), past weather (𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1), 
past electricity price level (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1), and current electricity price level (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1) at the beginning of 
period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. 
The marginal user cost represents the expected opportunity cost to the hydropower generator of a 
unit of period 𝑡𝑡 irrigation extractions reducing storage volume by one unit at the start of period 
𝑡𝑡 + 1. Relative to the SV Tariff, a tariff incorporating the marginal user cost will be higher when: 
(i) storage is expected to be low at the start of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 such that the hydropower operator 
cannot meet the minimum level of electricity supply through its own generation (i.e. 
1
𝑎𝑎
× (𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1) −  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) <  𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀), and/or (ii) when marginal hydroelectricity revenue is expected to 
be higher in 𝑡𝑡 + 1, i.e. 𝐸𝐸(𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1)) > 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) . 
Exact values for MUC𝑡𝑡 can be calculated through the stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) 
framework used to solve the original version of the model in Chapter 4. Here, we develop an 
alternative ‘rule-of-thumb’ approach that is less exact but easier to apply in practice. In the context 
of incorporating basin-wide opportunity costs into dynamic irrigation water pricing, Macian-
Sorribes et al. (2015) note that internally generated values for opportunity costs are dependent on 
the solution algorithm. The determination of a tariff by such algorithms could be perceived as a 
‘black-box’ calculation by the irrigators paying it. As Griffin (2016) notes, simplicity and 
transparency are important objectives for water tariff design. Further, hydropower operators or 
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regulatory agencies do not necessarily have the resources or data to use SDP algorithms to set 
water tariffs. Hence, I use the following heuristic to estimate the MUC tariff in period 𝑡𝑡: 
1. Assume that any extra unit of storage at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 would be used to 
generate hydroelectricity.  
2. Estimate expected marginal hydropower revenue in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Divide this value by the 
production parameter of water. The result is the main component of the volumetric water 
price. 
3. Calculate the expected volume of storage at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 by: (i) assuming 
that period 𝑡𝑡 hydropower extractions are equal to the volume required to meet the 
electricity supply obligation, (ii) estimating the expected volume of inflows, and (iii) 
estimating the expected volume of irrigation extractions if the water price is equal to the 
one calculated in Step 2 above.    
4. If the expected volume of storage at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is less than the water 
volume equating to the minimum electricity supply, then the volumetric water price is 
augmented by a premium that reflects the higher marginal cost of the hydropower 
operator purchasing electricity in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. 
Formally, the water tariff is defined as: 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = �              1𝑎𝑎  × (𝐸𝐸(𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡+1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)) +  𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐̅)  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  1𝑎𝑎 × (𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1|𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥(𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)) −  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 1
𝑎𝑎
 × ((𝜓𝜓 − 1) × 𝐸𝐸(𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡+1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)) +  𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐̅)  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  1𝑎𝑎 × (𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1|𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥(𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)) −  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) < 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 
𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1|𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥(𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)) =  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡)) − 𝐸𝐸(𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡�(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡  )) − 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 
Recall that 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 is the fixed evaporation rate of water held in storage at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡; 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 
is the seasonal volume of environmental flow deliveries; 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 is the season; and 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�  is the volume of 
reservoir inflows, which are unknown at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 and are a function of the 
previous period’s weather type, 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡. The term (𝜓𝜓 − 1) incorporates a water scarcity premium on 
foregone marginal electricity revenues, 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡+1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡), when the hydropower operator is expected to 
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purchase electricity in the next period. The expected volume of irrigation extractions, 𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡�, is 
calculated using the period 𝑡𝑡 water price that would prevail without the water scarcity premium.  
The term 𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1|𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥(𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)) is the hydropower operator’s expectation (at the beginning of 
period 𝑡𝑡) of the storage volume at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 if hydropower extractions during 
period 𝑡𝑡 are equivalent to the minimum electricity supply obligation. This condition isolates the 
impact of irrigation extractions from the joint impact of period 𝑡𝑡 hydropower and irrigation 
extractions on whether or not the hydropower operator is expected to purchase electricity in period 
𝑡𝑡 + 1. The rationale for this assumption is two-fold. First, it counterbalances the water scarcity 
premium being triggered in period 𝑡𝑡 regardless of how much of the minimum electricity 
requirement is expected to be supplied through period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 electricity purchases. Second, it 
prevents moral hazard by removing the incentive for the hydropower company to operate the 
reservoir at maximum capacity in every period to trigger the water scarcity premium and make 
windfall profits if electricity purchases are not actually required in the next period. 
Note that I drop the time discount from the expected future value of storage because, consistent 
with Chapter 4, period 𝑡𝑡 irrigation charges are received as revenues by the hydropower company 
in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Hence, incorporating the discount rate in the water tariff as well would result in 
the revenue from provision of irrigation water being discounted twice, and thereby decrease the 
incentives for the hydropower company to leave water in the reservoir and potentially bias the 
results. 
5.2.4. Summary of Profit Functions and Optimisation Problems 
I solve the hydropower operators’ optimisation problem under the different water tariffs. The 
irrigator’s water extractions (and profits) in a given period are a function of the water price, the 
weather/season state, and the residual storage after water has been extracted for hydropower, 
released to environmental flows, and evaporation has occurred. The hydropower operator only 
directly controls the amount of water allocated to hydropower generation. The revenues that the 
hydropower operator receives from the previous period’s irrigation extractions varies according to 
shifts in water demand. 
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Below I provide a summary of the profit functions and optimisation problems for the three water 
tariffs outlined in Section 5.2.3. The reader is referred to Chapter 4 for a full exposition of the 
optimisation procedure and the transition of state variables. I define a finite planning horizon, 𝑡𝑡 =(1,2, … .𝑇𝑇), initial values of the state variables, and the transition probabilities for the previous 
period’s weather state (𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡) and current period electricity price level (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡). The final period 
hydropower profit remains the sum of the value of the accessible water in storage and irrigation 
revenues from the penultimate period. There is no electricity supply obligation in the final period. 
I continue to assume that there are no fixed costs associated with electricity generation and 
irrigation water supply, nor variable costs associated with electricity generation. 
Standard Volumetric Tariff 
For the SV Tariff, hydropower profits are comprised of the current period’s electricity revenues, 
minus the cost of any electricity purchases, plus irrigation revenues from the previous period:  
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) =  1𝑎𝑎 × 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 × 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) − 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) × max (0, 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡)) + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡) × 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡)  
where 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 is the electricity price level in period 𝑡𝑡 −1 and 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 is the volume of hydropower extractions 
that the operator schedules at the beginning of period 𝑡𝑡. 
The irrigation net profit function, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 , for water pricing is: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡)1𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 + 1)�𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 (𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) − 𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 (𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡)�                        + 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 × 𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡) −  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)  × 𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡)   
The hydropower operator controls the volume of water released to the power station in each period 
to maximise the net present value of profits over time. The irrigator maximises the within-period 
benefits of its water extractions subject to the water price.  
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 The formal problem is: 
max
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐸𝐸1�
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) (1 + 𝜌𝜌)𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1  
subject to: operation and regulatory constraints defined in Chapter 4 and modifications specified 
in Section 5.2.2; the initial conditions for the season (𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡), current period’s electricity price level 
(𝐿𝐿1), previous period’s weather (𝐵𝐵1) and price level (𝐾𝐾1), and the terminal profit condition; and 
the transition of the state variables (𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡). 
The profit-maximising hydropower generation schedule from 𝑡𝑡=1 to 𝑡𝑡=𝑇𝑇 is found with stochastic 
dynamic programming (SDP). The Bellman equation is 
𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 ,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) =  max
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 ,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) +  11+𝜌𝜌  𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1)�  
Price Stability Tariff 
The hydropower profit function, optimisation problem, and associated Bellman equation are 
augmented by the additional electricity price state variables corresponding to the number of 
previous periods over which the average water price is calculated. For the 𝑛𝑛 = 3 case, this means 
that I need to include both 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 and 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡, the electricity price level from three periods ago, because of 
the lag in the hydropower operator’s receipt of irrigation revenues. The Bellman equation is: 
𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 ,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡, 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, ) =  max
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡, 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) +                                                                    1
1+𝜌𝜌
 𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1)�  
Marginal User Cost Tariff  
An additional state variable for the weather two periods ago, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, is added to the model. This is 
necessary because the period 𝑡𝑡 irrigation revenues received by the hydropower company are 
determined by the period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 irrigation extractions that, in turn, are a function of the period 𝑡𝑡 −1 water tariff and expectations regarding the period 𝑡𝑡 storage volume and period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 inflows that 
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were formed on the basis of the known weather state in period 𝑡𝑡 − 2. The hydropower operator’s 
profit function is: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) =  1𝑎𝑎 × 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ×  𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) − 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) × max (0, 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡)) + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡) × 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡)  
The irrigator’s profit function is: 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡)1𝛼𝛼(𝛼𝛼 + 1)�𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 , 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) − 𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼+1𝛼𝛼 (𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡)� +                                                  𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 × 𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡) −  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)  × 𝚤𝚤̃𝑡𝑡(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)  
Finally, the Bellman Equation is: 
𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 ,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) =  max
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 ,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) + 11+𝜌𝜌  𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡+1,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1)�   
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4.3. Recalibration of Model to Arthurs Lake, Tasmania 
The model of hydropower operations and irrigation extractions is reapplied to the multipurpose 
Arthurs Lake reservoir and Midlands Irrigation Scheme considered in Chapter 4. The parameters 
and their derivation are the same as Chapter 4 unless specified below. Table 4.A1 in Chapter 4 
provides a full summary of all variables and parameters, and their respective mathematical 
notation; Table 5.1 below summarises the parameter values used in this Chapter. All monetary 
values are reported in 2018 Australian dollars (AUD). Note that the hydro-economic modelling of 
Arthurs Lake operations is a calibration exercise and not a case study for the purpose of proposing 
regulation or management reforms for that particular reservoir. Instead, our purpose is to develop 
general insights into the costs of price stability controls, relative to the MUC Tariff, and how they 
change with different parameter specifications. 
The reservoir storage level that irrigation water extractions cannot be extracted below, 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,  
remains at the medium environmental risk level defined in operation rules for Arthurs Lake 
(164,000 ML). The level constraining hydropower extractions, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, is set at the June 1st minimum 
value (217,000 ML) under the water supply agreement between Hydro Tasmania and Tasmania 
Irrigation for the Midlands Irrigation Scheme. I increase the minimum storage volume, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, to 
150,000 ML to reduce the size of the state space that needs to be considered in the application of 
the solution algorithm. The ratio between the electricity price level and the cost of the hydropower 
operator purchasing electricity, 𝜓𝜓, is 1.27. This value equates to the average percentage difference 
between the monthly peak and average spot price for the Victorian NEM market from 1999-2016. 
Prior to the establishment of regulated Tasmanian electricity prices in 2017, Hydro Tasmania used 
this peak-average difference to calculate the cost of increased net imports from neighboring 
Victoria within the scarcity premium component of the irrigation water tariff. Note that this 
scarcity premium was allowed under the terms of the Hydro Tasmania water license which 
specifies that newly established irrigation schemes can be charged a water price equating to the 
value of foregone hydropower generation.  
In order to simulate the impact of large fluctuations in electricity and water prices, I adopt the high 
electricity price level for the ‘price spike’ risk analysis in Section 4.2.2. of Chapter 4: $102.31. 
The minimum volume of electricity generation per season, 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, is set at an arbitrary level of 30% 
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of maximum generation, or 37375 MWh. In the context of Arthurs Lake, hydropower extractions 
equating to less than this volume (<19,700 ML) occurred 5 times across the 40 summer/winter 
seasons between 1995 and 2015, and average extractions were 46,115 ML per season. Section 
5.4.2 provides a sensitivity analysis of this key parameter. 
The PS Tariff is consistent with the water price calculation method used by Hydro Tasmania from 
2017 onwards, although not for the Midlands Irrigation Scheme because of the scheme’s mini-
hydropower plant that provides a natural hedge against water price fluctuations. The rationale 
provided for this averaging approach has been smoothing out the impact of electricity price spikes 
on water prices, and thereby assisting the planning activities of irrigators and other stakeholders 
(Hydro Tasmania 2017b, 2017c, 2018). Notably, the Tasmanian government has a stated goal of 
increasing the value of the state’s agricultural production ten-fold to 2050, with a particular focus 
on financing and constructing new irrigation infrastructure through the ‘Pipeline to Prosperity’ 
scheme (see Infrastructure Tasmania 2018). In 2017, when price stability controls were first 
introduced, the volumetric water price was averaged over 5 years; this was subsequently extended 
to 10 years in 2018. Here, I only average the PS Tariff across 3 seasons (or 1.5 years) instead of 
20 seasons (or 10 years) because matching the full 10-year time span would require a further 17 
state variables to be added to the model. The parameter in the PS Tariff for the fixed probability 
of the hydropower operator purchasing electricity due to insufficient reservoir storage, 𝜔𝜔, is the 
value used to calculate the water scarcity premium in Hydro Tasmania (2017).
The Cost of Price Stability Controls on Dynamic Water Tariffs 
162 | P a g e  
 
Table 5.1. Summary of parameters for recalibration of the model to Arthurs Lake.
Variable Mathematical Notation Value 
Minimum and maximum storage volume 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 150000 ML, 449000 ML 
Risk storage level volume 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 164000 ML 
Irrigation buffer storage volume 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 217000 ML 
Inflows, by season and weather type 
 𝐹𝐹 =  �𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙=1,𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙=2,𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤� �18227 ML 22679 ML 39375 ML59850 ML 88207 ML 122905 ML� 
Random inflow shock 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 =  
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
0.87  w. p 0.20.97 w. p 0.21 w. p 0.21.03 w. p 0.21.13 w. p 0.2  
Evaporation rate of storage 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 = �𝜉𝜉𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=1 𝜉𝜉𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=2  � �0.138 0.049  � 
Seasonal environmental flows 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑣𝑣𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=1 if 𝜙𝜙 =  1𝑣𝑣𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=2 if 𝜙𝜙 =  2 � �4000 ML1000 ML � 
Electricity price levels ($/MWh) 𝐿𝐿 =  {𝐿𝐿 𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 𝐿𝐿ℎ} {$31.96 $44.40 $102.31} 
Conversion factor for water releases into energy (MWh/ML) 𝑎𝑎 0.5272 
Maximum extractions for hydropower 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 = �𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=1𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡=2� �65681 ML66044 ML� 
Price elasticity of water demand 𝛼𝛼 -0.81 
Fixed seasonal irrigation extractions (ML) 
 𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡 =  �𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡=1𝚤𝚤?̅?𝜙𝑡𝑡=2� �15114 ML14895 ML� 
Weather and electricity price transition matrices See Appendix A3 in Chapter 3  
Carbon market starting price ($/MWh) 𝑐𝑐0 $41.11 
Accreditation per unit of hydroelectricity generated 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐  0.5 
Scaling parameter for the water demand/marginal benefit 
function 𝛾𝛾 = �𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑛𝑛 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑛𝑛 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑤𝑤� �952477 746125 503291960030 735314 500033� 
Choke price for irrigation water ($/ML) 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 $611 
Choke volume for irrigation extraction (ML by 
weather/season) 𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 = �𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=1,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=2,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤� �5274 ML 4131 ML 2787 ML5316 ML 4072 ML 2769 ML� 
Number of time periods 𝑡𝑡 20 seasons (10 years) 
Initial reservoir volume 𝑆𝑆0 310000 ML 
Discount factor (per seasonal time-step) 𝜌𝜌 0.015 
Ratio of electricity purchase cost to the electricity price level 𝜓𝜓 1.27 
Maximum/Minimum volume of electricity supply per season 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 124585 MWh, 37375 MWh 
Probability of electricity purchases (Price Stability Tariff) 𝜔𝜔 0.05 
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5.4. Results  
5.4.1. Water Allocation and Benefits under Alternative Tariffs  
I calculate the net benefits of water allocation under the three alternative water tariffs: 
(i) Standard Volumetric (SV) Tariff – A water price for irrigation water extractions in period 
𝑡𝑡 equal to the marginal revenue of hydroelectricity generation in period 𝑡𝑡;  
(ii) Price Stability (PS) Tariff – A volumetric water price that is the average of the marginal 
revenue of hydroelectricity generation across periods 𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡 − 1, and 𝑡𝑡 − 2, plus a fixed water 
scarcity premium; 
(iii) Marginal User Cost (MUC) Tariff – The main component of the period 𝑡𝑡 water tariff is the 
expected marginal revenue of hydroelectricity generation in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Expected 
marginal revenue in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is determined by the period 𝑡𝑡 electricity price level and 
the associated probabilities of alternative price levels occurring in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. If the 
expected volume of period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 reservoir storage is insufficient to fully supply minimum 
electricity generation, then a scarcity premium is applied to reflect the expected cost of the 
hydropower company purchasing electricity in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. 
Replicating the method used in Chapter 4, I conduct 1000 random simulations of the three water 
tariff scenarios. The sequence of stochastic shifts in the weather, electricity price, and random 
inflow shocks are the same in each simulation, i.e. for simulation 𝑗𝑗 the time paths of the various 
state variables (e.g. 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡), the random inflow shock, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡, and inflows, 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, are the same 
across the different scenarios. I calculate the average net present value (NPV) of hydropower 
benefits, irrigation benefits, total benefits, and electricity purchases for each period within each 
simulation across the scenarios. The average volume of water extractions, hydroelectricity 
generation, and electricity purchases is also calculated.  
The presentation of the results focuses on the differences between the PS Tariff and the MUC 
Tariff. Specifically, I concentrate on four costs associated with deploying price stability controls 
instead of the marginal user cost approach: (i) foregone hydropower benefits; (ii) foregone 
hydropower generation; (iii) additional cost to the hydropower operator of purchasing electricity 
to meet supply shortfalls; and (iv) reduced efficiency of overall water use. I also calculate the 
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indirect subsidy to irrigators that is generated by price stability controls. The SV Tariff is the same 
as the water pricing scenario in Chapter 4 and its inclusion in this analysis shows how that basic 
tariff design can be improved by incorporating marginal user cost.  
Tariff 
Hydropower Irrigation Total 
Average 
water 
extractions 
(St. dev.) 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
(St. dev.) 
$ millions 
Electricity 
generation 
GWh 
Electricity 
purchases 
GWh 
Average 
NPV of 
cost of 
electricity 
purchases  
$ millions 
Average 
water 
extractions 
(St. dev.) 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
(St. dev.) 
$ millions 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
(St. dev.) 
$ 
millions 
 Standard 
Volumetric 
 474.7 GL 
(72.4 GL) 
$83.3 
($14.6) 
900.4 
(137.3) 
215.5 
(51.3) 
$12.9 
($4.0) 
266.8 GL 
(23.0 GL) 
$52.8 
($4.0) 
$136.1 
($11.6) 
Price 
Stability 
  481.0 GL 
(72.0 GL) 
$84.8  
($14.9) 
912.4 
(136.6) 
204.8 
(51.6) 
$12.3 
($4.0) 
257.7 GL 
(23.7 GL) 
$52.1 
($4.0) 
$136.9 
($11.8) 
Marginal 
User Cost 
 492.2 GL 
(67.4 GL) 
$91.5 
($13.5) 
933.6 
(127.9) 
172.9 
(54.9) 
$10.5 
($4.3) 
236.4 GL 
(14.6 GL) 
$49.1 
($2.7) 
$140.6 
($11.5) 
Table 5.2. Aggregate model results across water tariff scenarios. Averages reported for 1000 
simulations. Each simulation experiences the same stochastic variations across periods as the 
corresponding simulation in a different scenario. The simulations span 20 seasons (10 years). 
Table 5.2 summarises the results for the three water tariff scenarios with a minimum electricity 
supply requirement equivalent to 30% of the technical maximum hydroelectricity generation 
production per season, 37.4 GWh. Comparing the average results from the PS Tariff and MUC 
Tariff across the 10-year simulation period, the average cost of imposing price stability controls 
from foregone hydropower profits is $6.6 million, or 7.3% of profits under the MUC Tariff. 
Similarly, hydroelectricity generation is 21.2 GWh, or 2.3%, lower under the PS Tariff. The 
additional costs of purchasing, on average, an additional 31.9 GWh of electricity under the PS 
Tariff are $1.8 million. The protection from price fluctuations and a dynamic water scarcity 
premium means that irrigators receive an indirect subsidy of $3 million, or 6.1% higher benefits, 
under price stability controls compared to the MUC Tariff. But the resulting reallocation of water 
from hydropower to irrigation is inefficient: the average cost of reduced water allocation efficiency 
under the PS Tariff is $3.7 million, or 2.6% of total benefits under the MUC Tariff. Across all 
simulations, the average volumetric water price is $144 (SV Tariff), $145 (PS Tariff), and $158 
(MUC Tariff). Given the inverse relationship between irrigation water demand and water price, 
these average water prices are consistent with the relative differences in water extractions and 
benefits across hydropower and irrigation under the alternative tariffs.  
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Comparing the PS Tariff to the SV Tariff, the deployment of price stability controls with a fixed 
water scarcity premium reallocates more water to hydropower generation, such that electricity 
purchases and irrigation benefits are slightly lower and there is a minor increase in the total benefits 
of water allocation. Comparing the MUC and SV Tariffs, the opportunity costs of not incorporating 
marginal user cost into the water tariff and the indirect irrigation subsidy are even higher than 
under the PS Tariff. Note that, for this primary specification of the model, the storage conditions 
for irrigation and hydropower extractions and the configuration of the water demand function mean 
that there is no excess irrigation demand across all simulations for all Tariffs (i.e. there is always 
enough water for irrigation extractions to continue until the marginal benefit equals the volumetric 
water price).  
Figure 5.A1 in Appendix 5.A1 is a histogram of the cost of price stability controls for individual 
simulations from the hydropower operator’s perspective, i.e. NPV hydropower benefits under the 
PS Tariff minus NPV hydropower benefits under the MUC Tariff. Figure 5.A2 provides the 
equivalent histogram for total benefits, or the efficiency of water allocation. Although average 
hydropower and total benefits are generally higher under the MUC Tariff, that is not the case for 
all simulations. This is because the MUC Tariff is determined by the expected value of foregone 
hydropower generation in the next period, but the actual transition of the electricity price and 
weather are random and cannot be predicted precisely. Neither the PS nor MUC Tariff will 
perfectly optimise hydropower profits nor the efficiency of water allocation because of this 
randomness. But, on average, the deployment of the PS Tariff represents a major cost to the 
hydropower operator and reduces the overall social benefits from multipurpose operations. 
The results of an individual simulation provide further insights into the dynamics of the model. 
Below I consider the results from a simulation where the average costs of deploying the PS Tariff 
instead of the MUC Tariff are: (i) $8.9 million in foregone hydropower profits; (ii) 22.1 GWh in 
foregone hydroelectricity generation; (iii) $3.7 million of additional electricity purchases; and (iv) 
$5.4 million in foregone total benefits. Figure 5.1 displays the timepath of the respective 
volumetric water prices resulting from the different Tariff structures. The marginal revenue of 
hydropower generation can take on three different values according to the low, medium, and high 
electricity price levels. The water scarcity premium comes into force under the MUC Tariff in 
periods 5, 7, 9, 15, 17, and 19.  
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Figure 5.1. Volumetric water price under the PS and MUC Tariffs and the marginal revenue of 
hydropower generation for a selected simulation.  
In the first 7 periods and in periods 12-13, the MUC Tariff is higher than the PS Tariff because the 
former incorporates the probability of the transition to the highest electricity price level in the next 
period. Consequently, more water is available for hydropower extractions in periods 6 and 8 under 
the MUC Tariff. Although the PS Tariff and MUC Tariff are approximately the same as the 
electricity price transition moves to the highest level in periods 8-9 and 14-15, the MUC Tariff 
adjusts more quickly to the downward shift in the electricity price, thereby enabling an efficient 
water reallocation from hydropower to irrigation in periods 10, 11, and 17. This is a somewhat 
perverse outcome: the price stability tariff, which is designed to protect irrigators from price 
variability, actually prevents an efficient reallocation of water from hydropower to irrigation.  
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Figure 5.2. Cumulative hydropower profits under the Price Stability Tariff and Marginal User 
Cost Tariff. 
Figure 5.2 demonstrates how cumulative hydropower benefits change over time and Figures 4.3a-
4.3d demonstrate the causes of divergences in benefits under the PS and MUC Tariff. Under the 
PS Tariff, there is insufficient storage available to meet the minimum supply obligation in periods 
6, 8, 10, and 16. By contrast, the hydropower operator only needs to purchase electricity under the 
MUC Tariff in periods 10 and 16; instead of needing to purchase electricity in period 8, the 
hydropower operator can sell high-value electricity when an electricity price spike occurs. While 
specific events driving variations in hydropower and total benefits can be readily identified, it is 
important to note that small differences in hydropower and irrigation extractions accumulate. 
Overall, the timepath of the reservoir level is very similar, the major difference is how water is 
allocated between hydropower and irrigation under the different pricing arrangements. This 
description of the model dynamics for a specific simulation provides insights into the different 
ways in which the application of price stability controls may, relative to outcomes under the MUC 
Tariff, generate costs. The specific nature of these costs and why, where, and when they occur 
varies across different simulations.
The Cost of Price Stability Controls on Dynamic Water Tariffs 
168 | P a g e  
 
  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Time-path of key variables for a simulation where the Price Stability Control Tariff causes reduced hydropower profits and inefficient 
water allocation relative to the Marginal User Cost Tariff. 
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5.4.2. Sensitivity Analysis of the Costs of Price Stability Controls 
I conduct a sensitivity analysis of key parameters to derive insights on how the costs of price 
stability controls change relative to the primary model results reported in Section 5.4.1. A 
description of the sensitivity analysis for each parameter is provided in Section A.2 of Appendix, 
including Tables 5.A1-5.A4 for data underlying the values in Table 5.3 below. 
Scenario 
Costs of price stability controls 
Indirect 
irrigation 
subsidy 
Foregone 
hydropower 
benefits 
$ millions 
Foregone 
hydroelectricity 
generation 
GWh 
Cost of 
additional 
electricity 
purchases 
$ millions 
Reduced 
efficiency 
of water 
allocation 
$ millions 
Additional 
irrigation 
profits under 
PS Tariff 
$ millions 
Primary model $6.6 (7.3%) 21.2 (2.3%) $1.8 (17.3%) $3.6 (2.6%) $3.0 (6.1%) 
Minimum electricity supply obligation  
𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟎𝟎 $0.50 (0.5%) 5.6 (0.6%) Not Applicable $0.8 (0.1%) $0.6 (1.2%) 
𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎% of 𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 $4.1 (4.2%) 20.9 (2.1%) $0.7 (17.6%) $1.4 (1.0%) $2.7 (5.4%) 
𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟓𝟓𝟎𝟎% of 𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 $11.6 (14.1%) 47.1 (13.6%) $3.2 (13.6%) $6.7 (5.2%) $4.9 (10.4%) 
𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟕𝟕𝟎𝟎% of 𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 $9.3 (13.8%) 64.3 (6.2%) $4.0 (9.3%) $3.0 (2.7%) $6.2 (13.6%) 
Electricity purchase premium  
𝝍𝝍 = 𝟏𝟏.𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 $3.7 (4.1%) 1.0 (0.1%) $1.7 (15.2%) $1.3 (1.0%) $2.3 (4.7%) 
𝝍𝝍 = 𝟏𝟏.𝟑𝟑𝟏𝟏 $4.8 (5.3%) 26.7 (2.9%) $1.8 (16.5%) $1.6 (1.1%) $3.3 (6.7%) 
High and medium electricity price level   
𝑳𝑳𝒉𝒉 = $𝟏𝟏𝟕𝟕.𝟕𝟕𝟏𝟏 $2.50 (3.1%) 9.3 (1.0%) $1.5 (12.7%) $0.2 (0.2%) $2.7 (5.1%) 
𝑳𝑳𝒉𝒉 = $𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟑.𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒 $6.0 (5.8%) 31.0 (3.3%) $2.0 (19.6%) $2.5 (1.7%) $3.5 (7.5%) 
𝑳𝑳𝒎𝒎 = $𝟏𝟏𝟕𝟕.𝟕𝟕𝟏𝟏 $3.4 (3.2%) 24.8 (2.4%) $1.0 (6.0%) $0.5 (0.4%) $2.9 (6.5%) 
Water demand and irrigation storage buffer  
Doubled water demand $11.3 (12.3%) 77.0 (12.7%) $3.4 (16.8%) $2.8 (1.5%) $8.5 (9.0%) 
𝑺𝑺𝑴𝑴𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑺𝑹𝑹 $2.6 (2.5%) 28.6 (2.66%) $0.3 (5.3%) $1.2 (0.8%) $1.4 (2.9%) 
Doubled water demand 
& 𝑺𝑺𝑴𝑴𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑺𝑹𝑹 $3.1 (3.0%) -7.7 (0.8%) $1.4 (9.4%) $2.3 (1.3%) $0.8 (1.0%) 
Price elasticity of water demand  
𝜶𝜶 = −𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 $4.0 (4.4%) 24.7 (2.7%) $0.7 (5.5%) $0.7 (0.5%) $3.3 (4.9%) 
𝜶𝜶 = −𝟎𝟎.𝟕𝟕 $5.4 (5.9%) -16.1 (1.7%) $3.1 (29.4%) $2.2 (1.5%) $3.0 (5.5%) 
𝜶𝜶 = −𝟎𝟎.𝟗𝟗 $4.8 (5.3%) 24.6 (2.6%) $2.0 (18.8%) $1.9 (1.4%) $2.9 (6.5%) 
Table 5.3. Average costs of price stability controls and indirect irrigation subsidies under 
alternative values for key parameters. Percentages are calculated in terms of the total value under 
the MUC Tariff, e.g. the percentage of foregone hydropower benefits equals 
MUC Tariff hydropower benefits −PS Tariff hydropower benefits 
MUC Tariff hydropower benefits . The relevant parameters for the primary 
model are 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 30% of 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 𝜓𝜓 = 1.27,  𝐿𝐿ℎ = $102.31, 𝛼𝛼 = −0.81.   
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Overall, the costs of foregone hydropower benefits are generally higher (lower) for higher (lower) 
values of the electricity supply obligation and when irrigation water demand is higher. Although 
the relative benefits of marginal user cost tariffs are not substantial if there is no electricity supply 
obligation, they are consistently evident across the various parameter specifications. 
Notwithstanding some exceptions, there are generally costs in terms of foregone generation, 
particularly for high levels of the electricity supply obligation, the electricity purchase premium, 
electricity price level, and irrigation water demand. Variations in the cost of additional electricity 
purchases broadly move in sync with foregone hydropower benefits. For all specifications where 
there is an electricity supply obligation, the size of the indirect subsidy to irrigation under the PS 
Tariff is consistently less than foregone hydropower benefits and, hence, water is allocated 
inefficiently. However, the efficiency loss is generally less than under the primary model. 
The overall result of imposing price stability controls is an increase in irrigator profits through 
inefficient water allocation. Although this result is generally due to reduced hydropower profits, 
there is one model specification where a substantial component of inefficiency in water allocation 
is due to excess irrigation water demand. If irrigation of water demand is doubled and the irrigation 
storage buffer is removed, the PS Tariff leads, on average and compared to the MUC Tariff, to 
excess irrigation water demand of an additional 35 GL (see Table 5.A3 in Appendix). This 
translates into foregone irrigation benefits of $25.7 million under the PS Tariff compared to $20 
million under the MUC Tariff. Overall irrigation benefits remain higher under the PS Tariff, but 
the relative benefits accruing to irrigators of price stability controls become less than $1 million. 
This demonstrates that, as irrigation water demand increases and water becomes scarcer, trade-
offs can also emerge between period 𝑡𝑡 and period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 irrigation extractions under inefficient 
pricing. Even though our specification of marginal user cost is focused on the costs of water 
scarcity borne by the hydropower company, scarcity-based pricing can also provide irrigators with 
incentives to reduce the incidence of their own excess water demand. 
Appendix 5.A2 also reports results for the SV Tariff across the various parameter specifications in 
Table 5.3. Comparing the SV and MUC Tariffs, both hydropower benefits and the total efficiency 
of water allocation are consistently higher under the latter approach.  
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5.5. Discussion  
(i) Price stability controls generate private and social costs when hydropower operators have an 
electricity supply obligation and/or water availability for hydropower generation is constrained 
Section 5.4 shows how price stability controls reallocate water and benefits to irrigators when there 
are opportunity costs from hydropower generation falling below a threshold. Importantly, the 
indirect subsidy resulting from the PS Tariff is not costless. Foregone hydropower profits and 
generation are not just private costs borne by hydropower companies; if those companies are state-
owned then lower revenues will either reduce dividends to the government or necessitate 
government expenditure to maintain their financial sustainability. Both of these outcomes would 
detract from government spending in other sectors, such as health and education.  
In many electricity systems, hydropower will increasingly play a key role in: (i) providing firming 
capacity for solar and wind generation, and/or (ii) addressing burgeoning electricity demand. In 
the absence of these energy services, the gap will be filled by electricity imports from neighboring 
markets or generation from alternative sources (such as natural gas and diesel), with the additional 
costs passed through to consumers in the form of higher electricity prices. The relative inefficiency 
in water allocation of 1-2% estimated for the particular reservoir modelled here may not seem a 
major concern at first glance, but, in practice, these costs would escalate under supply variability, 
as additional sources of demand compete for scarce water, or when inefficient practices perpetuate 
across multiple reservoirs and water catchments. Further, I have only estimated here the distortions 
arising from misallocating water with a water price averaged over 3 years; extending that approach 
to 5 or 10 years could exacerbate those distortions even further. 
Regulators need to account for social preferences and externalities from irrigated agriculture (that 
were not modelled in this study) when deciding whether price stability controls are appropriate 
elements of water tariff design for multipurpose reservoirs. However, price controls do not come 
for free and subsiding irrigators using this method would imposes externalities on hydropower 
companies and, potentially, businesses and households that are not directly affected by reservoir 
operations and their governance. If policy-makers seek to further the capacity for hydropower 
reservoirs to provide water services through water pricing, then hydropower companies need to, 
at minimum, be compensated for the approximate value of their foregone generation. Unless the 
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user cost of water services provision is incorporated into dynamic water tariffs, water pricing will 
not provide sufficient incentives for hydropower companies to invest in multipurpose 
infrastructure or flexibly provide water services beyond those mandated by command-and-control 
regulation. 
(ii) Incorporating marginal user costs into water tariff design is practically achievable and 
increases the efficiency of water allocation  
In this Chapter, I estimate marginal user cost with a heuristic that leads to a more efficient water 
allocation compared to either the SV or PS Tariff. For hydropower, there are certain cases where 
the marginal user cost could be calculated even more accurately using this method, e.g. where 
forward electricity prices are known two seasons in advance, future electricity prices are regulated, 
or there are financial contracts available. On the other hand, there may be situations where our key 
assumption, that the opportunity cost of extracting a unit of water for irrigation is equal to the 
marginal value of foregone hydropower generation in the next period, is less applicable. Where 
there are in-situ benefits from additional water storage, such as improved reservoir water quality, 
or there are multiple types of variable water extraction, then the value of holding additional supply 
may extend several periods into the future. In these last two cases, the practical benefits of the 
heuristic approach may be outweighed by imprecision and the model-based calculation is 
preferable. Nevertheless, I have shown that is it not necessary to use stochastic dynamic 
programming or other modelling techniques to estimate marginal user cost and beneficially 
incorporate it into water tariff design. The heuristic I outline here could be adapted to other 
applications, such as urban water systems, and enable regulators to implement dynamic water 
tariffs in a manner that is understandable and transparent for all stakeholders.  
(iii) Price stability controls on irrigation water pricing could prevent efficient water reallocation 
from hydropower to irrigation and generate intertemporal opportunity costs for irrigators  
In this study I have primarily focused on the trade-offs between irrigation benefits and hydropower 
benefits. The results of the specific simulation described in Section 5.4.1 show how price stability 
controls create lags in the impact of both upward and downward shifts in electricity prices on the 
volumetric water price that irrigators pay. Constraints on efficient water reallocation generate 
social welfare losses regardless of the direction of unrealised transfers. From the perspective of 
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irrigators, however, price stability controls suppressing cheaper water prices is a private loss. In 
the sensitivity analysis of the water demand specification and the irrigation storage buffer, it is 
shown that price stability controls can cause a greater volume of excess irrigation water demand 
relative to the MUC Tariff. This is a perverse outcome: pricing controls intended to benefit 
irrigators can actually undermine their welfare by inefficiently allocating water across time 
periods. Whilst the effect of lagged downward price shifts and the volume of excess water demand 
may depend on the number of periods over which the water price is averaged, these factors 
highlight that price stability controls could actually deliver limited welfare benefits to irrigators in 
some cases. 
(iv) One policy instrument for one policy objective is a useful principle for pricing irrigation 
extractions from multipurpose hydropower reservoirs 
In a review of the limitations of Increasing Block Tariffs for urban water pricing, Young and 
Whittington (2016) cite the work of Tinbergen (1952) to argue that equity objectives should be 
addressed through separate policies. The Tinbergen Principle of one policy instrument for one 
policy objective similarly applies here. I have shown in this Chapter how price stability controls 
are a blunt instrument that inefficiently imposes costs on hydropower operators, society, and, in 
certain situations, does not doing a particularly good job of increasing irrigators welfare under 
water price spikes. A preferable approach would be to complement efficient water tariff design 
with separate measures that address negative impacts on irrigators’ welfare from higher or more 
variable water prices. For example, redistributing part of the additional benefits that the 
hydropower operator receives under the efficient marginal user cost tariff towards: (i) cash 
transfers to farmers when water prices become high, (ii) reductions on the fixed costs of within-
scheme water prices, or (iii) the provision of extension services, finance for regional infrastructure, 
and any other scheme that supports farmers’ welfare and agricultural productivity. Provided these 
measures did not increase irrigation water demand, then water would still be allocated more 
efficiently. Ultimately, water pricing is about the efficient and sustainable provision of a scarce 
resource. Other priorities, such as equity, are just as if not more worthy goals of water policy and 
regulation: the point is that they could and should be addressed through targeted measures that do 
not distort water allocation and generate private and social costs.  
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 4.6. Conclusion 
There is great scope for water pricing to regulate the provision of irrigation water services by 
hydropower reservoirs. But, as in other areas of water management, realising the potential benefits 
of price-based water allocation is contingent on tariff design. In this Chapter, I have shown how 
price stability controls can inefficiently subsidise irrigation water provision, and that these 
subsidies impose private and social costs when hydropower operation is constrained by electricity 
supply obligations. I have also outlined a transparent approach to calculating marginal user cost 
and its incorporation into water tariffs. Both of these contributions provide guidance for future 
applications of water pricing to hydropower governance. 
A number of limitations of this study provide directions for future research. I have not considered 
stochastic or deterministic changes in the cost or penalty of a hydropower operator purchasing 
electricity to meet their supply obligations. Similarly, the specification of the electricity price 
considers only three levels, and there is scope to subject the final electricity price to a random 
shock in the same way that a given weather state can lead to a range of reservoir inflows (see full 
model description in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4). I have assumed that hydroelectricity is sold in a 
forward market while, in practice, hydropower operators derive revenue from spot markets and a 
variety of different products in contract markets. I have used an averaging approach to 
implementing price stability controls because that is the method used in the location to which the 
model is calibrated. Other options to control prices could include caps, floors, or a combination 
thereof in the form of a price collar. I have highlighted that targeted, non-price measures would be 
a more efficient method of supporting irrigators than price controls, but have not modelled a 
specific measure here. All of the above matters warrant further study and consideration for other 
multipurpose hydropower reservoirs and regulatory contexts. Finally, the heuristic I have outlined 
for estimating marginal user cost needs to be adapted and tested for other applications, such as 
urban water provision and within-scheme irrigation water pricing, in order to understand the 
broader utility of the approach. 
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Appendix 5.A1. The Costs of Price Stability Controls Across Simulations 
 
Figure 5.A1. Histogram of the cost of price stability controls from foregone hydropower revenue 
across individual simulations for the primary model.  
 
Figure 5.A2. Histogram of the cost of price stability controls from inefficiently allocating water 
between hydropower and irrigation across individual simulations for the primary model.
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Appendix 5.A2. Complete Results of the Sensitivity Analysis 
Minimum electricity supply requirement 
Alternative specifications of the minimum electricity supply requirement are considered. Table 
5.A1 shows how the results change if the supply obligation is lower (0% and 10%) or higher (50% 
or 70%). Overall, the average costs of price stability controls (i.e. foregone hydropower profits, 
foregone hydroelectricity generation, additional electricity purchases, and foregone total benefits) 
are generally higher (lower) for higher (lower) electricity supply requirements.  
Tariff 
Hydropower Irrigation Total 
Average 
water 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Electricity 
generation 
GWh 
Electricity 
purchases 
GWh 
Average 
NPV of 
cost of 
electricity 
purchases  
$ millions 
Average 
water 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟎𝟎 
SV 499.1 $96.6 946.7 NA NA 266.8 $52.8 $149.4 
PS 509.3 $98.1 966.0 NA NA 257.7 $52.1 $150.0 
MUC 512.2 $98.6 971.6 NA NA 250.9 $51.5 $150.1 
𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎% of 𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 
SV 496.7 $92.9 942.1 73.8 $4.5 266.8 $52.8 $145.4 
PS 503.6 $93.3 955.0 70.9 $4.3 257.7 $52.1 $145.4 
MUC 514.5 $97.4 975.9 59.5 $3.7 238.6 $49.4 $146.8 
Primary model (𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟑𝟑𝟎𝟎% of 𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴)  
SV 474.7 $83.3 900.4 215.5 $12.9 266.8 $52.8 $136.1 
PS 481.0 $84.8 912.4 204.8 $12.3 257.7 $52.1 $136.9 
MUC 492.2 $91.5 933.6 172.9 $10.5 236.4 $49.1 $140.6 
𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟓𝟓𝟎𝟎% of 𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 
SV 489.7 $73.3 928.8 464.4 $27.7 266.8 $52.8 $126.1 
PS 496.0 $70.9 940.8 444.9 $26.8 257.7 $52.1 $123.0 
MUC 520.9 $82.5 988.0 392.0 $23.6 224.6 $47.2 $129.7 
𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 = 𝟕𝟕𝟎𝟎% of 𝒆𝒆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 
SV 502.0 $56.1 952.1 803.6 $48.1 266.8 $52.8 $109.1 
PS 509.2 $58.1 965.9 749.0 $47.2 257.7 $52.1 $110.2 
MUC 543.1 $67.3 1030.2 718.9 $43.2 217.5 $45.9 $113.2 
Table 4.A1. Sensitivity analysis of the minimum electricity supply obligation.  
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Electricity purchase premium and high/medium electricity price level 
Alternatives to the electricity purchase premium are calculated on the basis of the 25th percentile 
(𝜓𝜓 = 1.16) and 75th percentile (𝜓𝜓 = 1.31) for the average percentage difference between the 
monthly peak and average spot price for the Victorian NEM market from 1999-2016. The high 
price level for the original specification used in Chapter 4 (𝐿𝐿ℎ = $67.71) is calculated using long-
term averages. I also consider the highest average wholesale spot market price during Q1 2018 
(𝐿𝐿ℎ = $133.48) and a higher medium electricity price level (𝐿𝐿ℎ = $67.71). 
Tariff 
Hydropower Irrigation Total 
Average 
water 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Electricity 
generation 
GWh 
Electricity 
purchases 
GWh 
Average 
NPV 
electricity 
purchases  
$ millions 
Average 
water 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Primary Model (𝝍𝝍 = 𝟏𝟏.𝟐𝟐𝟕𝟕, 𝑳𝑳𝒉𝒉 = $𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟐.𝟑𝟑𝟏𝟏,𝑳𝑳𝒎𝒎 = $𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒.𝟒𝟒𝟎𝟎) 
SV 474.7 $83.3 900.4 215.5 $12.9 266.8 $52.8 $136.1 
PS 481.0 $84.8 912.4 204.8 $12.3 257.7 $52.1 $136.9 
MUC 492.2 $91.5 933.6 172.9 $10.5 236.4 $49.1 $140.6 
𝝍𝝍 = 𝟏𝟏.𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 
SV 492.8 $85.5 934.7 242.8 $13.4 266.8 $52.8 $138.3 
PS 498.3 $86.8 945.2 229.9 $12.8 258.5 $52.2 $139.0 
MUC 498.8 $90.5 946.1 199.6 $11.1 240.9 $49.9 $140.4 
𝝍𝝍 = 𝟏𝟏.𝟑𝟑𝟏𝟏 
SV 475.7 $85.0 902.3 217.3 $13.4 266.8 $52.8 $137.8 
PS 479.4 $86.6 909.3 202.6 $12.6 257.4 $52.1 $138.7 
MUC 493.4 $91.4 936.0 173.0 $10.8 233.7 $48.8 $140.2 
𝑳𝑳𝒉𝒉 = $𝟏𝟏𝟕𝟕.𝟕𝟕𝟏𝟏 
SV 488.6 $76.3 926.9 263.6 $13.4 279.4 $55.4 $131.8 
PS 492.9 $77.1 935.0 259.1 $13.2 274.6 $55.0 $132.1 
MUC 497.9 $79.6 944.3 230.2 $11.7 255.2 $52.3 $131.9 
𝑳𝑳𝒉𝒉 = $𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟑.𝟒𝟒𝟒𝟒 
SV 471.7 $94.6 894.7 201.4 $13.6 260.0 $50.9 $145.5 
PS 478.7 $97.2 908.0 181.5 $12.5 246.6 $49.9 $147.1 
MUC 495.1 $103.2 939.1 149.6 $10.4 222.1 $46.4 $149.5 
𝑳𝑳𝒎𝒎 = $𝟏𝟏𝟕𝟕.𝟕𝟕𝟏𝟏 
SV 529.3 $99.4 1003.9 243.7 $17.9 233.8 $47.7 $147.1 
PS 535.9 $101.2 1016.5 232.3 $17.2 224.6 $46.9 $148.1 
MUC 549.0 $104.6 1041.3 217.9 $16.3 207.3 $44.0 $148.6 
Table 5.A2. Sensitivity analysis of the electricity purchase price premium and the specification 
of the high and medium electricity price levels. 
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Water demand and irrigation storage buffer 
The scaling parameter of the water demand function (𝛾𝛾) is doubled for all weather/season pairs so that: (i) irrigation water demand is 
doubled for each period of every simulation and, (ii) the irrigation choke volume (𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶) value is doubled. Formally, this means that  
𝛾𝛾 = �𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑛𝑛 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=1,   𝑤𝑤𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑛𝑛 𝛾𝛾𝜙𝜙=2,   𝑤𝑤� =  �952477 746125 503291960030 735314 500033�, 𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 = �𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=1,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=1,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=1,𝑤𝑤𝚤𝚤?̃?𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=2,𝑑𝑑 𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=2,𝑛𝑛 𝚤𝚤̃𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝜙𝜙=2,𝑤𝑤� =  �5274 ML 4131 ML 2787 ML5316 ML 4072 ML 2769 ML� 
Tariff 
Hydropower Irrigation Total 
Average 
water 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ 
millions 
Electricity 
generation 
GWh 
Electricity 
purchases 
GWh 
Average NPV 
of cost of 
electricity 
purchases  
$ millions 
Average 
water 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Excess 
irrigation 
water 
demand  
GL 
Average NPV 
of cost of 
excess water 
demand  
$ millions 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Primary model (𝑺𝑺𝑴𝑴𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 > 𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑺𝑹𝑹) 
SV 474.7 $83.3 900.4 215.5 $12.9 266.8 $52.8 0 Not applicable $136.1 
PS 481.0 $84.8 912.4 204.8 $12.3 257.7 $52.1 0 Not applicable $136.9 
MUC 492.2 $91.5 933.6 172.9 $10.5 236.4 $49.1 0 Not applicable $140.6 
Doubled water demand 
SV 267.0 $78.9 506.5 406.3 $24.0 513.2 $103.8 20.29 $2.1 $182.7 
PS 278.0 $81.0 527.3 397.5 $23.6 499.5 $102.9 15.9 $1.7 $183.9 
MUC 318.6 $92.3 604.3 342.8 $20.2 447.0 $94.4 4.0 $0.3 $186.7 
𝑺𝑺𝑴𝑴𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑺𝑹𝑹 
SV 555.4 $100.5 1053.4 126.3 $6.8 238.2 $48.3 28.6 $5.7 $148.8 
PS 551.7 $101.3 1046.4 113.6 $6.1 233.3 $48.2 24.4 $3.9 $149.5 
MUC 566.7 $103.9 1075.0 108.3 $5.8 223.2 $46.8 19.8 $3.4 $150.8 
Doubled water demand & 𝑺𝑺𝑴𝑴𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 = 𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑺𝑹𝑹 
SV 481.3 $97.3 913.0 279.5 $16.1 372.3 $79.5 158.4 $31.8 $176.8 
PS 489.3 $98.2 928.1 286.5 $16.5 364.8 $78.6 150.5 $25.7 $176.8 
MUC 485.3 $101.3 920.5 266.4 $15.1 359.2 $77.8 114.4 $20.7 $179.0 
Table 5.A3. Sensitivity analysis of water demand and the irrigation storage buffer. 
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Price elasticity of irrigation water demand 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, the price elasticity of demand (𝛼𝛼) defines the slope of the marginal 
benefit function for irrigation water demand. The value used above (𝛼𝛼 = -0.81) implies that the 
demand for water decreases by 0.81% for every 1% increase in price. A lower value (i.e. 𝛼𝛼 = -0.9) 
indicates the marginal benefit function has a flatter slope and lower choke water volume for a 
given weather/season state. Conversely, a higher value (i.e. 𝛼𝛼 = -0.5, -0.7) indicates a steeper slope 
and higher choke volume. These changes affect the volume of irrigation water demand and, 
consequently, the volume of water available for hydroelectricity generation. 
Tariff 
Hydropower Irrigation Total 
Average 
water 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Electricity 
generation 
GWh 
Electricity 
purchases 
GWh 
Average 
NPV of 
cost of 
electricity 
purchases  
$ millions 
Average 
water 
extractions 
GL 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
Average 
NPV 
benefits 
$ millions 
𝜶𝜶 = −𝟎𝟎.𝟓𝟓 
SV 469.0 $86.3 889.7 211.8 $12.7 270.9 $69.7 $156.1 
PS 472.6 $87.3 896.5 206.7 $12.5 265.9 $69.3 $156.6 
MUC 485.7 $91.3 921.2 194.1 $11.8 251.6 $66.0 $157.3 
𝜶𝜶 = −𝟎𝟎.𝟕𝟕 
SV 473.2 $85.5 897.5 216.9 $13.0 268.0 $58.1 $143.6 
PS 495.8 $86.2 940.5 227.8 $13.8 260.4 $57.5 $143.8 
MUC 487.4 $91.6 924.4 176.3 $10.7 241.7 $54.5 $146.0 
𝜶𝜶 = −𝟎𝟎.𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏 (Primary model) 
SV 474.7 $83.3 900.4 215.5 $12.9 266.8 $52.8 $136.1 
PS 481.0 $84.8 912.4 204.8 $12.3 257.7 $52.1 $136.9 
MUC 492.2 $91.5 933.6 172.9 $10.5 236.4 $49.1 $140.6 
𝜶𝜶 = −𝟎𝟎.𝟗𝟗 
SV 475.9 $85.2 902.7 217.5 $13.0 266.0 $48.9 $134.1 
PS 482.7 $86.5 915.6 206.8 $12.5 255.5 $48.1 $134.6 
MUC 495.7 $91.3 940.2 171.5 $10.5 232.2 $45.2 $136.5 
Table 5.A4. Sensitivity analysis of the price elasticity of water demand. 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
6.1. Summary 
This thesis examines the economics and governance of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs from 
macro-level concepts to how research can be incorporated into decision-making and the design of 
a specific regulatory reform. It addresses the following research questions (previously stated in 
Chapter 1): 
a) What hydropower governance reforms could enable multipurpose operations under risks?  
b) How can applied research on water governance reforms be integrated into real-world 
decision-making?  
c) When does water pricing allocate water more efficiently than fixed irrigation quotas 
under risks?  
d) What is the optimal design of irrigation water tariffs for hydropower governance in the 
presence of an electricity supply obligation and electricity price spikes?  
Chapter 2 addresses (a) by proposing three reforms that could enable the sustainable provision of 
water services through dynamic water reallocation: (i) periodic relicensing, (ii) water pricing, and 
(iii) climate/green performance bonds. Chapter 3 addresses (b) by providing insights on the use of 
participatory modelling tools to conduct policy-focused risk assessments, including: the transfer 
of knowledge and information, establishing the credibility of the participatory process, and 
balancing reductionism and completeness. Chapter 4 addresses (c) through hydro-economic 
modelling, finding that water pricing allocates water more efficiently under shifting water demand, 
water scarcity, and level effects in hydroelectricity revenues. On the other hand, fixed quotas may 
be sufficient for multipurpose hydropower regulation where: (i) they provide a central estimate of 
the shifting demand for and opportunity cost of water services; or (ii) they can be updated to reflect 
dynamic changes in the value of water and energy services, e.g. through periodic relicensing. 
Chapter 5 addresses (d) by showing how price stability controls indirectly subsidise irrigation 
water provision and impose private and social costs when the flexibility of hydropower operation 
is constrained by electricity supply obligations. By contrast, a water tariff that incorporates the 
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intertemporal opportunity costs of water services provision allocates water more efficiently and, 
importantly, provides profit-motivated hydropower companies with greater discretion to provide 
water services under electricity market risks.  
The contributions of the thesis to the academic literature include: 
• Demonstrating that the resilience of multipurpose hydropower reservoirs to risks is 
dependent on the capability of water governance instruments to dynamically reallocate 
water; 
• Designing and conducting the first, field-based application of a participatory risk 
assessment process developed by an international network of researchers and practitioners; 
• Conducting the first hydro-economic modelling and analysis of the application of water 
pricing to hydropower regulation; 
• Conducting the first hydro-economic modelling and analysis of alternative water tariff 
designs for hydropower regulation; 
• Developing and demonstrating a heuristic for incorporating marginal user cost into water 
tariffs that is applicable to water management problems where large opportunity costs 
accrue beyond threshold levels of storage. 
6.2. Implications of the Research 
This research reframes the regulation of multipurpose hydropower operations as the resolution of 
trade-offs through dynamic reallocation of water. I show that the shifting values of energy and 
water services mean that hydropower companies require flexible regulation to support the 
resilience of connected water systems. Ultimately, broad-scale shifts in perceptions and 
preferences may be needed for hydropower reservoirs to promote water security, contribute to 
climate change adaptation, and consistently deliver non-energy benefits to societies. Simply 
assuming that built water infrastructure will consistently deliver benefits is a flawed perspective, 
particularly given the complexity and magnitude of the risks emerging from climate change and 
the renewable energy transition. Absent flexible regulation, new multipurpose hydropower 
projects could become sources of instability in social-ecological systems. 
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The vision of sustainable, multipurpose hydropower development may only be realised if profit-
motivated hydropower companies can generate revenue across a portfolio of energy and water 
services. In short, transitioning to being water managers that generate electricity. Financial 
incentives from water pricing could be supported by dynamic operating constraints to provide 
hydropower companies with the discretion to reallocate water for both public and private benefit. 
Implementing these regulatory innovations would require a major cultural change across the 
hydropower industry, water users, and regulatory agencies. And there would be many policy 
design and implementation challenges to overcome. But the necessary change could begin by 
developing and testing the reforms proposed here through participatory research with those 
stakeholders. 
6.3. Future Work 
Each chapter of this thesis provides a summary of limitations and prospects for future work. Here, 
I develop the main ideas further and explain how they could be developed into research projects. 
Climate/green performance bonds for water infrastructure 
Further development of the climate/green performance bonds outlined in Chapter 3 would require 
a number of key research steps. First, a formal mathematical derivation that examines alternative 
design features, such as the variable interest rate being determined by input or output based metrics 
(e.g. the volume of water delivered to farmers versus farmer’s water security), and identifies the 
likely implementation barriers, such as the size of the variable interest rate spread. Second, further 
research into the relevant features of similar financial instruments, including real estate 
performance bonds, index-based weather insurance and climate derivatives, and social impact 
bonds. Third, analysis and classification of the likely types of water infrastructure where 
climate/green performance bonds could be applicable. Fourth, quantitative modelling within a 
stochastic framework would provide insights as to whether bond issuers and investors may see 
merit in using this new type of financial instrument to meet their objectives. And, finally, if the 
refined concept is proven theoretically and through modelling, participatory workshops with 
stakeholders could provide the basis for a pilot application. 
  
Conclusion 
184 | P a g e  
Resilience of a multipurpose hydropower system to droughts 
In Chapter 2, I showed how the resilience of a multipurpose hydropower system can be conceived 
as consisting of: robustness, resistance, and recovery time. Each of these components can be 
measured through hydro-economic modelling. However, the seasonal time step of the modelling 
framework used in Chapters 4 and 5 prevented a detailed resilience-based analysis in this thesis. 
Hence, future work could use a shorter time-step (e.g. weekly or monthly) to assess alternative 
water allocation regimes across these resilience metrics, particularly in terms of recurring droughts 
of different frequency and magnitude. Further, additional water-based services could be 
incorporated into the economic analysis where existing non-market valuation data is available, e.g. 
the economic benefits of recreational reservoir fisheries.  
Enabling the provision of water services from pumped hydropower projects  
The value of energy storage is increasing in many electricity networks as the penetration of 
variable solar and wind generation increases. Pumped hydropower projects provide the capacity 
to store excess electricity and rapidly dispatch electricity to meet rising loads or shortfalls in 
variable generation technologies. In deregulated electricity markets, hydropower companies can 
exploit arbitrage opportunities by pumping water to an upstream reservoir (when electricity prices 
are low) and generating electricity (when prices are high) by releasing water to a downstream 
reservoir. Pumped hydropower could also create opportunities for multipurpose operations and the 
increased provision of water services with no or reduced opportunity cost to hydropower 
companies. For example, downstream reservoirs can provide storage to replicate aspects of natural 
flow regimes or deliver water to irrigation. Fundamentally, the capacity for hydropower companies 
to generate revenues from recycling water raises the prospect of reduced trade-offs between the 
provision of energy and water services. Once again, however, regulation and incentives would be 
needed to realise this potential: pumped hydropower infrastructure, such as an additional dam and 
pumps, are costly. One option could be climate performance bonds that provide concessional 
finance for pumped hydropower projects that is conditional on the provision of additional water 
services. Another option could be a fixed water tariff that water users pay to the hydropower 
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company to partially recover the costs of installing additional infrastructure. These and other 
options can be examined by adapting the hydro-economic modelling framework used in this thesis. 
Participatory modelling for hydropower reforms 
Desktop modelling needs to be connected to actual decision-making processes to influence reform 
agendas. An obvious extension of the current research would be the use of the hydro-economic 
modelling and participatory risk assessment frameworks to inform real-world hydropower 
regulation. For example, the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s relicensing 
processes, the due diligence processes of multilateral banks and other lenders, or voluntary self-
regulation processes, such as the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol. Further, these 
tools could be used in applied research to examine the potential for broader application of water 
pricing to multipurpose hydropower operations. 
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